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ABSTRACT
EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY REVISITED:
INSTITUTIONS, POWER. AND SECURITY
Blagovest Tashev 
Old Dominion University, 2001 
Director: Dr. Donald J. Zeigler
Drawing on the literatures on democratization, security studies, and small states 
this dissertation explores the relationship o f small states’ domestic and international 
institutionalization and their security. Small states have limited power not only to affect 
their environment but also to guarantee national security. Small states, it is hypothesized, 
enhance their security through the consolidation of domestic institutions and the 
accumulation of capacities provided by their participation in capacity-reach international 
institutions.
The dissertation tests the hypothesis by applying the comparative method to the 
post-communist states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three case 
studies analyze the effects of domestic institution-building and integration in international 
institutions on the security of each state. The study analyzes the policies that the three 
states applied in the last ten years after the collapse of communism, which led to a 
profound transformation of their national security.
The most important finding of this dissertation is that the security of each o f the 
states was determined not only by external factors, traditionally identified by realist 
approaches, but also by domestic factors. States that were able to quickly consolidate 
their political institutions were able to achieve not only a greater degree of integration in 
international institutions but also a greater level of security. Hence, states' attempts to 
enhance their security should not only seek formal alliances and integration in powerful
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
international institutions but also a domestic institutional strength that would enable the 
state to achieve a further international integration and a greater capacity to address what 
the population perceives as security threats, both domestic and external. Thus, the 
security of small states is best achieved not only by attaining traditional security 
guarantees, i.e. alliances, but also by strengthening domestic institutions.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In a threat-rich environment, the security o f a small state is a function of the 
capacities of the state. The capacities of the state, in turn, depend on the strength of the 
domestic institutions and the capacities the state can derive and utilize from capacity-rich 
international institutions. The stronger the small state in terms of the level of 
institutionalization o f domestic institutions, and the higher the level of integration of the 
state in a stable, highly integrated, and capacity-rich core of states, the more secure the 
small state.
After regaining freedom to participate actively in international relations, the states 
of Eastern Europe embarked on a difficult process o f a profound political, economic, and 
social transformation. This process is taking place within a security void. Having lost the 
security guarantees provided by the Soviet Union, the small states of the region found 
themselves dangerously exposed to both external and internal security challenges and 
risks. The requirements of political and socio-economic transition challenged the ability 
of the states to respond to the growing demands o f a newly mobilized domestic public 
and individuals. Externally, restive diaspora, past unsettled scores among neighbors, 
regional conflicts, and an unpredictable, yet always threatening-looking Russia, 
heightened the perception of security threats in the states of the region. Most of them 
were quick to seek deep integration in West European and Atlantic institutions, some of 
which posses supranational functions. This process indicates that rather than seek 
complete autonomy o f action. East European states opted to face challenges and threats
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of the Chicago 
Manual o f Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
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by partially surrendering their sovereignty and autonomy in a larger institutional context. 
O f course, security is not the only national concern prompting this process. It is also 
motivated by the states’ attempts to define their identities in a new polity. This foreign 
policy seems to be defined as much by societal preferences as by the structure of the 
European international system.
The struggle for power as a means o f achieving security is still an enduring 
characteristic of international politics. According to realism, the dominant school of 
international relations, states, regardless o f their size, address security challenges through 
the accumulation o f power. What is different about power at the end o f the 20lh century, 
however, is its nature and sources. Yet, realism fails to provide a comprehensive 
framework for the study of how small states address the new type of challenges to their 
security. While big states still can face security threats through enhancing their military 
power, small states are forced to look for other sources of power and security.
Thus there emerge questions pertaining to the security of East European countries 
under post-Cold W ar conditions. How does one account for the ability o f Eastern 
European states to face challenges, indeed, to ensure their security? Is security a function 
of the state's ability to withstand external threats through military force? Or does it 
depend on the capacity to keep its citizens content and its society cohesive? What are the 
sources of security in Eastern European countries after the Cold War?
Historically, security threats to East European states have derived from the 
region’s geostrategic position between powerful and expansionist empires: Russia and 
later the Soviet Union in the east, the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey in the south, and 
Germany and Austria in the west. The region’s geostrategic vulnerability was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3exacerbated by its states’ political, economic, and social backwardness.’ Furthermore, 
situated at the junction o f  major foreign empires. Eastern Europe had an explosive mix of 
nations exposing militant nationalism which often threatened both neighbors and its own 
ethnic groups. In this environment, international relations in the region were 
characterized by great-power rivalry for domination over the states, realpolitik, and 
balance o f power. Eastern Europe has traditionally been what Martin W ight called a 
“buffer zone:” a group o f  weak states between stronger powers which try to deny 
domination over the states to their rivals.' In these conditions. East European states had 
little room for maneuvering and their security options were extremely limited.
After the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the states of Eastern Europe 
regained their independence and became active participants in international politics. Most 
of them, however, were quick to seek deep integration in West European and Atlantic 
institutions. This seems to suggest that rather than seek complete autonomy of action 
after freeing themselves from hegemonic domination. East European states prefer to face 
external challenges by partially surrendering their autonomy within a larger institutional 
context. This foreign policy orientation seems to be as much a national choice based on a 
traditional quest for security as it is a result o f the structure o f the international system.
The main point here is that changes in the international system increased the freedom of 
choice of the small states; their behavior is not tied to the realist notions o f balancing and 
bandwagoning to the same extent as was evident during the Cold War.
’Daniel Chirot, ed.. Origins o f  Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and  
Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University o f 
California Press, 1989).
'M artin Wight, Power Politics (London: Penguin. 1979), 160-1.
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4With the decline of direct military threats, alliances and other tools became less 
appropriate responses to security problems, which are mainly related to internal 
capacities and international vulnerabilities and instabilities. National coherence and 
international stability are increasingly important requirements for national security. 
Although security still remains a function o f  power one needs to look at the non- 
traditional ingredients that define its nature rather than merely its military, economic and 
other more readily quantifiable, and already extensively analyzed, elements.
Allan C. Lambom writes that “much of what is traditionally meant by power does 
involve the government’s capability to mobilize resources.'0  The state has an interest in 
increasing its revenues, which enables it to address both domestic demands for resources, 
and international challenges and requirements. In the early European experience the 
search for security prompted states to build administrations and institutions capable of 
extracting resources needed to enhance the states’ power.4 Power then meant military 
power capable of resisting foreign and domestic challenges and enlarging the state’s 
territorial possessions. On the eve of the 21st century, however, only a small fraction of 
the resources extracted by the state goes to sustaining its military power. Yet, in the 
international context, the states need resources to alleviate international pressures 
stemming from balance o f payment deficits, external debt and adjustments to structural 
changes in the global economy.
O f course, one might point out that the globalization o f  politics and economics 
places severe constraints on the autonomy of state choices and actions and thus
Alan C. Lambom, “Power and the Politics of Extraction,” International Studies 
Quarterly 27, no. 2 (June 1983). 126.
4Charles Tilly, ed.. The Formation o f  Nation-States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1975).
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5circumscribes state power. International trade and finances, the argument goes, have 
grown explosively. Economic booms and recessions spread more rapidly from country to 
country. Interest rates in one country affect rates in others. Those chances have crippled 
the ability of national governments to decide their interest rates, exchange rates, and trade 
policies. Economic integration and competition have rendered governments impotent in 
their traditional tasks of guaranteeing economic and social benefits to citizens.
However appealing this reasoning might be, it fails to appreciate the still 
considerable, if not growing, power o f the state. Regardless of growing integration, 
national governments have increased the extent to which they control resources. In fact 
since 1980 the public spending ratio has increased from 36 percent of the GDP to 40 
percent.3 It is true, however, that integration and globalization have increased the 
intensity and severity of long existing constraints on government policies. Global markets 
have shortened the distance between an event and its consequences, and denied 
governments room for maneuvering and vital time to adopt policies to respond. States 
must often react in a crisis-like environment wherein time for response is short, the threat 
to national economy and well-being is apparent, and instruments for dealing with these 
crises are limited.
It is hard to account for these conflicting portraits of the power and autonomy of 
the state in the post-Cold W ar conditions o f globalization as states operate in two 
intersecting arenas. In the first arena governments interact with foreign leaders, 
international organizations, international corporations, and transnational actors. The 
second arena encompasses the domestic sphere: states exert authority over society and 
interact with its institutions, leaders, and the public in general.
3“The Myth of the Powerless State," The Economist (7 O ctober, 1995), 15.
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6In such an environment, small and fragile post-communist democracies face 
especially grave risks. Transition to a free market requires embracing the rules and 
principles of the world economy, including exposure to highly competitive economic 
pressures. The restructuring o f economies often involves borrowing from international 
institutions or financial markets which, in turn, comes with the commitment to meet 
financial obligations. A lag in economic modernization, lack of competitive practices, 
and, very often, outright inept leadership turns the conditions of globalization into 
challenges to the stability o f  transition countries. According to the stated objective of 
joining European and Atlantic institutions, most post-communist countries adopted 
reforms that required the complete alteration of the way the states participate in the global 
economy.
The external challenges to the ability o f post-communist countries to integrate 
into the European and Atlantic institutions are not. however, the only tests that confront 
them. The goal of building market-based democracies requires domestic reforms that 
alter the ways the states extract and redistribute scarce resources. Concurrently, states 
come under pressure from multiple demands for democratization, resources, and values. 
Different, often opposing, interests challenge the state's capacity to satisfy expanding 
demands and test the state's ability to resolve conflicts peacefully. The politicization of 
social forces, or what Samuel Huntington calls praetorian politics, exposes the 
weaknesses o f political institutions to mediate and moderate political action.6 Trade 
unions, ethnic groups, political parties and social groups confront each other in the 
absence of an established institutional framework capable of channeling high levels of
6Samuel S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 194-98.
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political participation and demands. Thus the stability, indeed, sometimes the survival of 
the state hinges on its capacity to create institutions and procedures which channel 
domestic political action and respond to demands from within and without. In other 
words, the security o f  the state depends to a large extent on the political capacity of the 
state.
The Security o f  Sm all States in Eastern Europe
After the C old War, critical perspectives shifted security analysis toward a more 
inclusive framework by questioning the dichotomous. zero-sum thinking o f realism. The 
changing nature o f the state, particularly its conspicuously diminishing ability to address 
traditional and non-traditional threats, prompts a redefinition of security concepts and 
fundamental assumptions about the nature o f international conflict. This dissertation, 
while recognizing the problematique of various security conceptions, utilizes the state as 
the major unit of analysis, though not the single unit of analysis. The variables included 
in the study pertain to the state as well as to societal structures. This approach is based on 
the assumption that some of the threats to national security emanate not only from outside 
but also from within states. Kalevi Holsti goes even further by questioning the 
assumption that the problem of war is primarily a problem of relations between states. 
“Security between states,” he argues, “... has become increasingly dependent upon 
security within states ... The problem of contemporary and future politics, it turns out. is 
essentially a problem of domestic politics.”7 A comprehensive analysis o f international
?Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State o f  War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1996), 21.
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8security must, therefore, include international, national and societal dimensions that to 
various degrees affect security on both the national and international levels.
The validity o f many critiques of a state-centric vision and traditional definitions 
of security does not, however, eliminate the need for analyzing the state sources of 
security and threats. Evidence of the state’s inability to respond to challenges and threats 
is not proof of the existence of an alternative political entity better suited to address them. 
Weakened, inadequate, and sometimes impotent, the state still remains a strong player, 
and therefore a legitimate unit of analysis. In addition, in contrast to the industrialized 
world where under the conditions o f globalization the traditional state may have given 
way to the “virtual state,” societies, which have yet to fully embrace liberal democratic 
practices and market economy, lack the essential social, economic, and political 
capacities and therefore rely on state-driven transitions. Such states still seem 
unchallenged by other political organizations in their ability to mobilize and redistribute 
resources and manage social and political conflicts. Similarly, the state in Eastern Europe 
is widely expected to provide security to individuals, groups, nation, and borders.
States in post-communist transition are not immune to the larger processes 
affecting the rest of the world. Deep political and economic crises in Russia in the 
summer of 1998 led to the downgrading of Central Europe’s GDP forecasts, despite the 
low trade turnout between the two regions. The economic crisis led to generally negative 
sentiments of portfolio investors toward emerging markets, irrespective of the 
discrepancy of the economic performance between Russia and Central Europe.8 This is
8Kelvin Done. “Central Europe: Region’s Growth Forecasts Revised Down.” The 
Financial Times (28 August, 1998). Available from http://www.ft.com; INTERNET.
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9indicative of Eastern Europe’s newly found exposure to international challenges which is 
in marked contrast to its Cold War insulation.
In addition to their recently gained international autonomy, the states of Eastern 
Europe embarked on a transition to democracy and a market economy in a security 
environment profoundly altered by the end of the Cold War. However, the manner in 
which the new environment affects the security of the post-communist countries has not 
been systematically investigated.
One of the explanations for the lack of comprehensive insights into the security of 
the Eastern European countries is that realism -the dominant school o f political thought- 
has been fixated with the study o f great powers. The problem of war and security in the 
theoretical literature on international relations has been characterized as essentially a 
great power phenomenon. In addition, realism 's preoccupation with sta te 's  survival fails 
to provide an agenda for the study o f small states.9 Ever since Annette Baker Fox's The 
Power o f  Small States, seen as the main inspiration for the security-oriented small state 
approach, realist studies have attempted to explain the resilience of small states despite 
the lack of military capabilities.10 Thus, following the realist logic for all Eastern 
European states, preservation of the country is supposedly their main foreign policy
9For definitions of the small state concept see Robert Rothstein L., Alliances and 
Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29: David Vital, Inequality 
o f States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 8; Peter R. Baehr. “Small States: A 
Toll of Analysis?” World Politics 27, no. 3 (April 1975): 456-66.
l0Annette B. Fox, The Power o f  Small States: Diplomacy in World War II 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959). For a short history of the small state 
approach, see Wilhelm Christmas-Moller, “Some Thoughts on the Scientific 
Applicability of the Small State Concept: A Research History and a Discussion,” in 
Otmar Holl. ed.. Small States in Europe and Dependence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1983): 35-53.
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objective. Yet currently most o f  these states’ sovereignty is not contested by any power in 
the European system.
Lack of realists' interest in the small state security problem has an even more 
fundamental explanation. Realists, and especially neorealists, while explicit that domestic 
variables are outside their subject foci, recognize that there exists a particular relationship 
between the systemic and domestic. Kenneth Waltz argues that the international 
environment “can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by 
the system of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the 
units of the system will respond to these pressures and possibilities.” 11 The international 
structure constrains and conditions behavior but ultimately it is domestic actors who must 
assess domestic and international conditions and requirements and implement policies 
necessary for their survival. “Each state,” Waltz asserts, “arrives at policies and decides 
on action according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very 
presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.” 12 Indeed, the constraints 
explain the similarities of behavior by states with comparable positions of power w ithin 
the system, but fail to account for their behavioral differences. States vary in their 
domestic structure and policies and therefore address the challenges of the international 
environment in different ways. “To explain the expected differences in national 
responses, a theory would have to show how the different internal structures of states 
affect their external policies and actions.” 13 Neorealism, however, has confined itself to
11 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, PA: Addison- 
Wesley. 1979), 71.
'“Ibid.. 65.
' ’Ibid., 122-23.
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the study o f environment as a primary determinant of state behavior, since the structure 
of the international system cannot be reduced to variables in its component units.
Systemic liberalism, on the other hand, is commonly seen as more hospitable to 
domestic level variables. Jenifer Sterling-Folker summarizes the difference between 
liberalism and realism in their treatment of state behavior as the “disagreement over 
whether process or environment is a primary determinant for actor interest and 
behavior.” 14 Bureaucracies, elections, political parties, and interest groups are essentially 
multiple processes and commonly thought to fit the process-based theory of liberalism. 
Sterling-Faulkner. however, faults liberalism in failing to treat these as independent 
variables and instead renders them as dependent variables in order to claim that systemic 
processes have an impact on domestic actors. Alternatively, she asserts that “the 
combination o f environment and process means that the systemic and domestic can act as 
simultaneous independent variables in the realist argument.”
For structural realists, the process serves the function of ensuring state survival. 
Ultimately, it is domestic actors, however, who recognize threats, assess their extent and 
formulate policies to achieve security. While the environment stimulates the drive for 
survival and security, it is the domestic process that accounts for the particular state 
behavior. In order to explain varied state responses of similarly situated actors, realism 
needs to incorporate process-based theorizing. In fact, systematic approaches to bridge 
the gap between international politics and comparative politics are already emerging. The 
first is based on the logic of two-level games as originally advanced by Robert Putnam .13
l4Jenifer Sterling-Folker, “ Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic- 
Level Variables.” International Studies Quarterly 41, no.l (March 1997), 22.
l5Robert D. Putnam. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level 
Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60. See also Peter B.
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National leaders, while seeking deals with their international partners, must ensure the 
acceptance of such agreements by relevant domestic actors. Another approach bridging 
the gap between domestic politics and international relations is provided by the concept 
of domestication of the international system: the process by which the international 
system becomes less anarchic and more rule-governed. This process is not simply 
integration among states based on interdependence, but more on “structural merger of the 
constituting principles, that is, their constitutions.” 16 No doubt, the large literature on 
European integration best represents such an approach.
Theoretical problems with the study of small state security were compounded by 
the lack of agreement on the analytical usefulness o f the small state concept.17 Due to its 
dominant position in the field of international relations theory, the American scholarly 
community declared small state approaches irrelevant to the understanding of world 
politics. By the mid 1970’s small state studies became rare. Realist and neorealist 
approaches have made only cursory references to the security of the small states in the 
framework of the great power politics. Hans Morgenthau, for example, stresses that “the 
protection of the right of a weak nation that is threatened by a strong one is then 
determined by a balance of power as it operates in that particular situation ... the small
Evans. Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993).
l6For a discussion of attempts to breach the gap between international relations 
and comparative politics see, James A. Caporaso. “Across the Great Divide: Integrating 
Comparative and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 
(December 1997): 563-92.
l7See Baehr.
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nation must look for the protection of its rights to the assistance of powerful friends."1* 
Realism generally treats the security and survival o f small states as achievable only 
through system wide measures, i.e., balance o f power, rather than enhancing national 
power. Even then small states can preserve independence only if great powers consider 
this in their own interest. The end o f the Cold War, however, once again revived the 
interests in small states as they became free to pursue independent foreign policies.
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the security o f small states. The analysis 
is grounded in the realist perspective and joins the debate on the changing nature of 
security in the post-Cold W ar era. The end of rigid bipolarity enabled small states to gain 
more freedom of action in their quest to guarantee national security. The changed 
environment gives even more credibility to voluntarism as a mode of thought in realism - 
the belief that decision makers have effective choice and ability to affect outcom es.19 
Thus, the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe represent an excellent test ground 
to analyze the security o f small states. All countries shared common experience in terms 
of political and constitutional system, were subordinated to the Soviet Union, and 
enjoyed the same security arrangements. Following the end of communism, facing new 
structural constraints and conditions domestic actors initiated assessments of internal and 
international conditions in order to formulate and implement new policies and strategics 
for national security. The post-communist period presented conditions for the empirical 
study of the internal processes which account for behavioral similarities and differences
18Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
1964). 295.
19For a recent exam ple of the voluntarist conception grounded in the realist 
tradition see Henry Kissinger, Does America N eed a Foreign Policy ? Toward a 
Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster. 2001).
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among countries with comparable position in the international system. In the post­
communist decade Eastern European countries achieved different levels of security and 
experienced different security dynamics for which external factors account only partially. 
Obviously, internal factors and processes, too, affected external policies and actions. 
Having lost long-existing security arrangements, the states made deliberate choices based 
on assessment of internal and external factors that resulted in different security outcomes.
This dissertation utilizes the insights provided by major bodies of literature on 
small states, security, realism, and democratization to explore the security of small states. 
For this purpose, the study uses the cases of three post-communist states including 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three countries started to formulate 
new security policies at the same time and achieved different levels o f security. The 
dissertation chooses three transition countries as the dynamic political, social, and 
economic transformation enables the analysts to identify empirically the variations in 
domestic and international processes and factors that determine differences in security 
outcomes. The study attempts to join the recent efforts in bridging the gap between the 
systemic approach o f realism and domestic level variables and providing a systemic 
approach for the study o f small state security.
This study contends that the security of the small state is a function of its power. 
The power of a small state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state's 
capabilities and the distribution of capabilities in the subsystem of which the state is a 
member. In order to better understand the security and power of small states, the study 
will explore two sources o f state power—the capabilities of national institutions and the 
capabilities the state can derive from its membership in core international institutions.
The stronger the state in terms of the level of institutionalization o f domestic institutions.
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and the higher the level of integration o f the state in a stable and highly integrated core of 
states, the more secure the state. In other words, the security of small East European 
states is to a great extent a function of the degree of institutionalization of domestic 
institutions and the levels of political, social, and economic integration in Western 
institutions. Domestic and international institutions are two major sources of a small 
state’s power in the modem international system.
Content o f  the Study
The dissertation explores the relationship between a small state's domestic 
institutionalization and integration in international institutions and the ability of the state 
to ensure its national security. The study investigates the ability of small states in the 
process o f profound political, economic, and social reforms to guarantee their security. 
More specifically, the study focuses on states in Eastern Europe which faced a 
fundamentally transformed security environment and which sought to attain security 
while transforming their regimes’ type.
Chapter II explores the current theoretical debate over the changing nature of 
security. The discussion sets the stage for understanding the process of reevaluation and 
the reconceptualization of security in the three states during the post-communist 
transition. The first section surveys the theoretical state o f the field in the context of the 
recent attempts to redefine the concept. The next section describes the theoretical context 
in which the debate on the security concept takes place including the debate over the 
changing role of the state and the transformation of state sovereignty. The next section 
surveys the state of literature on East European security after the Cold War. It identifies
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the major approach used in the literature to the study o f security in the region and the lack 
of systemic and theoretical approaches to the study o f  the subject.
Chapter III describes the dissertation’s theoretical model, which draws on existing 
theory. This chapter builds a theoretical argument that can be summed up as follows. The 
security of a small state is a function o f its power. In contrast to the past, however, the 
power of the small state is not determined exclusively by its military power and 
participation in a military alliance but rather by the strength of its domestic institutions 
and the capacities the state can utilize from international institutions, which possess 
ample military, political and economic capacities. In other words, the security of a small 
state depends on the strength of its domestic institutions and the capacities derived from 
international institutions.
The following section identifies the two independent variables including domestic 
institutionalization and international integration. It also identifies the dependent variable 
security. The next section operationalizes the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. Drawing on the large body of democratization literature, the first independent 
variable, domestic institutionalization, will be measured by the analysis of five factors, or 
variables, which account for the degree of institutional strength.
The next section describes the second independent variable, international 
integration. The operationalization o f this variable is based on the organizing concept of 
core-periphery interaction. The concept places states on a core-periphery continuum, 
from belonging to the core to having no relationship with the core. The core represents a 
stable group of states organized in an institutional framework possessing great military, 
political and economic powers which provides, among other things, a high level of 
security to its members against internal and external threats. This section provides an
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empirical method o f identifying the state's place on the core-periphery continuum, which 
provides a corresponding set of power capabilities to the state. According to the adopted 
theoretical model and consistent with the realist approach, the state’s relative power 
capabilities depend not only on the state’s absolute capabilities derived from the state’s 
specific place on the core-periphery continuum but also on the distribution of capabilities 
derived from the core in the state's regional environment. Just as neorealism 
distinguishes between capabilities as actor’s attributes and the distribution of capabilities 
as a structural com ponent, this dissertation defines a set of core-periphery interactions as 
an attribute and the distribution o f core-periphery interaction in the subsystem as its 
structural component. For this purpose the theoretical model distinguishes between the 
interaction of the state with the core—designated as flow in this study—and the 
distribution of the interactions of the state’s neighbors with the core—called stock. In 
other words, the sta te 's  capabilities derived from the core is the flow, and the distribution 
of capabilities derived from the states in the regional environment is the state's stock. The 
state’s flow is measured by the level o f integration in international institutions 
representing the core states and the amount of economic interaction, including trade and 
investments, between the state and the core. The state’s stock is measured by gauging the 
neighboring states’ integration in the core, including their membership in the core’s 
institutions.
The next section o f the chapter defines and operationalizes the dependent 
variable, national security. The discussion builds on the contemporary debate over the 
changing nature o f security. Accordingly, the theoretical model adopts a more inclusive 
definition of security, which goes beyond the traditional conceptualization of security as 
freedom from military threats and instead incorporates additional elements, including
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internal security and societal security. Security is seen as both an objective state and as a 
matter of official and popular perceptions. The last section o f the chapter describes the 
methodology including the three case studies and the criteria for their selections.
The following three chapters are case studies of domestic institutionalization and 
international integration and their effects on security. Chapter IV, drawing on the rich 
body of empirical studies on the post-communist transition in Eastern Europe, evaluates 
the degree of domestic institutionalization in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania 
as measured by the five factors associated with institutional strength. A separate section 
is devoted to each country. Based on the discussion in previous sections, the final section 
provides a comparison o f domestic institutionalization by ranking the three countries on 
an ordinal scale.
Chapter V evaluates the degree o f international integration with the European 
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of each of the three 
states. The first section describes the decision of the European Union to integrate East 
European countries and the process to achieve this goal. The next section provides an 
overview of the emergence of NATO as the only robust security institution in post-Cold 
War Europe and its expansion to the East.
The next section o f Chapter V sheds light on the three countries’ attempts to join 
the EU. It evaluates the states’ degree o f integration in the Union by identifying the 
phases each country has gone through in the process of joining the institution. For this 
purpose. Chapter V draws on documents produced by the Union, which evaluate the 
countries’ progress in meeting membership criteria. In addition, the chapter identifies 
important Union decisions to begin new phases in the negotiations with each country as 
evidence o f the country’s degree of integration in the institution. The next section traces
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the three countries’ degree of integration with NATO. It traces the phases o f each 
country’s process of increasing interaction with the Alliance and the transformation of its 
military structure to meet the membership criteria.
The next section evaluates the economic transactions between each country and 
the core countries. For this purpose, the section analyzes the trade flow between each 
state and the EU using trade statistics. Another section gauges the level of integration by 
estimating each state’s foreign direct investment originating in the EU.
Another section in Chapter V evaluates each state’s stock. For this purpose the 
section provides estimates of the neighboring states’ integration in the core based on their 
relationships with the EU and NATO. The relationships range from membership to 
adversarial relations. The section also includes evaluation of public and official support 
for integration in the EU and NATO.
Based on the discussion in the previous sections, the last section of the chapter 
provides a comparison of international integration in the core among the three countries. 
Separate figures compare the three states' flows and stock by placing them on ordinal 
scales. The higher the values o f the country’s flow and stock, the higher the country's 
degree of integration in the core.
Chapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate 
sections are devoted to each o f the three states. Each section surveys the objective 
security of each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the evolution o f the 
official conceptualization of national security and the evolution of popular perceptions of 
security. The last section of Chapter VI provides a comparison of the degrees o f national 
security placing the countries on ordinal scale from most secure to least secure. The three
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cases are ranked by summing up the three values assigned for objective security, official 
perception of security and popular perception of security.
Chapter VII summarizes the main findings o f the dissertation. It also joins two 
major debates—the sources of security in Eastern Europe and the security o f small states. 
The first debate is rather limited both in its theoretical scope and depth, and empirical 
range. The current literature on East European security is devoted mainly to the 
discussion of policy issues including the proposed NATO enlargement, interstate 
relations and their effects on international politics, and ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, 
security is conceptualized in traditional terms and participation in military alliances is 
assumed to provide the answer to security threats and risks. When the contributions to 
this literature, firmly grounded in the neorealist tradition of international relations, 
provide analyses of the domestic politics in the countries of Eastern Europe the authors 
see various factors not as variables in the theoretical model to explain the security of the 
countries but rather as factors which either facilitate or inhibit the countries' ability to 
join Euro-Atlantic institutions which would enhance national security. Invariably, the 
studies either propose policies that would accelerate the process of NATO expansion, or 
more rarely, warn about the policy implications of incorporating rather diverse societies— 
with deep political and ethnic divisions and economic problem s-into already strained 
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The other body of literature, which focuses on the security of the small state, is 
written mostly from a realist perspective and defines security as a function of power 
relations among the great pow ers-or less frequently, among the dominate regional 
players. Thus the security of small states is determined by exogenous factors and very 
little is attributed to the independent action of national decision makers. While providing
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empirical evidence of varying outcomes resulting from specific choices, the studies 
investigating the decision-making process within the state almost always point to the 
limitations imposed by the states’ small size and little power. This neorealist approach to 
the study of small states, however, is limited in its explanatory pow er when applied to 
security in the post-Cold W ar period. The final chapter of this dissertation attempts to 
contribute to the literature on small state security by focusing on the significant effect of 
preferences and choices on the security of the state. The end o f the rigid bipolarity of the 
Cold War provided decision makers with greater room to maneuver and thus there 
emerged a need to investigate what within the state determines its foreign policy choices 
and what are the internal sources o f security.
The last chapter also deals with another weakness of the traditional neorealist 
approach as applied to small states—the little attention paid to internal factors as 
determinants o f security. Thus the role of domestic institutions as an element of power is 
an often ignored variable in the existing literature. The last chapter addresses this 
shortcoming by identifying ways to include national institutions in a modified realist 
approach to the study of small states’ security. One o f the most important findings of this 
study is that security policies are influenced not only by the international environment 
and context but also by domestic politics and more specifically by institutional processes. 
Thus, international actors interested in enhancing the security o f small states should focus 
their efforts not only at providing external guarantees to national security but also at 
strengthening national institutions. In fact, powerful national institutions will provide 
security in the long run as international security institutions are structurally limited in 
their ability to address the new security threats and risks. Furthermore, the expectations 
and security perceptions of populations relate to the functions o f national institutions as
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CHAPTER II 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON STATE SECURITY
The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, it describes the current theoretical 
debate over the changing nature o f security and the role of the state and state sovereignty 
in the post-Cold War environment. The first section surveys the state of the field in the 
context of recent attempts to redefine the concept. It sheds light on the theoretical 
attempts that reflect empirically identifiable processes of reconceptualization of security 
underway in the international system. The second section places the debate in the context 
o f recent attempts to redefine the functions and place of the nation-state in the 
international system. Second, the chapter surveys the literature on East European security 
after the Cold War and identifies the dominant theoretical approach used in the stuffy of 
the subject.
The Literature on Security
Since the end of the Cold W ar scholars have advocated the need for a broader 
concept of security. In the post-W orld W ar II period, security was seen as the absence of 
military threat. Now, however, a broader definition must incorporate political, economic, 
environmental, societal, and military security.1 The broader concept takes into account 
the multidimensional character of security threats and enables the analysts to turn to the 
most threatening problem in each area. Even those who find the state as an adequate unit
'Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in 
International Relations (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1983).
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of analysis argue for a position that views security as a holistic concept that breaks the 
confines of the realist framework with its military and power orientations.2
To be sure, basic differences about the security paradigm have long existed. 
Thucydides, John Hobbes, Nicolo Machiavelli. Emmanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius. in 
specific historical settings, outlined the main tenets of future concepts of security. 
According to realists, the nation-state system, not unlike the pre-state chaos described by 
Hobbes, lacks common rules and institutions of law enforcement.3 War and the pursuit of 
power are the primary means to ensure national security and survival.
Hugo Grotius, the precursor of modem liberalism in international politics, 
challenged the Hobbesian view of the world by contending that states are limited in their 
struggle with each other by common rules and institutions. To Grotius. values and norms, 
particularly ones that are codified in international law, are important in maintaining order 
and security among states. Grotians, like Hobbesians, accept the state-centric vision of 
the international system, but contend that rules, norms, and laws and institutions 
significantly modify state behavior.4
'K en Booth. “Security and Emancipation." Review o f  International Studies 17, no.
4 (October 1991). 313-26.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, The Matter, Forme, and Power o f a Common­
wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1965).
■^ The English School and pluralists owe much to Grotius’ study of norms and 
laws. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds.. International 
Relations Theory Today (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1995); 
Barry Buzan. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism 
and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” International Organization 47, no. 3 
(Summer 1983): 327-52; Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones. The Logic o f  
Anarchs: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993)
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Against the Hobbesian realist image. Emmanuel Kant proposes a vision of 
perpetual peace—an enlightened political order forged by a community of humankind.
The modem liberal tradition-inspired by the Kantian belief in republicanism, federalism, 
and global citizenship—not unlike Hobbes, accepts the state-centric vision of the 
international system, but contends that reason and moral commitments of individuals can 
subsume narrow national interests.
The debate about security after the Cold W ar has led to different interpretations of 
the meaning and nature o f the concept. Some authors have attempted to broaden the 
neorealist conception o f security to incorporate a wider range of threats, including 
economic, environmental, migration, and human rights issues.3 Richard Ullman suggests 
a definition of security that includes threats to quality of life and the range of policy 
choices available to both governmental and non-governmental entities. Jessica Mathews 
argues that the definition should include demographic, environmental and sustainable 
development issues. Others have attempted to shift the debate from its state-centric focus 
to the level of international, global, regional, societal, and individual security as well as 
state security.6
3Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 
(Spring 1989): 162-77; Brad Roberts. “Human Rights and International Security," 
Washington Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 65-75: Myron Weiner. “Security.
Stability and International Migration,” International Security 17. no. 3 (W inter 1992-93): 
91-126; Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security." International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer
1983): 129-53.
6Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Studies in 
the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester W hcatsheaf. 1991); Ole Wacver. Barry 
Buzan, Morton Kelstrup, and Pierre Lcmaitre. Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); J. Ann Tickner, Gender and International 
Relations: Feminist Perspective and Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992); Barry Buzan, Ole W aever and J. de Wilde. Security: A New  
Framework fo r  Analysis (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
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O f course, challenges to the traditional approaches to security studies are not new; 
a large body of literature on European integration has generated propositions that hard­
core security problems can be partially resolved or mitigated by non-military approaches. 
Integration theories first developed by David Mitrany, Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch 
emphasize the effect of interdependence, political choice, and supranational institutions 
on national and international security.7 While the realists view international interaction as 
basically a zero-sum game, integrationists claim that interaction can be turned into a 
posilive-sum game in which there are mutual benefits to be gained. In fact, the early 
proponents of integration theory recognize the difficulty which security dilemmas and 
threats pose to cooperation. What distinguishes them from realists, however, is their 
effort not toward understanding conflict among states but toward defining the conditions 
and processes which lead to cooperation. In fact, making a realistic assessment of 
international politics, integrationists, particularly Haas, emphasize that political elites 
must perceive cooperative behavior to be in their rational self-interest.
What non-realist attempts have in common is their criticism of the state-centric 
orientation of neorealist perspectives. They question whether the state can be an adequate 
provider of security when security is defined in terms o f economic, cultural, and 
ecological as well as politico-military terms. Most critics of neorealism agree that
7See Karl Deutsch, ed.. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957); David Mitrany, “The Prospect o f Integration: Federal or 
Functional?” in Joseph S. Nye, ed.. International Regionalism: Readings (Boston: Little. 
Brown & Co., 1968); Emst B. Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1968).
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policies intended to ensure security at all levels require a fundamental revisiting of 
traditional concepts and theories associated with thinking about security.8
One common criticism leveled at attempts to expand the security agenda or the 
levels on which security is analyzed points to their failure to explain how the newly 
emerging issues or levels o f analysis are to be brought together. Keith Krause notes that 
the “new thinking on security” fails to confront the ontological underpinnings of the 
traditional concept of security and does not provide a new analytical core to the concept.9 
In fact, lack of a clearly defined concept of security, he argues, prevents many authors 
from distinguishing between “threats" and “problems” and thus overloading analytical 
frameworks. More often, however, authors implicitly accept the traditional concept of 
security by conceding that an issue becomes a threat when “it feeds into process that can 
lead to violent conflict.”
David Baldwin argues that the problem of defining security after the Cold War is 
even more significant than the perceived lack of a widely accepted concept. Reviewing 
the state of security studies as an academic field. Baldwin finds that most efforts to define 
security are. in fact, more concerned with defining policy agendas of nation-states while 
little attention is devoted to clarifying the meaning of security.10 Consequently, security 
appears to be “a confused or inadequately explicated concept." To be sure, this 
shortcoming is endemic not only to recent attempts at conceptualization but also to
8See R. B. J. W alker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles fo r  a Just World Peace 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988). See also Booth: Booth and Smith.
'Keith Krause, “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the Third World” in 
the Post-Cold W ar W orld,” Review o f  International Studies 24. no. I (January 1998): 
125-36.
l0David A. Baldwin, “The Concept o f Security,” Review o f  International Studies 
23, no. I (Winter 1997): 5-26.
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neorealism, the theory o f international politics which posits security as one of the primary 
motivations of nation-states. Neorealism limits the object o f study by constricting the 
range of relevant theories applied to understand security, and normatively. limits itself to 
national security.11 Instead, Baldwin proposes that students of security need to address 
the concept by specifying its problematic. Basic questions such as “what is security?”; 
“security for whom?”; “security for which values ?” ; “from what threats ?”; etc., need to 
be addressed in order to conceptualize security. Others, too, point out that the field 
suffers not only from the absence of a common understanding o f what security is. but 
also what its most relevant research questions are.12
Attempts o f critical perspectives to broaden the agenda of security studies are 
viewed from the neorealist perspective as making the field theoretically ineffectual. 
Alternative approaches are seen as providing no clear explanatory framework, which is 
most clearly reflected in the lack of concomitant empirical research. In the neorealist 
account, the field is about “the study of the threat, use. and control of military force...."1 ’ 
The state-centered orientation of the field is reflected in the conceptualization of security 
as state security, threat as the military force applied by the state, and the state as the 
unchallenged political authority in world politics. Accordingly, recent security studies in
MSee Edward A. Kolodzicj, “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!” 
International Studies Quarterly 36. no. 4 (December 1992): 421-38.
'"See Helga Haftendom, “The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline- 
Building in International Security," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. I (March 
1991): 3-17; As early as 1962 Arnold Wolfers cautioned that national security “may not 
have any precise meaning at all.” See, Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: 
Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1962), 147.
1 Stephen M. Walt, ‘T he  Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies 
Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1991), 212.
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the neorealist field have remained in the more traditional state-centric framework to 
advance historically tested approaches to addressing security issues.14
Most o f the students of security came to embrace the neorealist perspective as the 
only approach to offer a systematic way to investigate the subject. The dominance of the 
neorealist perspective rests on the confidence that the field has evolved into a scientific 
discipline which involves few foundational assumptions and generates empirically 
testable hypotheses. Of these, the existence o f foundational assumptions in the neorealist 
perspective is central to the claim to scientific knowledge. Indeed, realists and neorealists 
might disagree on whether the sources of insecurity are exogenous or indigenous to the 
state but both agree that, under the conditions of anarchy—which is another foundational 
c laim -it is the interaction of states that gives rise to it. Thus, the assumption that the state 
is the subject of security conditions dominates the discipline and precludes the 
introduction of more inclusive conceptions of security. Grounded in a number of 
assumptions about the reality of international politics, the neorealist security perspective 
can reject alternative approaches, which attempt to bring new issues into the security 
agenda as not meeting the expectations about what observable facts represent threats and 
insecurities.
An important reevaluation of the concept o f security from a neorealist 
perspective, which attempts to go beyond this state-centric focus, is Barry Buzan's 
People, States and  Fear. Buzan broadens the definition of security to include freedom
14Ibid.; See also John Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, 
no. I (Summer 1995): 82-93; Charles Kupchan and Cliford Kupchan, "Concerts, 
Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16, no. I (Summer
1991), 114-61; Henry Kissinger, "Balance of Power Sustained,” in Graham T. Allison 
and Gregory F. Treverton, eds.. Rethinking America ’.v Security: Beyond Cold War to New 
World Order (S e w  York: W. W. Norton, 1992).
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from military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats. Security is 
examined from the perspectives of the state and the international system as well as of the 
individuals. Yet, according to Buzan, the state remains the most important provider of 
security. The evolution toward “strong states,” he argues, will result in a greater degree of 
security to the individuals as well as the society. International security, on its part, can be 
attained through the conjunction of the strong-state evolution and the move toward what 
he calls “mature anarchy.”
The Broader Debate
These and other attempts revisiting the concept o f security reflect a broader 
debate on the nature o f the state after the Cold War. New approaches challenge the 
traditional realist-neorealist-neoliberal debate in international relations.13 The 
proliferation of international institutions and regimes, the growing inability of nation­
states to respond to increasing public demands from within, and inability of states to 
unilaterally face the challenges of globalization and interdependence have challenged the 
accepted concepts of sovereignty and state. Views range from the spirited defense of the 
tenacious principle of sovereignty and the power of the states16 to the insistence that
l3David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1993); Robert O. Kcohane, ed., 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1986); Kenneth
Waltz, ‘T he Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 
2 (Fall 1993): 44-79: Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of
Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
l6John Mearsheimer. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War.” International Security 15. no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.
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markets have overtaken the states.17 In between, there is a growing body of literature 
which investigates the broad transformation of sovereignty and power of the nation­
states. Rather than see the state as withering away, this approach claims that, as a political 
organization, the nation-state is adjusting to the changing conditions in the global system. 
The spiraling growth of financial transactions and the free flow of capital and labor have 
created what Richard Rosecrance calls the “virtual state,” a political unit with a 
transformed concept of sovereignty.18
The large body of literature on European integration, too, points to the divergent 
processes of integration and disintegration, which transfer authority from nation-states to 
sub-national and supranational political units. In a related process, relations between 
industrial democracies have com e to rest on consensus rather than force. Undoubtedly, 
the major powers are today less inclined to resort to force to resolve their differences.
It seems only natural that the dominant tradition in security studies, neorealism, 
has a difficult time addressing the question of how the transformed international security 
environment would affect the various aspects of state structure and its nature in general. 
There is no realist theory o f the state and domestic institutions, merely simplified 
assumptions about them. The state is seen as a constant; the post-Cold War context might 
have altered the behavior o f states, but its core structures, functions and goals remain 
unchanged.
l7See Immanuel W allerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the 
Changing World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Susan Strange. 
States and Markets: An Introduction to Political Economy (London: Frances Pinter,
1988): Susan Strange, The Retreat o f  the State: The Diffusion o f  Power in the World 
Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
l8Richard Rosecrance. ‘T h e  Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4
(July/August 1996): 45-61; See also Richard Rosecrance. The Rise o f  the Trading State: 
Commerce and Conquest in the M odem  World (New York: Basic Books. 1986).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
There are two groups of literatures on the state that speculate about the effect of 
the changing international security environment on the nature of the state.''' Authors such 
as Michael Mann insist that despite the dramatic changes brought about by the Cold W ar’ 
end. states will remain essentially unchanged in scope and cohesion."() States need to 
facilitate domestic political, economic, and social functions such as redistribution tasks or 
mobilization for collective action, regardless of the international context.
The other group o f theories, on the other hand, maintains that the changed 
security environment challenges the cohesion, and in some cases the viability, of certain 
states. According to this reasoning, threats are crucial in the creation, consolidation and 
continued cohesion of political entities. This argument is based on the assumptions that 
threats and wars expand the scope o f  states and that without threats some states would 
collapse under the strains of fractured and polarized societies. For scholars such as 
Charles Tilly, it is the competition for power between states that provide impetus for 
state-building. As Tilly puts it, “war makes states.” The process of state formation in 
Europe was protracted and violent; it resulted in vastly strengthened state structures.21 
Thus, the end of the Cold War would have a dramatic effect on the scope and cohesion of 
states, especially weak ones.
This group of theories brings about an important point with relevance to security. 
In contrast to neorealism’s external security orientations, this approach defines security in
' 'For a discussion see Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and 
Weak States?” International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 237-68.
‘"Michael Mann, “Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, 
Developing, not Dying,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 115-40.
2lSee Tilly; See also Charles Tilly, “War-Making as Organized Crime” in Peter 
Evans. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 169-91.
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relation to both internal and external threats. Mohammed Ayoob observes that the 
explanatory power of the neorealist concept has been vastly reduced when applied to 
Third World states.22 While the long consolidation of states in the West created strong 
institutions and loyal citizenry and eliminated the domestic security dimension, most of 
the non-Westem states still face significant internal threats. In fact, in some parts of the 
world, threats to security are almost exclusively domestic in their origin. Third World 
countries emerged in a state system in which the principle o f territorial inviolability 
ensured their survival as international subjects, yet their fractured societies and politics 
challenge the survival of the state as a political unit.2-’ Paradoxically, it is the lack of 
challenging external environment during state-formation that accounts for the fragile state 
structure in most of the non-Westem world.24 Authors such as Buzan and Holsti advance 
even further the connection between national security and state strength by arguing that 
in the post-Cold War environment it is the strong-weak state variable that accounts for 
international security. To Buzan, the evolution to “strong states” in conjunction with a 
move toward “mature anarchy” would result in greater international security. Holsti sees 
the problem of international security as determined by domestic politics.-3
Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, 
Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
2 ,See Krause.
-4See Jeffrey Herbst, “W ar and the State in Africa,” International Securitx 14. no.
4 (Spring 1990): 117-39.
23See Holsti.
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The Literature on East European Security
This study will attempt to make a contribution to a small body o f literature on the 
post-Cold War Eastern European security. The size o f the literature notwithstanding, ten 
years of a fundamentally altered security environment has yet to translate into a rich body 
of empirical and theoretical accumulation. The very few works on the region's security 
have not produced a deep understanding of the subject as they confined their analytical 
focus on a variety o f real and potential threats and risks, political and military variables 
associated with traditional security considerations, and recommendations and options 
related to practical foreign policy objectives. This state o f the field comes as no surprise 
given that during the Cold War. at least on the part of American foreign policy, there was 
no autonomous policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe; they represented but an 
element in the more significant policy toward the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, much 
of the literature dealing with security is devoted to “rediscovering” much of the 
countries' cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds, an exercise which in 
itself discerns the unstable, fluid, and dynamic character of the security environment in 
the region.
As far as Eastern European security, the literature may be divided into two main 
groups, the first of which deals with traditional hard-core security issues. The second, 
vastly richer one, while not directly discussing security, focuses on problems, including 
political change, institution building, market reform, and political culture, which have a 
direct effect on it. In other words, previous studies have concentrated on either traditional 
politico-military factors of security or the nonmilitary factors of transition in Eastern 
Europe. This study will attempt to bring together some o f the findings and concepts o f the
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two bodies of literature; it will combine some of their themes and subjects, and integrate 
them against the backdrop of the current debate over the changing nature o f security and 
threat in world politics.
Only a handful o f works systematically analyze the changing security 
environment in Eastern Europe. Most of the investigations provide policy studies o f the 
states' foreign policy objectives and behavior, and abound in practical recommendations 
to both the West and the East concerning the states’ proclaimed objective o f “joining the 
West.”26 Policy oriented works focus on the challenges to the region by identifying the 
main risks and threats, both within and outside the countries. Frequently, past historical 
experience and patterns o f politics are used as a significant indicator of potential future 
security problems and conflicts.
Very few studies have ventured to theorize and empirically explore the security in 
the region, within the context of the wider debate on the transformation of the security 
environment. Usually, the problematique o f security in the region is seen as determined 
by the collapse of the regional hegemon rather than as conditioned by the global 
processes, which alter the nature of sovereignty, nation-state, and national and 
international security. In one rare attempt, John Lampe and Daniel Nelson provide a 
framework for the study of East European security, taking into consideration the
' 6 Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f  East Central Europe 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: 
Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Andrew 
Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary in Search o f  Security (New York: St. Martin Press, 1995); Stephen F. 
Larrabee, East European Security After the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1993); Steven L. Burg, War or Peace? Nationalism, Democracy, and  
American Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Europe (New York: New York University 
Press, 1996); David G. Haglund, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 1994).
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changing nature o f threats and security.27 The complexity and dynamic of the concept of 
security in the region stems as much from global, political, social and geopolitical 
processes as from the history and recent experience of Eastern Europe. In the book, the 
problem of security is related to democratization, market and political change.
In another attempt, Richard Smoke edited a volume on public and expert 
perceptions o f security in Eastern Europe. This work, written from a Eastern European 
perspective, lays out some very interesting—although given the unexplored status of the 
subject, still tentative—observations. These observations include the convergence of 
security perceptions held by the public and security experts, and the presence of relatively 
intense perceptions o f insecurity despite the lack o f clearly identifiable threats. Perhaps 
the most significant observations reached by some of the authors is that despite the 
existence o f a real security vacuum in the region and the intensity of perceptions of 
insecurity, the situation is not perceived to be critical, as the emergence and enlargement 
of European and Atlantic structures (NATO. EU, Partnership for Peace, Council of 
Europe) are minimizing the negative effects o f a security void.28
The literature on political and social transformation in Eastern Europe, while not 
directly discussing international security in the region, contains insights about the 
countries’ perspective on stable and peaceful development. A rich edited piece by 
Beverly Crawford, though not directly discussing security and institutionalization in 
Eastern Europe, contains a few chapters in which the authors are quite skeptical about the
-7John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson in collaboration with Ronald Schonfcld. 
eds.. East European Security Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press and Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1993).
Richard Smoke, ed., Perceptions o f  Security: Public Opinion and Expert 
Assessment in Europe's New Democracies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996).
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future o f the region’s security and stability.2*’ With the development o f capitalism and 
liberal institutions in Western Europe. Eastern Europe became a peripheral region, a 
status which created institutional, economic and social obstacles to reform. In another 
thorough and ambitious study of the most troubled region of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, 
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott provided a systemic and cross-country comparison of 
political change in post-communist states.30 While not directly addressing the problem of 
security, the various essays provide a rich catalog of security threats and risks and their 
effect on institution building and politics under the conditions of social and political 
transformation. This study is so far unrivaled in its systematic approach to the problem of 
transition in this part o f Eastern Europe. In another edited volume, both authors, applying 
the same approach, focus on similar processes in East-Central Europe. ’’
" ’Beverly Crawford, ed.. Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy 
o f Post-Communist Transformation (Boulder. CO: Westview. 1995).
30Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds.. Politics, Power, and the Struggle fo r  
Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
’'Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The Consolidation o f  Democracy in 
East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN
Chapter III describes the theoretical model that will be used in the dissertation. 
The first section discusses the dissertation’s hypothesis. The next two sections describe 
the two independent variables-dom estic institutionalization and international integration. 
The following section discusses the dependent variable—national security. The final 
section describes the methodology—the three case studies used and the criteria for their 
selection.
Hypothesis
This dissertation explores the relationship of the small state’s power and its 
security. The hypothesis can be summed up as follows. The security o f a small state is 
determined by its power. In contrast to the past, however, the power o f a small state is not 
determined exclusively by its military power and participation in a military alliance, but 
rather by the strength o f its domestic institutions and the capacities the state can utilize 
from international institutions, which possess ample military, political and economic 
capacities. In other words, the security o f a small state depends on the strength of its 
domestic institutions and the capacities derived from international institutions.
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Independent Variable I: National Capacity as Measured by Domestic Institutionalization
Robert Jackman proposes a definition and measurement of national political 
capacity conceived in terms of institutional capacity and legitimacy.1 Jackman and 
Kenneth Bollen2 argue for separating questions of stability from questions of democracy 
on the grounds that each concept represents a distinctive phenomenon. Stability can be 
seen as reflecting the political capacity in a sense that is independent o f  regime type. 
Their emphasis on political capacity built upon already existing studies examining the 
social and political conditions associated with the stability of democratic societies. The 
problem of political capacity was most thoroughly treated by Samuel Huntington, who 
argued that institutionalization is the key ingredient to political capacity. ’
After making the distinction between force and power, Jackman defined political 
capacity in terms of institutions that are sustained by legitimacy. Institutions reflect the 
structures necessary for the exercise of power, which assumes a degree o f continuity and 
regularity in the relationship between the participants. But these structures must also be 
seen as legitimate: that is, consent must be attained. Given that legitimization is an 
ongoing process, political capacity is never an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but rather a 
matter of degree.
A central feature of these forms is that they take considerable time to develop, 
which immediately draws attention to the age of institutions. Jackman's analysis of
'Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New 
York: Wilcy-Interscience, 1975).
2Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘issues in the Comparative Measurement o f Democracy,” 
American Sociological Review  45, no. 3 (June 1980): 370-90.
’Huntington, Political Order.
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national political institutions accordingly focuses on their age, conceived in both 
chronological and generational terms. With age com es the formalization of routines, and 
the goal becomes organizational survival. By increasing the adaptability of institutions, 
age increases the probability o f survival. While age increases the odds of survival, it is 
hardly a sufficient factor for the success of institutions. Thus it is reasonable to assume 
that those with a relatively strong pre-communist democratic tradition would have an 
advantage over states establishing democratic institutions for the first time.
Traditions always seem to be present in any assessment o f democratic transitions’ 
chances of success. Yet some authors question the invariable effect of the past on 
contemporary transitions. For example, Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart focus on 
the possibility of overcoming the Leninist legacy through what they call “the imperatives 
of liberalism.”4 They argue that “new institutions can be crafted and new international 
pressures can be brought to bear that shut out the negative influences of the past." Indeed 
a substantial part of the democratization literature focuses on the elites' strategic 
interactions and choices in crafting institutions and procedures. Newly created 
institutions are often the result o f the domestic balance of political forces, expectations 
about the future, and compromise rather than long held liberal principles and memories of 
a democratic past. Crawford and Lipjhart, trying to reconcile the historical determinism 
approach and recent democratization literature, argue that the immediate context of 
norms, institutions, and international pressures shapes the particular way that legacies 
influence outcomes. Therefore, it can be contended that while age increases the odds of
4Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, “Explaining Political and Economic 
Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic 
Norms, and International Pressures,” Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2 (July 1995), 
187.
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institutional survival, it hardly precludes extinction; issues o f legitimacy therefore need to 
be addressed explicitly. Drawing on a distinction between power and force, a regime is 
legitimate when it can resolve problems by exercising power without resorting to force or 
provoking a forceful challenge.
Rigid historical determinism is also challenged by sociology’s institutionalism. 
Formal bureaucratic structures did not spread as a result o f their functional virtues as 
efficient coordinators of complex relationships but because the wider environment 
supports and legitimizes rational bureaucracy as a social good. Organizations exist, 
proliferate, and have the form they do not necessarily because they are efficient, but 
because they are externally legitimated.5
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell have a slightly different take on the 
capacities of political systems. Instead of capacities they speak of capabilities of political 
systems.6 The capability approach attempts to understand the performance of the political 
system in its domestic and international environments by introducing the notions of 
extractive, regulative, symbolic, responsive, and international capabilities.
Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, while analyzing the correlation between the size 
of the state and democracy, implicitly investigate the relationship of small states' national 
capacities and threat abatement.7 The authors ask the question: Can a small country
5W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer and Associates, eds., Institutional 
Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism  (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994). See also, John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan 
“Institutionalized Organizations; Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American 
Journal o f  Sociology 83, no. 2 (September 1977); 340-63.
6Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A 
Development Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 190-213.
7Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1973).
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maintain its independence as well as a large country? First it must be observed that Dahl 
and Tufte do not identify a single dimension of size. Instead, population, area, and 
density as well as socio-economic variables are adopted as indicators of size.
Furthermore, when dealing with the capacities of political systems the socio-economic 
variables are gauged, for, the authors argue, a nation’s capacity for survival and 
autonomy depends on the size o f its wealth, skilled workers, etc., rather than on the size 
o f its population and territory.
Neorealists, too, include political capacity among the factors, which determine the 
state’s power. According to Kenneth Waltz, the place of the state in the international 
system depends on how it ranks in terms of size of population and territory, resource 
endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.8 
He goes on further to argue that states are highly ranked not because they excel in one 
way or another. O f course, we have to acknowledge that neorealist assumptions and 
prescriptions pertain to great powers rather than small states.
For the purpose of this study, states will be placed on a continuum of strength. As 
Kalevi Holsti defines it. “ ... state strength ... is not measured in military strength. It is. 
rather, in the capacity o f the state to command loyalty—the right to rule—to extract 
resources necessary to  rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of 
sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, 
and to operate within the context of a consensus-based political community.”<) This 
conception of state strength goes beyond the traditional focus on institutionalization, 
capabilities for extraction of resources, and autonomy. These are important but
8Waltz, Theory, 131.
'^Holsti, 82-83.
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insufficient variables in determining the strength of states. What Holsti suggests is that “It 
is in the realm of ideas and sentiments that the fate of the state is primarily determined.” 10 
He proposes that in addition to the instrumental capacities o f the state one needs to 
analyze legitimacy, both horizontal and vertical, as another measurement o f state’s 
strength. Vertical legitimacy deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the ideas of 
state; horizontal legitimacy deals with the definition and political role of com munity."
In order to operationalize the variable “domestic institutionalization” the study 
will investigate five factors that are commonly seen by most students of political systems 
as the variables determining the degree o f institutionalization. According to the field of 
study or personal preferences, these variables are seen as determining the strength, 
power, capability, or capacity o f the institutional system. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, these five factors are seen as determining the level of domestic 
institutionalization which partially accounts for the state’s power.
Two-turnover test. One criterion for measuring institutionalization in transition 
states is the two-turnover test. A political system can be viewed as consolidated if the 
party takes power in the initial election at the time of transition, loses a subsequent 
election and peacefully turns power to those election winners, and if these election 
winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners o f a later election.12
Of course, one might argue that the two-tumover test is an unclear indicator of 
political institutionalization as elections in transition democracies are marked by a high
,0Ibid„ 84.
"Ibid. 108
1'Samuel S. Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 266-67.
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level of electoral volatility.1 ’ If a great percentage o f voters change their voter 
preferences, political leaders might come to believe that they can achieve either total or 
overwhelming electoral victory over their opponents. Thus electoral volatility may not be 
conducive to moderation and political compromise. On the other hand, low volatility 
should encourage less confrontational politics among the elite. A study by Gabor Toka, 
however, persuasively argues that a high electoral volatility in Central Europe in the mid- 
1990s has not prevented the consolidation of democratic regimes.14
Initial agreement among all sectors o f society' on the fundamental rules o f  the 
political game. In his discussion of democratic consolidation. Giuseppe Di Palma warns 
that “time alone—a number of elections or parliaments, or other supposedly significant 
institutional occurrences—is insufficient to advance consolidation: for example, elections 
and parliaments themselves come under attack."13 Instead, his main argument emphasizes 
the significance of “outlying in advance of the rules o f the game—the norms, procedures, 
institutions whose operation should affect a fair balance o f winning and losing."16 In this 
initial phase of a transition to a pluralistic political system, diverse political players agree 
upon clear, workable rules to which contending political players can commit themselves 
and ensure restraint, mutual security, and a nonviolent exit from authoritarian rule. As Di 
Palma cautions, however, the negotiations of these rules must involve all relevant
1 ’Electoral volatility (or net volatility) is defined as half the sum of the absolute 
value of the differences between the vote of each party in two consecutive elections.
l4Gabor Toka, “Political Parties in East Central Europe," in Larry Diamond, Marc 
F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds.. Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997): 93-134.
l3Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 143.
,6lbid„ 44.
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political players, or at least must be drawn with an eye on them, lest in the future the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of newly formed institutions and the rules of their crafting 
are challenged. Therefore, agreement on the rules of the game requires more than a 
majority. Instead it necessitates a broad, early consensus involving almost all relevant 
political players. It must be noted that this initial agreement is not about formal 
institutions, constitutions, separation of power, or the nature o f the emerging regime. 
Rather, it is about basic rules guiding players’ behavior and ensuring their security in a 
fluid political environment where processes have uncertain outcomes.
It seems to follow from these considerations that the consolidation of institutions 
in the transition countries of Eastern Europe depended on the speedy adoption of basic 
rules according to which political conflicts are carried out. Indeed, the new democracies 
became involved in the turbulent process o f rule making in areas such as division of 
powers between president and parliament, minority rights, multiparty systems, civil- 
military relations, and market economies. The process of rule making was carried out 
under the conditions of specific cost-benefit calculations, which made them vulnerable to 
challenges when, subsequently, payoffs did not satisfy various groups. This phase of the 
transition, also known as extrication, is seen by many authors as a crucial explanatory 
variable for the institutional outcomes and future political development.17 Initial 
institutional choices are not easily altered and have clear implications for the fate of the 
new polity. In any event, it is expected that after the initial phase of institution setting- 
building consensus on the ends—the polity would move to political struggle over the
17Some authors offer typologies o f modes of extrication. See Samuel S. 
Huntington. “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (Fall
1992): 579-616; Terry Linn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter. "Modes of Transition in 
Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” Journal o f  International Affairs 45, no. I 
(W inter 1991): 269-84.
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means. In other words, groups move from the uncertain and volatile fundamental politics 
to the certain (as far as the security of groups and players) instrumental politics.
The dominance o f instrumental rather than fundamental politics—consensus on 
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. A well-institutionalized society is one in 
which the constitutional order according to which political conflicts are carried out are 
not themselves the object of political struggle. Once the rules o f  the game have been 
established in the initial transition period, politics lose their confrontational character and 
become merely competitive. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrih Preuss distinguish between 
distributional and constitutional conflicts. Distributional conflicts relate to divisible 
goods, thus easily accessible to bargaining within an established framework of bargaining 
procedures and rules.18 Constitutional conflicts are about the basic norms and 
fundamental institutions of the political order, including the rules about competing for 
and exercising of political power. In other words, constitutional conflicts pertain to 
ideological conflicts in which, although actors do not fear for their survival, political 
interactions are seen as a zero-sum game. Conflicts between political actors espousing 
competing ideologies are not easily reconciled as they see each other as mutually 
threatening. Each of them questions the legitimacy of its opponent and sees itself as 
better off if the opponent were defeated.
The completion of transition from fundamental politics to instrumental politics, in 
other words, from constitutional to distributional conflicts, marks the routinization and
18' Elster and his associates also define another category, categorical conflicts, 
which involves conflicts about social belonging and identity. Examples of this category 
are ethnic and religious conflicts. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank 
Boenker, Ulrike Goetting, and Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional Design in Post- 
Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 147.
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consolidation of political institutions. Politics becomes the process o f competitive 
selection of sets of policies rather than about the struggle between various ideologies 
espousing different ideas about political and social order.
Writing about post-communist political elites, John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel 
make a similar argument by identifying a normative and interactive dimension in elite 
co h esiv en ess.T h e  normative dimension is the extent of shared beliefs and values 
among the elite, as well as informal norms pertaining to political access, competition, and 
restrained partisanship. The interactive dimension is the extent of inclusive channels and 
networks through which elite members, political parties and groups obtain access to the 
political decision-making processes.
Inclusiveness o f  political society—the degree o f  participation o f  diverse social and  
ethnic groups. Political institutionalization is based, among other things, on the 
fundamental rule that no group in a society is excluded from seeking political power and 
participation. In the countries o f Eastern Europe the end of communism led to an 
explosion of participation and political mobilization. The emerging institutions had a 
difficult time channeling multiple demands and expectations from a suddenly empowered 
public. In this initial phase of transition, the main challenge to the emerging institutions 
was posed by the lack of clearly defined and constantly shifting functions, authority, 
resources, and even legitimacy. Once established, however, one of the main challenges 
comes from particular groups and interests. In the post-communist societies the initial 
phase of transition witnessed the differentiations and aggregation of diverse interests and 
groups ending the preceding dominance of the conflict between the extricating elite and
10John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites A fter State Socialism  (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 2.
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reform elite. The outcome is contingent on the capacity of the institutions to absorb new 
groups, and the receptivity o f  the groups to the institutions. If the institutions fail by 
design or default to incorporate newly mobilized groups, there emerges a serious 
challenge to the stability o f the institutions and the functioning of the institutional 
arrangement. It might be hypothesized that what worked in the institutions' favor, in 
terms of fending off challenges arising from newly emerging groups, is the relative 
weakness of those groups in terms o f organizational depth, ideological clarity, and 
functional skills. Although the disintegration of communist regimes brought about an 
explosion of political mobilization, it also exposed the weakness of diverse groups to 
formulate and channel interests and demands into a political program and action. In other 
words, groups needed time to build their identity in order to assert themselves politically.
Among the newly mobilized segments in the transition societies, ethnic groups 
already possessed distinct and identifiable interests and demands. Having distinct 
identities and interests, often predating the establishment of communist regimes, placed 
them into the fore of political conflicts and issues to be addressed in the transition. 
Negotiating elites had to reconcile the often conflicting concerns o f building functioning 
institutions which ensure the interests and security of diverse groups, on the one hand, 
and the traditional—and often supported by the society at large-exclusion of ethnic 
minorities policies, on the other. Ethnically exclusive arrangements in crafting the new 
institutions led to the most disruptive consequences in transition societies. The price o f 
ethnic exclusion was not sim ply the failure of various institutions but, in its extreme, the 
compromised territorial integrity of the state.
High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedurals norms o f  the 
state's constitutional system. In the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe one o f
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the most important problems of institutionalization is the extent and degree of public 
acceptance of, and commitment to, the newly emerging and transforming institutions.
The institutional framework of new regimes can consolidate only if a large majority of 
the public supports it.20 At bottom, consolidation of the existing regime can be construed 
as the process of achieving broad and sustainable legitimization: the belief among 
relevant political actors and the mass populace that the current regime is the best one 
among various alternatives.21 On the mass level, there must be a broad consensus on the 
legitimacy of the constitutional regime, regardless of its immediate political, economic, 
and social performance. Therefore, disengagement of legitimacy from the short-term 
performance of the regim e requires nothing short from a transformation of political 
culture. In this process, the commitment to the constitutional regime, the rules of the 
game, and the procedural norms of the political process become routine and political 
players and the masses do not question and challenge the established order.22 In other 
words, citizens develop loyalty to the regime by deepening their normative and 
behavioral commitments to the specific rules and norms o f the constitutional system.
Legitimacy is shaped by a wide range of historical, cultural, and performance 
variables, which affect the normative and behavioral commitments to the constitutional 
order. In the nascent democracies of Eastern Europe the political, social, and especially
"°Larry Diamond argues that consolidation is indicated when at least two-thirds of 
citizens believe that democracy is the best form of government for their country at their 
time. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999). 68
2lIbid., 65.
Writing about democracy as a form o f political organization. Dankwart Rustow 
calls this process of transformation, “habituation.” Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to 
Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 337-63.
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economic performance of the regime took on special significance as one o f the immediate 
problems the emerging institutions encountered was the entrenched cynicism and distrust 
of state and political institutions, a consequence of decades o f communist rule. 
Historically, regimes which fail to deliver on citizens’ expectations are unable to gain 
legitimacy in the long run. Indeed there is a reciprocal relationship between legitimacy 
and regime performance. The regime performance is a crucial intervening variable 
affecting the internalization of beliefs, commitments that sustain legitimacy. At the same 
time, if the regime enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, its institutions and political actors 
can negotiate, design, and implement efficacious policies. Effective policies enhance the 
individual political, social, and material benefits provided to the citizenry and thus 
strengthen the regime legitimacy.
One, however, should not exaggerate the effect of regime performance on 
legitimacy. As noted above, legitimacy is shaped by a wide variety of factors, and the 
more these factors produce legitimacy, the less significant the impact of regime 
performance on the consolidation of the emerging institutional framework. Thus, 
populations with a political culture, history, and prior experience which generate 
commitments to democracy might be wiling to accept a short-term political and economic 
“under-performance” of the regime without seriously questioning the political and 
constitutional order.
It follows from these considerations that one would expect to find in Eastern 
Europe a co-variation of public perceptions o f the regime’s political and economic 
performance, while the legitimacy of democracy as a political form varies somewhat 
independently. In other words, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of
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the political system reflect partisanship and attitudes towards governments, while the 
legitimacy of democracy is autonom ous.2"
Independent variable II: Level o f  International Institutionalization
In the last decades the grow ing proliferation of transnational interactions and 
increasing dominance o f economic as opposed to military concerns, along with the 
growth of highly integrated international institutions, have made synergistic strategies 
more prevalent and essential to national and international governance. Certainly, the 
significance of international variables that affect national institutions and national 
developments, and the linkage between national and international systems, has long been 
recognized.24 Later, ample literature explored the interaction between domestic, foreign 
policy, and international negotiations. Putnam, for example, argues that the politics of 
many international negotiations can be treated as two level gam es.'3
In his overview of the crisis o f  authoritarianism, Lucian Pye saw the sovereignty 
of the regime as being critically underm ined by the increasing flow of international 
finance, trade, communications and technologies.J ' Similarly, it is now widely accepted 
among students of democratization that external factors played a decisive role in the
~3For a comprehensive study see Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian 
Haerpfcr, Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
' 4James N. Rosenau. Linkage Politics: Essays in the Convergence o f  National and  
International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
' 3See Putnam.
“6Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism.”
American Political Science Review  84, no. 1 (March 1990): 3-19.
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regime change in Eastern Europe.27 W hile Western Europe had a substantial contribution 
to democratization in Southern Europe, particularly in the consolidation phase, in no 
other part of the world as in Eastern Europe did one witness the almost complete 
withdrawal of one superpower and the radical reorientation of states in terms of 
ideological principles, institutional objectives and social and economic transactions with 
the rest of the world. External factors seem to be one of the decisive sets o f reasons for 
the East European change, causing the initial impetus for regime transformation and 
conditioning the subsequent democratic consolidation.28 The reason for the initial 
"opening" of the regimes was external, due to the reluctance of the Soviet Union to keep 
its empire intact at any cost. The ideas underpinning the emerging regimes were derived 
from the Western tradition. Additionally, the massive support in creating the democratic 
institutional framework and alleviating the shock of economic transition came from the 
West. Not unlike the South European experience, along with the process of 
democratization Eastern Europe embarked on the process of joining various European 
and Atlantic institutions, which provided W est Europe with even further influence in the 
region. In fact, even before the outset of democratization. East European countries were 
what James Rosenau refers to as “a penetrated system ... in which non-members of a
*7Archie Brown, "Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism." 
paper presented at the 3 P ‘ National Convention of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Slavic Studies, St. Louis. Missouri, on 18-21 November 1999.
" 'X“  Jeoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, George Sandford, Building Democracy? The 
International Dimension o f  the Democratization in Eastern Europe (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994); Laurence Whitehead, "Democracy and Decolonization: East- 
Central Europe," in Laurence Whitehead, ed., The International Dimension o f  
Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996): 
356-91: Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner, ‘The Interaction Between Internal and 
External Agency in Post-Communist Transitions," in Karen Dawisha, ed.. The 
International Dimension o f  Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States o f  
Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 1997), 407.
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national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with 
the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values o r the mobilization o f support 
on behalf o f its goals.” involving a certain “fusion of national and international systems 
in certain kinds of issues-areas.”29
The international environment, along with providing the incentive for regime 
transformation, posed numerous novel challenges to the security of post-communist 
states. Therefore, East European states were faced with the task of accessing threats and 
designing policies to guarantee their ability to ensure their basic security needs. This 
requirement also represents a major challenge to security studies to provide understating 
of the region's security in a systematic way. Neorealism would point us in the direction 
of measuring the state's capacity to influence and control the shaping of events within a 
specific international context. However, the application of this statement to the analysis 
of East European states' security is obviously problematic. As stated above, neorealism 
applies to great powers and its assumptions and prescriptions for small states give little as 
a basis for investigation. In addition, most o f the realist research on the behavior of small 
states, which the East European countries certainly are, was done in the context of the 
Cold War and thus provides insights into their behavior under conditions of bipolarity. 
During the Cold War, small states tended to confirm neorealist notions that systemic 
constraints accounted for small states’ compliance with the will of the respective bloc's 
leader.
In multipolarity, however, the validity of this hypothesis must be called into 
question. Small states find themselves free to choose among multiple policy options,
"9James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” in R. Barry 
Farell, ed.. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston. IL: 
Northwestern University Press. 1966), 65.
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being restrained by much more benign structural limitations. Newly acquired autonomy 
in the multipolar international system raises the question o f what determines the security 
of small states. Since most of the East European states are by definition small states, it is 
tempting to analyze the regional setting in search of the subsystem distribution of power. 
That, in turn, would provide insights into the extent of security enjoyed by various states. 
Indeed, the end of bipolarity enhanced the ability of regional powers to claim leadership 
and superior status in various subsystems. The lack of great power confrontation that led 
to the extension of their rivalry far beyond their boundaries provides regional great 
powers the opportunity to advance their interests into previously off-limit states. Yet 
regional subsystems are not insulated from the larger international structure. Regional 
states stand in empirically identifiable relations not only to one another but to great 
powers as well. This leads to the reasonable assertion that the behavior of small states is 
influenced by the combined effect o f the international system and the regional sub­
system.
Of course, there emerge questions about the relative impact of the international 
system on the regional system, the extent of regional politics on state behavior as 
opposed to the effect of great power interactions, etc. In order to preserve the neorealist 
notion of structure one must account for the capabilities o f regional actors and the 
distribution of capabilities among them, while incorporating the real impact of the larger 
international system on both subsystem and regional states. In short one ought to account 
for both actors' attributes and distribution of capabilities.
To this end, this dissertation introduces the organizing concept of core-periphery 
interaction, that is the pattern of interactions between small peripheral states and the 
industrialized, democratic system o f states in the context o f the regional subsystem. Just
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as neorealism distinguishes between capabilities as actor's attributes and the distribution 
of capabilities as a structural component, this project defines a set of core-periphery 
interactions as an attribute and the distribution of core-periphery interaction in the 
subsystem as its structural component.
East European states, in addition to being small states, are located in the periphery 
of the industrialized world. The core-periphery dichotomy pertains not so much to 
geographical location as to the extent of modernization, democratization, and political 
stability. Similarly, external and internal constraints on foreign policy are stronger in the 
periphery than in the core. Peripheral states are more exposed to external pressures and 
are frequently internally weak and fragile. This results in frequent instability and disorder 
in the periphery. ’0 Peripheral states are frequently dissatisfied with the territorial and 
demographic status quo and had often sought radical revisions. ’1 It was notably so in 
Central and Eastern Europe for the better part of the last two centuries. However. Vital 
also notes that these states tend to claim membership in regional system, organization, 
alliance, association, or league—a distinct phenomenon of our times. In any event, what 
need to be emphasized is that crucial to the difference between core and peripheral states 
in their respective patterns of international behavior are factors that are internal to the 
societies in question.
In a contribution to the study of European security. Ole Waever argues that the 
continent has witnessed the transformation of the pattern of politics from the traditional
’°James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and 
Periphery in the Post-Cold W ar Era,” International Organization 46. no. 2 (Spring 1992): 
467-91.
’’David Vital. “M inor Power/Major Power Relations and the Contemporary 
Nation-State,” in Efrain Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, eds.. The National Security o f  Small 
States in a Changing W orld  (Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 1997), 203.
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model of competing nations to a core-periphery model.32 While traditionally the basic 
pattern in Europe had been a number o f centers competing with each other, in the last 
decade this has been replaced by a pattern o f concentric circles around the EU/NATO 
center. ’3 Indeed, since the end of communism a large number of European issues have 
translated into issues of “center-periphery, distance, questions o f getting in to achieve 
influence versus keeping distance for the sake of independence.” Similarly, the 
international and domestic politics of the states of Eastern Europe are no exception to this 
pattern; political controversies range from the East European states’ quest to join Euro- 
Atlantic organizations, to policies intended to increase the inflow of Western investments 
to the transforming market economies, to policies seeking to engage Euro-Atlantic 
institutions in maintaining the stability and territorial integrity o f weak East European 
states, to domestic debates about the diminishing national independence in the process of 
joining institutions with supranational functions. In this model some of the states are 
closer to the center—not necessarily geographically-while others are more distant.
It is important to stress that in the so delineated model of European politics, the 
European Union, although not a formal security institution, has a crucial security role. 
According to Waever, the EU keeps the core intact, provides stability to the near 
periphery, and, if needed, directly intervenes in conflicts in the distant periphery. ’4 In
,2Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non- 
War Community,” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Bamett, eds.. Security Communities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 69-118.
,3Ibid, 99-100. Waever argues that the EU/NATO represents an instance o f the 
historically-tried method of peace-empire. Empires constitute political centers whose 
powers and influence extend radially with fading force, as a number of quasi-independent 
political units operate around the center with increasing independence as the distance 
from the center increases.
34lbid, 99.
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other words, the EU is an institution, which not only performs integrative functions in the 
core but also attracts states from the more distant centric circles through the diffusion of 
institutions, principles, norms and practices as well as direct intervention.
Another crucial element in the core-periphery model of European politics, as 
delineated by Waever, is the issue of security. Waever observes that in 1970 West 
European states moved toward a state of “asecurity," where the very question of security 
amongst the states lost its traditional meaning. °  Western Europe went through a process 
of “desecuritization” after which the possibility of change without the consent of the 
major states became very unlikely; it produced a “non-expectation of war." '6 In other 
words. West European states ceased to define their relationships in security terms. ’7 After 
the end of the rigid division of the Cold War, however, there is a new sense of insecurity 
as new elements were added to the security discourse including ethnic conflict, 
environmental issues, migration, and organized crime, among others. Although the 
emerging insecurity is more complex and hard to define as a pattern, it replaced the state 
of "asecurity" as new concentric circles were added to the core of Europe; a new process 
of “securitization” ensued as new risks and threats proliferated.
Security problems and controversies appeared in a variety of forms after 1989. 
Significantly, the traditional one-a  state or group of states posing a credible threat to the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states--was the least likely security threat.
But not all security threats are posed by states that have the capability and intentions to
35Ibid. 88.
36Ibid. 84-7.
,7It must be stressed that the state of “asecurity” emerged only in the context of 
interstate politics among West European states, while the communist states still 
constituted the overwhelming, and external to West Europe, security threat.
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circumscribe the security o f others. Security may be threatened by a state, which is 
politically unstable and therefore unable to keep its territorial integrity as it comes under 
pressure by discontent ethnic groups. A state may be a source o f mass migration, 
therefore threatening the social and political peace in neighboring countries. A state may 
be the source of organized crime with international operations in human trafficking, 
drugs, and weapons o f mass destruction. The proliferation o f security threats requires the 
creation of novel security strategies to address them. Therefore, it comes as no surprise 
that a variety of institutions, in terms of their forms and functions, are necessary to cope 
with these security threats. Thus, while NATO provides the protection against military 
threats, the European Union addresses the multitude of risks and threats arising from the 
expanding interaction between the core and periphery. Accordingly, this study includes in 
its analysis not only East European states’ relationship with organizations which address 
security threats through traditional means—including deterrence and defense—but also 
institutions that address threats through nontraditional means, such as values, norms and 
principles that suppress threats and risks.
Operationalization o f  Core-Periphery Variables
There have been several attempts to investigate and conceptualize the relationship 
of core-periphery and post-communist transitions.lS Analyzing East European
8Jacques Rupnik, “The Postcommunist Divide,” Journal o f  Democracy 10, no. I 
(January 1999): 57-62; Laurence Whitehead, “Geography and Democratic Destiny," 
Journal o f  Democracy 10, no. 1 (January 1999): 74-79; Jeffrey Sachs, “Eastern Europe 
Reforms: Why the Outcomes Differ so Sharply,” Boston Globe (19 September. 1997): 7; 
Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation 
of the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 53, no. 1 (January 2000): 1-37;
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transformations, several authors point out that the farther away a country is from the 
West, the less likely it is to be democratic. In other words, geographic proximity to the 
West exercises a positive influence on the transformation o f post-communist states, while 
isolation in the East arrests this transformation. In a compelling study, Jeffrey Kopstein 
and David Reilly go beyond the analysis of spatial context as mere distance from the 
West—pointing out that distance simply tells one that factors moving over space have 
discemable effects on East European transformations—and instead propose a model in 
which successful transformations are determined by spatial diffusion of resources, values, 
and institutions. Furthermore. Kopstein and Reilly go as far as to insist that although long 
neglected as a variable in the models of post-communist transformations, geography itself 
influences factors determining the pace and direction of transformations including 
communist legacies, historical context, culture, and other factors constituting the core of 
the so-called path-dependent explanations. Indeed, the authors conclude that the 
geographic pattern o f success and failure of post-communist transformations is 
significant even when controlling for cultural legacies and institutional choices.
Spatial diffusion is a "complex process that involves information flows, networks 
of communications, hierarchies o f influences, and receptivity o f c h a n g e . A t  the core of 
the spatial diffusion model is a relationship of stocks and flows, on the one hand, and 
transformation outcomes, on the other. The stock of the country represents the external 
environment while flows represent the movement of information and resources between 
the countries. Stocks may be the physical, political, economic, cultural and other 
structural and environmental conditions. Flows, on the other hand, may be represented by 
analyzing both the actual flow of resources and information and the country’s potential 
wKopstein and Reilly. 12.
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for these flows. The diffusion process is in large part a function of how open and 
interactive states are.40 It is important to stress that, as the authors point out. while the 
stock of the state represent the structural conditions and environmental context within 
which the state operates, flows indicate the willingness and capacity of the state and its 
society to behave in certain way. Indeed, as Andrew Cortell and James Davis argue, a 
state’s formal subscription to an international norm or principle is not a sufficient 
predictor of the nation’s commitment to this international norm.41 Instead, the norm’s 
‘‘salience” requires a durable set o f elite and public attitudes toward its legitimacy in the 
national arena.42
In a similar vein. Emannuel Adler and Michael Bamett posit that security 
communities rely for their governance structure not only on a common understanding of 
their members’ international behavior but also on a common reading of their domestic 
behavior and institutions.43 In other words, the assurance that states participating in a 
security community will not settle their differences through war is based on the members' 
shared international and domestic practices and commitments. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this study, the extent of state integration into an international institution will be 
measured not only by the state's formal membership in it but also by the extent of public 
and elite commitment to the institution’s norms and principles. The objective is to create
4(>For a description of the formal model see. Kopstein and Reilly, 7-24.
41 Andrew P. Cortell and Jam es W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic 
Impact o f International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review  2, no.
I (Spring 2000): 65-87.
42Ibid, 68.
43Emanuel Adler and Michael Bamett. “A Framework for the Study of Security 
Communities,” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Bamett, eds.. Security Communities (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 29-66.
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a measure that reflects the receptivity to the new norms and principles of both the elites 
and the public.
For the purpose of this study, states will be placed on a continuum of integration 
with the European core. The more integrated the country in the main European 
institutions, the closer the country to the core. Conversely, the less integrated the country 
is in European institutions, the more distant the country from the core. The degree of 
integration is determined by both the country's stock and flows. In order to operationalize 
a country’s flow the study will investigate the following factors:
Membership in core institutions including NATO. EU. OECD. As already 
discussed above, international organizations have important security functions. NATO is 
the institution that provides traditional security through deterrence and defense to its 
members. The Alliance also moderates the behavior of the allies.44 Even when military' 
threats disappear other security problems may remain. Therefore, alliances may transform 
their functions to cope with more diffuse risks and challenges. As Celeste Wallander and 
Robert Keohane point out. after the Cold War, NATO was being transformed into a 
security management institution.43 Indeed, although many of the East European countries 
do not face a clear threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty, they still seek 
NATO membership as a means of, among other goals, addressing more diffuse security 
risks and challenges. Similarly, EU membership is seen as another way to increase the
44 See, Christopher Gelpi, “Alliances ad Instruments of Intra-Allied Control.” in 
Helga Haftendom, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander. eds.. Imperfect Unions 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 107-39.
43Institutions whose functions, along with the defense and deterrence, include the 
management of security risks have rules, norms, and procedures to enable members to 
exchange information and avoid generating security dilemmas. For more on alliances' 
management of security risks see, Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risks, 
Treats, and Security Institutions,” in Helga Haftendom, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste 
Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 21-47.
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security of post-communist states. The European Union is an institution holding the core 
states together, an area where the likelihood of political change through war is non­
excitant so long as the organization performs its integrative functions.
Percentage o f  international trade with the EU. Trade is also seen as diffusing 
institutions and ideas.46 One of the most significant economic changes in Eastern Europe 
after the end of communism was the dramatic increase o f trade with the European Union. 
Usually, the more advanced post-communist economies were more successful in 
reorienting their trade patterns from the East to the West without experiencing dramatic 
economic difficulties.
The level o f  direct foreign investments in the national economy. The inflow of 
direct foreign investments has been identified as an important agent of diffusion of 
institutions, norms and rules. Foreign direct investments also increase the state's 
economic capacities and power. O f course it must be stressed that foreign direct 
investments are a result of, not a cause of. successful economic reform. Countries striving 
to attract investments must first significantly marketize their economies and fulfill the 
requirements of international financial institutions. Only then can states expect to attract 
foreign investments. In any event, what is significant for this study is the degree to which 
foreign investments incorporate the national economy into the core market and further 
how foreign investments increase economic, political, and social capacities.47 The study
4r,Jonathon Eaton and Samuel S. Kortum, "International Technology Diffusion: 
Theory and Measurement,” International Economic Review  40, no. 3 (August 1999): 
537-70.
47Foreign direct investments have been identified as an important agent o f ideas. 
See, Ray Barrell and Nigel Pain, “Foreign Direct Investment. Technological Change, and 
Economic Growth within Europe,” Economic Journal 107, no. 445 (November 1997): 
1770-86.
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includes the foreign direct investments in both absolute terms and per capita. The per 
capita levels address discrepancies in the sizes of case studies' economies, but does not 
measure the stakes the core has in the economies of the three countries. The total amount 
of foreign direct investments, therefore, provides a good measure not only of the levels of 
the core’s penetration o f the country but also the extent of stake the core has in the 
country’s well-being and security.
Public acceptance o f integration in the core. Integration in the core is a function 
o f both the elite’s commitment and the public’s mobilization. A country’s flow can best 
be measured by devising a measure that reflects the receptivity to the integration of both 
the elite and the public. Whereas the stock represents the structural conditions within 
which the state operates, the flow’s component represents the society’s willingness to 
integrate in the core. Indeed, although a state may enjoy good stock—short distance to the 
core and neighbors bent on integration in the West—the elite and society, for various 
reasons may choose to erect barriers to integration.
For the purpose of this study I posit a country’s stock to be who its immediate 
neighbors are. The stock of a country represented by the structural and environmental 
conditions within which the state operates shape the options available to the state. In 
order to analyze a country's stock this study looks at its neighbors' position on the core- 
periphery continuum. The more integrated the country's neighbors are in the core, the 
better the stock of the country. A post-communist country has a better chance of 
integrating itself in the core if its neighbors are already part of the core or are also 
striving to achieve integration in it. This measurement takes into consideration not only 
the geographic position o f the state in relation to the core but also the decision taken by
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its neighbors in relation to integration in the core and their place in the core-periphery
48continuum.
A state with a high level of interaction with the core enjoys membership in 
various organizations and institutions associated with being a part o f the core state 
system—the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe, among others; a high level of 
economic interaction including trade, financial penetration by core states’ businesses, and 
synchronization o f economic practices; and human and elite exchange. The core develops 
a stake in the stability and security of a peripheral slate with which it enjoys a high 
degree of interaction. The peripheral state, on its part, in addition to its own capacities 
can "borrow” capabilities from the core in confronting the challenges in its security 
environment and meeting the demands of transition to a market economy and democracy.
Of course, one can easily identify the correlation between the attributes derived 
from internal capacities and attributes gained from the pattern o f interaction with the 
core. Transition states that have achieved a high level of institutionalization of the market 
economy and democratic institutions have also achieved a relatively high degree of 
interaction with the core. Politically and economically stable and prosperous East 
European states have attained associate agreements with the European Union and are on 
their way to negotiating membership in the institution. Stable national politics have also 
qualified them for membership in NATO and increased the penetration of foreign capital
48 Although not investigating the international integration o f post-communist 
states, Kopstein and Reilly make some conclusions relevant to this study. Using 
regression analysis, the authors conclude that neighbors are strong determinants of 
political and economic behavior. See Kopstein and Reilly, 18. One can hypothesize, then, 
that neighbors are strong determinant of international behavior, including a willingness to 
integrate.
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from the core states, thus increasing their chances o f sustaining the political and 
economic stability so vital to strengthening of national institutions.
Dependent Variable: National Security
It is this dissertation’s contention that the security of a transition state depends on 
its power. The power of the state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state's 
capabilities and the distribution o f capabilities in the subsystem of which the state is a 
member. There are two sources o f state capabilities—the strength of national institutions 
and the capabilities the state can derive from the core state system. The system-wide 
component in the model is the distribution of patterns of core-periphery interactions in 
the subsystem in which the state is located.
One of the major problems with the dependent variable “security” is its definition 
as a concept. As David Baldwin observes, security has not been an important analytical 
concept for most security studies scholars.49 During the Cold War. if the military was 
relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue, reflecting the dominance of the 
field by scholars of military statecraft. Conversely, if the military was not relevant, the 
issue was consigned to the area o f low politics. Accordingly, security was defined as the 
absence of threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state. 
Specifically, the West defined security as the absence of military threat from the Soviet 
bloc and Moscow defined security as the absence of military threat from NATO.
The last decade has witnessed the proliferation of attempts to redefine security by 
giving high priority to previously ignored issues such as human rights, the environment,
49See Baldwin, ‘T h e  Concept of Security.”
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drug trafficking, organized crime, human smuggling, and social issues. According to 
David Baldwin, however, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to defining the 
meaning of security. In other words, there have been only limited attempts to explicate 
the conceptual issues o f security. Instead, most of the exploration of security intertwines 
conceptual analysis with empirical observations. Authors construct propositions, theories, 
and analytical frameworks as a substitute for the concept o f security. Concepts, however, 
are not theories or propositions; they are constructs, ideas of general or abstract nature, 
which are used in the construction of theories. Therefore, Baldwin argues that 
“understanding the concept of security is a fundamentally different kind o f  intellectual 
exercise from specifying the conditions under which security may be attained.”30
In defining the working definition of security in this study, the point o f departure 
is Baldwin’s characterization of security as “the low probability of dam age to acquired 
values."31 As the author points out, traditional definitions of security usually emphasize 
the absence of threats. This formulation, however, does not include threats, which are 
beyond any human control such as natural disasters. There is, however, another reason to 
choose Baldwin’s definition. Small states such as the ones in Eastern Europe have little 
independent control over their international environment. In response to external threats, 
including a powerful antagonistic neighbor or civil war on their borders, states develop 
deterrence policies. These policies are intended to provide security by lowering the 
likelihood that an attack or military spillover will occur. Yet by virtue o f their relatively 
small power, these states cannot determine the presence or absence of the threats. The 
best the states can hope for is to preserve acquired values ranging from preserving
50lbid„ 8.
5 'ibid.. 13.
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territorial integrity to maintaining the well-being of their society in the face of existing 
threats beyond the control of any individual state. In other words, East European states’ 
security policies do not eliminate threats but lower the probability o f losing 
independence, reversing the democratic process, economic collapse or anything else that 
is defined as the states' values.
Furthermore, the concept of security must also include two specifications:
Security for whom? And security for which values? For the purpose of this study the 
referent object will be the state and the society. As for the values, the security o f the 
states has traditionally included territorial integrity and political independence, and more 
recently other values such as open seas, uninterrupted flow o f resources, etc. Therefore, 
this study will include in national security the values as defined by the individual states. 
Those values are usually included in the national security concepts and other 
governmental papers created after the states found themselves free to pursue autonomous 
policies in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex international environment. In 
keeping up with the changing approach to security, these states, along with the traditional 
value of state security, included in their security conceptions abundant references to 
societal well-being and defined it as a referent object of security.32 The study identifies 
the values of state and societal security as defined by the national security concepts and 
other official papers prepared by the security experts in each country.
The working definition of security includes the subjective and objective 
dimensions of the concept. The purpose is to allow for the possibility that states and 
societies may either overestimate or underestimate the actual probability of damage to
32Following the logic o f distinguishing between conceptual analysis and empirical 
observations, state security and societal security are different forms of security, not 
fundamentally different concepts.
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acquired values. Therefore, “absence of fear” is designated as one of the values. 
Operationally, the study investigates the public and experts’ perceptions o f the existing 
threats to the state and society’s values which are defined as part of national security. On 
the other hand, the immediate regional environment is investigated to determine the 
objective state of threats to the state’s acquired values. Attention is devoted to the 
presence of states, conflicts and developments that present threats to security. They may 
include neighboring states that challenge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
case-study state, the presence of local conflicts, which hold the likelihood of spillover 
into the state, or adverse economic developments likely to affect the well-being of the 
society, among others.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable the study identifies what the 
individual states identified as the referent o f security or, in other words, what values must 
be protected. Then the study measures the level of objective security the transition states 
enjoyed in the decade of post-communist transition. It proceeds with identifying the 
official perceptions of the level o f security enjoyed by the state. Finally, it gauges the 
sense of security or threats exhibited by the populations o f the stales. The study also 
provides a comparison of the level o f  security each state enjoyed.
Case Selection
The selection o f the three case studies is based on three criteria. The first criterion 
for the selection of the three countries is a variance in the dependent variable, national 
security. The three countries achieved different levels o f security. While the Czech 
Republic enjoyed a relatively high level of security, Bulgaria and Lithuania faced
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security challenges o f high intensity. Similarly, the populations exhibited varying security 
perceptions. The second criterion pertains to similarities among the states in terms of 
power positions in the international system and types of political regimes at the beginning 
of the transition process.
Third, the countries have similar size and by all definitions qualify as small states. 
There is no widely accepted definition o f small states. The problem boils down to 
determining the dimension of size. Some definitions use area as the criteria o f size, others 
use population, GNP per capita, or military expenditures. Some authors prefer to speak of 
small powers rather than small states by mixing physical with psychological factors.5'’ In 
any event, by all definitions, the three countries are small states.
5;iRobert Rothstein defines small power as one which cannot obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities. Rothstein, 296.
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CHAPTER IV
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Chapter IV evaluates the level o f domestic institutionalization in the three case 
studies. Separate sections are devoted to the measurement of each country’s strength of 
domestic institutions using the five factors constituting the first independent variable. The 
final section compares the countries’ levels of institutionalization.
Bulgaria
Two-tunwver test. Formally. Bulgaria meets the two-tumover test. The former 
communist party, now named the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), won the first 
multiparty elections in 1990 and formed the first post-1989 government backed by a 53 
percent majority in the Parliament. In the next elections in 1991, the opposition coalition, 
the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) won 34 percent o f the vote and formed the first 
non-communist government headed by Filip Dimitrov. The minority government was 
backed by the votes o f the only other non-communist party in the parliament, the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a predominately ethnic Turkish party. In the 
next parliamentary elections in 1994, after gathering 43 percent of the votes, the BSP 
again formed a government led by Zhan Videnov, backed by a 52 percent socialist 
majority in the Parliament. In fact, no party or group has so far succeeded in winning two 
consecutive elections, as confirmed by the convincing win of UDF in the 1997 
parliamentary election.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It seems only logical to conclude that Bulgaria went even beyond the two- 
turnover test as the opposition parties or groups have formed governments after winning 
elections four times in the last ten years. Bulgaria's experience, however, must be 
qualified in one important way. Following Huntington's prescription, it is expected that 
the two-turnover test demonstrates that the losers of parliamentary elections, operating 
within the democratic system, are willing to peacefully turn over power to the winners. A 
peaceful transition is a reflection of the willingness of at least two groups in the political 
elite to commit to the rules and principles o f democracy. In Bulgaria, however, no winner 
in a parliamentary election has been able to complete a full mandate in power. Each 
government was forced to resign under public pressure, organized opposition, or both.
The first Socialist government of Andrei Lukanov. after the economy and standard of 
living went into a free fall, came under attack from a rapidly accelerating strike wave and 
had to resign. Bulgaria’s president, Zheliu Zhelev, asked the politically unaffiliated 
Dimiter Popov to form a coalition government which governed until the 1991 election. 
Similarly, the minority government o f Filip Dimitrov, formed after the UDF won the 
second multiparty election, lost the support of the MRF in the Parliament and had to 
resign after less than a year in power. The resignation came amid growing criticism of the 
government's policies by the president, unions, and the press. Once again. President 
Zhelev had to appoint a non-party government led by Liuben Berov, and supported in the 
Parliament by the BSP, the MRF. and a group of UDF dissident deputies. After nineteen 
months in power, the Berov government in turn fell out of favor with the odd coalition 
and had to be replaced by another nonparty government, led by Reneta Indzhova, until 
the December 1994 parliamentary election. The Socialists, winners in the election.
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formed a government led by Zhan Videnov, and relied on a disciplined 52 percent 
majority in the National Assembly.
The last transition of power, from the Videnov government to the UDF in 1997. is 
perhaps the clearest exam ple of why a formal application o f the two-turnover test alone 
may fail to account for the degree of institutionalization. Amid dismal economic 
performance, growing international isolation, and uncompromising political self- 
righteousness, the Socialist government came under severe criticism from the public, the 
president, nearly all political parties, and the press. After forty days of strikes, mass 
demonstrations, student boycotts, and even barricades blocking streets and roads, 
bringing the country to a standstill, the society came to the brink of mass political and 
social violence. The Socialist Party, seeing the leaders of the opposition gradually 
mastering the wave of social discontent. Finally agreed in early 1997 to relinquish power 
and hold early parliamentary elections.
In Huntington's treatment of the two-turnover test there is an explicit reference to 
the choice of the voters in determining the rulers. Indeed, in Bulgaria, as in what would 
be an institutionalized electoral system, the “voters regularly ousted the ins and the ins 
always yielded office to the new choices of the voters."1 It is important to note, however, 
that in 1990 and again in 1997, the voters had their say only after the “street” had its say 
and effectively forced both the Lukanov and Videnov governments to relinquish power.
It is only expected in well institutionalized political systems that governments, under 
pressure of unfulfilled public expectations, would resign after exhausting certain legally 
prescribed venues for change, e.g., seeking a coalition government, changes in the 
executive team, or a new government agenda. In Bulgaria, however, the decision to step
'Huntington, The Third Wave, 268.
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aside was taken as a response to the escalation of political and social violence. In other 
words, the mode of turnover did not occur in the framework of formally prescribed rules. 
In 1991 and 1997 the ballot boxes simply ratified what had been decided on the streets by 
the naked power clash between ruling party and opposition.
Initial agreement among all sectors o f  society on the fundamental ndes o f  the 
political game. One of the most significant evidence o f failed institutionalization is 
violence, ranging from civil war to ordinary crime. Civil strife, social unrest, and mass 
protests, as a form of violence in the initial phase of institutionalization in Bulgaria, 
signified the absence of legitimizing rules to which actors can refer.
Beginning in January 1990, the ruling Communist Party, its satellite, the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). and UDF initiated a series of roundtable 
talks intended to set up the initial rules of the game.2 In the next two months the 
roundtable functioned as a parliament as the communist-held National Assembly could 
pass no law without its formal approval. The negotiations produced a series o f 
agreements on political and institutional reforms including electoral law, basic 
depolitization of state institutions, granting citizens basic political and civil rights, and 
support to newly emerging political parties. One very significant stipulation called for the 
election of a Grand National Assembly to sit for eighteen months to prepare the new 
constitution and function as a regular parliament by passing new basic legislation. During
2For a discussion of the roundtable talks see, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, 
and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 333-43; 
John D. Bell, “Democratization and Political Participation in “Postcommunist” Bulgaria,” 
in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Politics, Power, and the Struggle fo r  
Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 353- 
403; Rumyana Kolarova and Dimiter Dimitrov. “The Roundtable Talks in Bulgaria,” in 
Jon Elster, ed.. The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown o f  Communism (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1996): 178-212.
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the negotiations, the UDF found itself outmaneuvered and yielded on most points of 
contention. For example, the UDF agreed to an early timing of the elections, thus giving 
the ruling party—already having a disproportionately large base and resources—an 
additional advantage. The BSP also retained Petar Mladenov as the head of state, and the 
ruling party successfully resisted attempts to bring to the talks any additional, potentially 
significant political players. In fact, Andrei Lukanov. a member of the Communist Party 
and later to become the prime minister of the first post-1989 government, held firm 
control over the negotiations and set their agenda.
This early phase of transition from totalitarian rule was initiated and heavily 
dominated by the old regime. The ruling elite was able to constitute a roundtable forum to 
set up the basic rules of the game to ensure the security of the participants and their 
interests. Yet. the rules of the game and institutions crafted in the initial phase quickly 
came under attack from newly emerging political actors. It must be noted that at the time 
of its formation, the UDF was dominated by center-left intellectuals, most of whom were 
former members of the Communist Party. In contrast to other Central European 
communist countries, Bulgaria did not develop an organized opposition to the regime 
until just before the beginning of transition. ’ At the macro level, the initial changes found 
the political system in what Linz and Stepan call "early-post totalitarian stage.”4 which 
goes a long way in explaining why the still unreformed communists were able to control 
the transition. What is significant, as far as the initial phase of institutionalization, 
however, is the failure of the roundtable talks to include all significant players in the 
process of crafting rules of the game, security, and new institutions. There simply lacked
"’For comparative analysis o f post-communist transitions see Linz and Stepan.
4Ibid.. 293-343.
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the process o f defining multiple opposition interests, players, and groups—a process 
which in other post-communist countries took years, even decades. The process of 
opposition formation and its differentiation into diverse political groups representing 
various interests in the society began only after the regime initiated the transition. Even 
then, the Communist Party faced a weak opponent, internally divided, leftist in outlook, 
and lacking in leadership and confidence.
The initial deal between the Communist Party and the opposition, which 
obviously favored the old elite, proved unable to provide a stable transition to building 
new institutions. After the elections o f  1990, the Communist Party, renamed the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in March of the same year, found itself the controlling 
majority in the Grand National Assembly, holding the presidency and controlling all 
other still unreformed institutions. A fter achieving legitimization through roundtable 
talks, free elections, and careful distancing from the personality of the last dictator Todor 
Zhivkov, the Socialist Party quickly lost interest in further substantial or symbolic 
reforms. Unwillingness to reform and dwindling standards of living gave impetus to the 
explosion of strong opposition in the civil society. This time the opposition was led by 
the emerging right-of-center elements in the UDF. These leaders, who came to be known 
as the “dark blues,” were in fundamental opposition not only to the BSP but also to the 
whole nature of the transition, including the agreements of the roundtable negotiations, 
the results of the first free elections and the right of the BSP to be a legitimate player in 
the political system. The “dark blues” challenged leftist elements, known as the “light 
blues,” in the UDF and accused them o f collaboration with the communists throughout 
the transition process. In fact, their allegations of collaboration only seemed real after a 
number of key leaders in the UDF were revealed to have been “police informers" before
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1989. In the Grand National Assembly, as the debate on the new constitution progressed, 
the ‘"dark blues" refused to participate in designing the basic law in a parliament 
dominated by the Socialist Party. They were joined by the MRF, which argued that the 
draft failed to protect the right o f ethnic minorities in calling for the elections of a new 
parliament that would be more representative of the rapidly increasing political demands 
in society. In fact, the most intense opposition in the civil society emerged after the first 
multiparty elections in 1990; this time they were led by the “dark blues.” The “ light 
blues," on the other hand, were becoming increasingly marginalized both in the 
Parliament and in the UDF.
When the draft constitution was presented in the Parliament, the “dark blues" 
walked out and began a hunger strike. The position of the strikers was supported by most 
MFR deputies and the increasingly radicalized UDF led by Filip Dimitrov. The majority 
of the UDF deputies, however, supported by the new president and former UDF leader 
Zheliu Zhelev, fulfilled their commitment to the roundtable agreements and in July 1991 
joined the BSP in endorsing the new constitutions.
After the Grand National Assembly fulfilled its task of crafting the new 
constitution, the Parliament set the new elections for October 1991 and dissolved itself. 
Prior to the elections, the UDF completed the purge of “light blues" and proclaimed itself 
as the true anticommunist force in the country. Ekaterina Nikova observes that this initial 
period of transition was marked by revolutionary rhetoric, preoccupation with the past 
and what she calls “prepolitics and antipolitics.'0 Indeed, the victory o f the UDF at the 
1991 elections did not subdue their uncompromisingly anticommunist stance despite their
3Ekaterina Nikova, “The Bulgarian Transition: A Difficult Beginning." in Joan M. 
Nelson, ed., A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1994): 125-162.
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lack of majority in the parliament and the need to seek support for reform legislation. The 
Dimitrov government’s most important policy imperative was the complete 
“decommunization o f the country." While the majority of the proposed legislation was in 
line with the attempts to create a modem political, economic, and social system, many of 
the laws were clearly aimed at denying the BSP a role in the society. The Assembly voted 
to deny pensions to former members of the Communist Party above a certain post or the 
security services. The so-called “Panev Law” barred former communists from 
administrative positions in academic institutions for five years. The UDF also introduced 
legislation that would have led to a broad purge of the civil administration. In one of its 
most controversial moves, the Prosecutor-General indicted Andrei Lukanov. former 
prime minster and a sitting member o f the parliament, for diverting resources to friendly 
Third World regimes. Most significantly, in February 1992 a number of “dark blues" 
accused the BSP of planning a coup and threatened to ban the party. In a comparative 
study of transitions from totalitarian regimes. Linz and Stepan argue that the "dark blues 
were only semiloyal democrats in opposition in 1990-91."6 In interviews with UDF 
leaders, Stepan finds them to be more concerned with moral imperatives of justice rather 
than formal constitutional procedures.7
Questions about the democratic credentials of the political players aside, from an 
institutional point of view, the events of the 1989-91 demonstrated a lack of consensus 
among the major political players on the essential rules of the game and the nature of the 
emerging institutions and political system. While in early 1990, during the roundtable 
negotiations, there seemed to be a tentative agreement between the ruling regime and the
6Linz and Stepan, 341.
7Ibid.
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soft-liners in the opposition, the failure of the “dark blues” (either because their interests 
were not transformed into political representation or because o f their outright exclusion 
by the Communist Party) to endorse the emerging mles of the game very soon put into 
question the viability o f the consensus. Indeed, the failure of the roundtable talks to 
formulate workable rules o f the game was signified by the fact that, only nine months 
after the series of agreements was signed and six months after the first post-1989 general 
elections, the accelerating political and economic crisis forced the main political players 
to sign a new agreement in January 1991. Even this agreement, however, did not 
establish stable mles of the game.
This initial failure, of course, should not have spelled doom for the prospects of 
political institutionalization. De Palma argues that “a democracy is not entirely doomed 
by a difficult birth."8 Players can adjust agreements and institutions or even leam to live 
with imperfect ones. Yet in Bulgaria the Socialist Party, gaining legitimacy after the 
roundtable negotiations and victory in the first free elections, lost incentives to implement 
further political, economic, and social reforms and isolated the opposition from further 
institutional crafting. Although the decision by the Communist Party in late 1989 to 
democratize was expeditious and relatively uncontroversial within its elite, the almost 
complete regime dominance over the initial transition precluded consensual institution 
building. The roundtable talks, although providing an orderly venue for transition, 
excluded, for various reasons, relevant players from the process. The constitution was 
drafted and adopted by a coalition of hard-liners in the regime and moderates (light blues) 
in the opposition to the resistance of the more radical opposition (dark blues).
Furthermore, the refusal o f  the Socialist Party, once it assumed power, to reform both
xDi Palma, 108.
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itself and the political system did not provide the radical opposition with stakes in the 
current process and emerging system. Riding on the wave o f popular discontent, the dark 
blues defined radical “decommunization” as the overriding imperative o f its present 
political activity and future governance, thus automatically excluding compromise with 
the Socialist Party, seen as the bearer of the past communist tradition.
The dominance o f instrumental rather than fundamental politics—consensus on 
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. The UDF’s refusal to regard the BSP as a 
legitimate political player is but one example of an important characteristic of Bulgarian 
politics. A well-institutionalized social order is one in which the mles according to which 
political conflicts are carried out do not become themselves the object o f such conflict. In 
other words, there is a dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics. 
Political players can disagree over what particular policies governments should pursue, 
and yet broadly agree over the center of authority and the means by which decisions are 
made. Political parties and groups in the society struggle over distribution of scarce 
resources, economic and social legislation, foreign policies, and extent of governmental 
regulations. On the other hand, in well-institutionalized societies the players do not 
contest such core areas as the separation of powers; the fundamental principles of justice 
that underline the state; guarantees of civil rights and liberties, including ethnic 
minorities; legitimation of government through periodic elections; limits of government 
authority and coercion; and, the right of diverse interests to representation and power.
Even when such areas are contested, the groups must be committed to seeking decisions 
that satisfy more than a simple majority of political interests. For example, amendments 
to the constitution, contain those “higher order” rules requiring in most well-
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institutionalized societies two-thirds o f the votes in the legislative bodies and even the 
positive vote of other institutions.
Bulgaria's party system is characterized by bipolarity with the UDF at one pole 
and the BSP at the other. O f course, a bipolar model itself is not conducive to political 
confrontation. In the case of Bulgaria, however, the two blocks embody two significantly 
divergent ideological programs, socio-economic policies, and ideas about the country and 
its future.9 The great ideological distance between the two poles translated into 
differences on the ends o f politics: the two parties differ to various degrees on almost all 
fundamental issues, including division o f powers, minority rights, property rights, market 
economy, and matters of social justice. Not surprisingly, changes of ruling parties amount 
to changes of ideological directions rather than pragmatic alterations of policies.
What is significant in the case o f Bulgaria is that the party system remains 
structured on the base of the roundtable division between ruling elite and opposition. 
While in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end of the roundtable negotiations and the first 
free elections marked the end of the rigid separation of the party system into opposition 
and communists, in Bulgaria there failed to emerge a significant political center capable 
o f bridging the gap between the two ideological poles. In the elections of 1991 and 1994 
respectively 25 and 16 percent of the active voters were not represented in the parliament 
and thus failed to create a centrist formation. Instead the BSP and the UDF dominated the 
political scene and seldom allowed smaller, centrist parties to emerge as consequential
9On Bulgarian parties’ ideologies and policies see Ivan Krastev. ' Party Structure 
and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria,” Journal o f  Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics 13, no. 1 (March 1997): 91-106; Venelin I. Ganev, “Bulgaria's Symphony of 
Hope.” Journal o f  Democracy 8, no. 4 (October 1997): 125-39.
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players and affect their policies.10 Not unlike in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end o f the 
initial phase of transition led to fragmentation in the opposition coalition, but unlike their 
counterparts in the region the UDF purged the dissenting groups and individuals from the 
organization rather than splitting into numerous weaker parties. The process of 
organizational restructuring in the UDF was com pleted in 1997-98 when it turned into a 
single party rather than a coalition of numerous and still rather diverse parties and groups. 
The BSP. too. despite the existence o f numerous fractions within the party, maintained 
relatively high coherence and until late 1996 witnessed little threat of splitting apart. In 
addition, the presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 candidates with no affiliation with 
the two parties did not come even close to gaining any substantial vote, thus maximizing 
the political dominance of the bipolar model.
The dominance of the two ideologically polarized blocs ensured the lurking 
existence of fundamental politics along with instrumental politics in the polity. The 
separation of powers, parliamentarism, civil-military relations, market economy, and 
human rights often became contentious issues and the object of polarized and bitter 
political confrontation. From the point o f view of institutionalization, what made these 
confrontations significant is their persistence after the initial phase o f transition. In spite 
of the relatively uncontroversial acceptance of the separation of powers in the 
constitution of 1991, its practice has been rather dismal. There has been a protracted 
struggle over the independence of the judiciary. W hile in power, the BSP, perceiving the 
Constitutional Court as anticommunist, repeatedly tried to curtail its powers and 
autonomy. Along with frequently accusing the Court o f being the political tool of the
l0This model fits what Giovanni Sartori defines as polarized pluralism. See 
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party System: A Framework fo r  Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 131-45.
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UDF. the BSP has tried to adopt laws and policies that undermine judiciary independence 
including openly defying the Court’s decisions.11 cutting the salaries and abolishing the 
pensions of the judges and trying to remove them from their building.12 The other 
institutions of the judiciary also came under attack; after wining the elections of 1994, the 
BSP tried to limit the powers of the Supreme Judiciary Council (the self-government of 
the judiciary) and enacted a law, later struck down by the Constitutional Court, requiring 
current judges, prosecutors, and law professors to have had five years of previous 
experience, thus ensuring that only individuals who had served under the communist 
regime would have their current positions.1 ’ The judiciary system came under extreme 
political pressure and arbitrariness when the Socialist majority in the Parliament 
abolished the Parliamentary Legislative Committee and entrusted the drafting of 
legislation to a Council of Experts—law professors affiliated with the Socialists.14
The UDF, too, has tried to influence, although not as zealously as the BSP. the 
judiciary. After assuming power in 1997 the Kostov government pushed through 
amendments to the Law on Judiciary Power, which in the view of President Stoyanov.
" ’’Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review  3. no. 3 and 4 
(Summer/Fall 1994), 6.
''See Transition 1 (8 September, 1995), 29; For a comparative study of East 
Europe's constitutional courts see Herman Schwartz, “Eastern Europe's Constitutional 
Courts.” Journal o f  Democracy 9, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 100-14.
i;,See “Bulgaria Update.” East European Constitutional Review  4. no. 2 (Spring 
1995), 6; For the BSP’s treatment of the judiciary also see Venelin I. Ganev, “Prisoners' 
Rights, Public Services, and Institutional Collapse in Bulgaria,” East European 
Constitutional Review  4, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 76-83; Albert P. Melone, “The Struggle for 
Judicial Independence and the Transition Toward Democracy in Bulgaria,” Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 29, no. 2 (June 1996): 231-43.
l4See “Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review  4, no. 2 (Spring 
1995): 5-7.
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elected on the UDF’s ticket and sympathetic to its program, gave the government too 
much power over the judiciary.13 Even more controversial, a provision of the law 
mandated the replacement of the current Supreme Judiciary Council, a body instrumental 
in the appointment o f magistrates, with a newly elected one before the end of its term. In 
fact, as Sergio Bartole observes in this case, the Constitution invites political meddling 
into the judicial system by giving priority to political appointments rather than to 
professional qualifications.16 Furthermore, the government did not abandon the 
Socialists’ habit of blaming the judiciary for runaway crim e rates. Under these 
conditions, it is remarkable that the Constitutional Court in spite of its still unclear and 
limited role has maintained its independence, often going against the ruling majority in 
highly controversial cases. The independent track record o f the rest of the judiciary 
institutions, however, is highly dubious.
The notion of parliamentarism, as the notion of separation of powers, is often 
misunderstood. During the crucial time of constitution crafting the dark blues boycotted 
the work of the parliament, a tactic later embraced by consecutive oppositions in the 
parliament, including the BSP. Even after ten years of transition, parliamentarian groups 
still resort to threats o f boycotts, a measure with greater impact and consequences for the 
work of democratic systems than the mainly symbolic walkouts.
Economic policy is perhaps the rule of the game over which the two contending 
blocs had the most significant ideological split. Despite the UDF’s opposition to the BSP
l5Stoyanov later vetoed the law. See “Bulgaria Update,” East European 
Constitutional Review  7, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 7-8.
l6Sergio Bartole, “Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe,” East 
European Constitutional Review 7, no. 1 (Winter 1998). Available from 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr: INTERNET.
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dominated process of institution building and constitution crafting, while in power in 
1991-92 and again from 1997 on. the dark blues did not make concerted efforts to alter 
the constitution and the form of government. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, 
upon assuming power the UDF embarked, with qualified success, upon marketization and 
privatization in stark contrast to the policies implemented by preceding socialist 
governments. It must be noted that one would not find the great ideological differences 
on economic issues in the election programs o f the two parties, as the socialists formally 
adopted the fundamentals o f the free market, although at a slower pace and with a social 
orientation.
The BSP did not make any attempts to reform the economy before the elections of
1990. fearing backlash against marketization policies which would have inevitably 
deteriorated the living standards. Indeed, the government of Prime Minister Lukanov 
spent the last of Bulgaria’s foreign currency reserves to pay salaries and pensions.17 After 
the elections, the government found itself unable to continue this policy and the economy 
went into free fall. It was the non-party government of Dimiter Popov appointed after 
Lukanov’s resignation which implemented, however modestly, the first reform policies. 
Although the BSP avoided association with the painful consequences of policies intended 
to bring the creation of a free market, it also displayed lack of intra-party consensus on 
the free market as a mode o f economic development.
After the 1991 election the minority government of Filip Dimitrov initiated the 
most radical economic reforms to date, including further price and trade liberalization, 
privatization, restitution, return of farm land to the previous owners, and repairing 
relations with international financial institutions (severely damaged after the government
l7See Bell, 370-72.
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of Lukanov suspended the repayment on the foreign debt). The success o f the economic 
reforms, however, was severely handicapped by systemic and political problems. 
Politically, the government was restrained by its lack o f majority in the Parliament, often 
sore relations with its informal partner in the Parliament, the MRF, and inability to forge 
informal alliances with various groups in the society, particularly the trade-unions. More 
importantly, the government prioritized the privatization of small enterprise and the 
restitution of properties confiscated by the communist regime, thus neglecting far more 
important (from a macroeconomic point o f  view) decisions on the future of large scale 
enterprise, the creation of a functional banking sector, and creating the institutional 
structure of market economy.
After the resignation of the D imitrov government, the government led by Lyuben 
Berov relied on the support of an odd coalition of the BSP. MRF. and UDF dissidents in 
the Parliament. Lacking the popular and political mandate to lead the country, this weak 
government stalled the reforms and instead turned a blind eye to the hidden privatization 
of much of the econom y by former com m unist nomenclature. With the ascendance of the 
socialist government led by Zhan Videnov to power in 1994. the reverse o f the process of 
economic reforms took an even more open character. Plans to implement cash 
privatization were rescinded and instead mass privatization was chosen as the option that 
would keep “national wealth" out of foreign reach. Resources were poured into heavily 
indebted state enterprises and deals and credits from state banks were offered to those 
close to government "shady" businesses. The restitution o f farmland was halted and an 
attempt was made to reinstate collective farming. The Parliament reversed many of the 
laws intended to create a market econom y and involved itself in the endless passing of 
legal amendments. Relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
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were frozen. By the end of 1996 the economy collapsed: inflation reached 300 percent, 
the GNP shrank by 9 percent, the corrupt banking system witnessed the bankruptcy of 
several banks, and the average monthly salary shrank tenfold. Facing growing public 
protest and political violence the government resigned.
After the April 1997 elections, the UDF government led by Ivan Kostov enacted 
radical policies to stabilize the economy, build some of the foundations of a free market, 
and repair relations with international financial institutions. The Parliament approved the 
institution of a currency board, an IMF-supported mechanism which virtually strips 
authority from national institutions in monetary matters. The government also initiated a 
broad process of privatization, which this time included large enterprises and industries 
considered by the Socialists as having national security importance (e.g. National 
Telecommunication Company, the largest state banks, and petrochemical and 
metallurgical industries). In addition the decision was taken to gradually close heavily 
indebted and losing enterprises should there be no buyers.
On civil-military relations, too, the two blocs have significant differences of 
political programs which led to frequent clashes and tensions. The Socialists opposed 
almost all reforms in defense matters beginning with their opposition to ending the 
presence of the Communist Party cells in the armed forces during the roundtable 
negotiations. The old elite also objected to any restructuring of the military to adjust to 
the altered conditions in the post-Cold W ar world. In many cases the BSP's resistance to 
any military reform took the form of public confrontation between civil and military 
authorities. In 1994, the joint-chief of staff General Lyuben Petrov openly defied a 
decision by the Ministry of Defense to retire a group o f high-ranking officers as part of a 
government program to streamline the army.
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The reasons for the significant differences between the UDF and the BSP on civil- 
military relations are not only ideological but also influenced by their respective visions 
of Bulgaria’s place in Europe. For the first ten years of post-communist transition, the 
Socialists’ foreign policy objectives included the country’s membership in the European 
Union but opposed membership in NATO, unless the organization included Russia and 
became an all-European security institution.18 In May 2000 at its congress the BSP finally 
endorsed Bulgaria’s bid to join NATO.19 The UDF, on the other hand, from early on 
declared NATO membership to be among the highest foreign policy priorities and sought 
military reforms that would lead to meeting the membership criteria.20 It is significant 
that Bulgaria-although one may argue Slovakia as w ell~is the only country among the 
EU 's associated members that in the ten years of post-communist transition has failed to 
achieve consensus among the main political actors on the main foreign policy orientation 
of the country. Although the BSP seemed recently to have joined the other political 
parties in their support of NATO membership, there still remain substantial divisions 
about its priorities, preceding military and political reforms, and the policies and foreign 
policy behavior membership would entail.21
18‘ Zhan Videnov. “Lektcija na Ministar-Predsedatelja na Republika Bylgarija 
Gospodin Zhan Videnov Pred Atlantitcheskija Klub v Bylgarija, Iznesena na 4 April 
1995.” [Lecture of the Prime Minister o f Republic of Bulgaria, Zhan Videnov Before the 
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. 4 April 1995]. Available from the Atlantic Club, Sofia.
1’“Socialists Break With Past, Back NATO," Reuters (7 May. 2000).
20After wining majority in the parliament, the UDF proposed and passed in the 
National Assembly the Declaration o f National Consent which expressed, among others, 
the consensual parliamentary support o f  Bulgaria’s membership in NATO. See Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (8 May, 1997).
2,“Socialist Party Insists on Referendum for NATO Membership,” Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (21 June, 2000).
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Inclusiveness o f  political society—degree o f  participation o f  diverse social and  
ethnic groups. Given the history of ethnic relations in Bulgaria, and specifically the 
decade preceding the beginning of transition, the potential for excluding the ethnic Turks- 
-the largest, 9 percent strong ethnic m inority-from  adequate political participation and 
power represented one o f the most significant challenges to institution building.22 With 
the forced mass migration of approximately 300,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey—in response 
to a repressive campaign of ethnic assimilation and waged by the communist regime in 
the 80’s~being a fresh memory, the interests of the Turkish minority at the onset of 
transition had more to do with acquiring fundamental assurances for identity survival and 
preservation than with conscientious demands for liberalization and democratization. A 
remarkable expression o f the differences of perceptions and experience between the two 
titular nation and the Turkish minority was the fact that while ethnic Bulgarians during 
the regular December 1989 picketing of the National Assembly demanded political 
changes and democratization, the Turkish participants in separate demonstrations before 
the building demanded the return of their ethnic names, the right to worship, and the use 
of Turkish language in public.
Ethnic relations and tensions were among the most delicate issues discussed at the 
roundtable negotiations. The MRF was publicly invited to participate as a representative
220 n  ethnic relations in Bulgaria sec John Georgeoff, "Ethnic Minorities in the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria,” in George Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds.. The Politics o f  
Ethnicity in Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press. 1981): 49-85:
Martin V. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” in Peter Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds.. 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1969): 93-166; 
Maria Todorova, ‘T h e  Course and Discourse of Bulgarian Nationalism,” in Peter Sugar, 
ed., Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC:
American University Press, 1995): 55-103; Blagovest Tashev, "Politics of Ethnicity and 
Security in Bulgaria,” occasional paper no. 9803 (Saint Louis: Center for International 
Studies of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1998).
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of the Turkish minority, but for yet unknown reasons it declined to join the discussions.23 
Years of ethnic oppression under communist regime and gradual liberalization at the end 
o f 1989 led to exploding political mobilization among Turks and the formulation of a set 
o f demands for improvement o f the human and civil rights of ethnic minorities. Ethnic 
Turks began picketing the National Assembly, soon to be countered by Bulgarian 
nationalists in a mass protest. Both the UDF and the communists felt apprehensive and 
uncertain about the simmering ethnic tensions in the country and the political role to be 
played by the Turkish minority. Although the roundtable negotiations took place with full 
public openness, discussions on ethnic issues were held behind closed doors. An 
agreement was reached to ban parties based on ethnic or religious base, a provision which 
later made its way into the Constitution (Article 11, Section 4). Indeed, the Constitution, 
crafted in a Parliament dominated by the Socialists, included no liberal provisions on the 
way minorities organize politically and on basic human and civil rights. Elster, Offe, and 
Preuss, in a comparative study of post-communist institutions, observe that the Bulgarian 
constitution contains no guarantees of group rights for minorities.24 There is a 
constitutional tendency toward ethnic homogeneity as reflected in the ban on ethnic and 
religious parties, the declaration of the Bulgarian language as the official language of the 
Republic, and the duty to use and study Bulgarian language—which is slightly mitigated 
by the right o f citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian to study and use their own 
language under the terms of the law.
Although it appears that the ban on ethnic parties was aimed at the MRF there 
emerged a tacit agreement, at least among some institutions, to tolerate its existence.
23Kolarova and Dimitrov, 191.
24Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 80-93.
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Early in the 1990 election campaign, the Central Electoral Commission, a committee 
charged with the overall implementation and administration of the elections, registered 
candidates nominated by the MRF although a court had refused to register it as a party. 
The UDF, although not always on good terms with the leadership of the party, also never 
questioned its legitimacy. The BSP. on the other hand, although it often found itself 
cooperating with the MRF, repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of the party, both 
in its political rhetoric23 and, most importantly, through judicial means. It was only due to 
international pressure that the Constitutional Court, against the letter of the basic law, 
allowed the MFR to participate in the elections of 1990, and subsequently reaffirmed the 
constitutionality o f the party in 1992.26
Apart from their precarious and uncertain constitutional status, the MFR was 
politically isolated in the first years o f  post-communist transition. Although it controlled 
the swing vote in the parliament from 1991 to 1994, neither the UDF nor the BSP 
ventured to create formalized alliances with the party. The leadership of the ethnic Turks 
could not jeopardize its credentials by forming an alliance with the Socialists who were
' 3For manifestations of the Socialists’ anti-Turkish rhetoric see the Socialist daily 
Duma. Stayko Trifonov. “Why the Bulgarians in Kurdzhali Region Seek Protection in 
Greece” (text). Sofia Duma in Bulgarian (26 November 1990). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 3 December 1990 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-232; p. 15-16): For a more recent example sec Radka Petrova. 
“Ankara se Gotvi za Privatizatcijata ni.” [Ankara is Preparing for Our Privatization 
Process) in Duma (4 December, 1995). 1.
■°“Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (Summer
1992): 11-12; It must be noted that in the eve of the 1991 elections first the Regional 
Court and subsequently the Supreme Court refused the register the party under the name 
of Party for Rights and Freedoms. The Central Election Commission then re-registered 
the organization under its previous name, the MRF. Therefore, the registration of the 
MRF was based on precedent and remains an exception as no other ethnically based party 
has registered. See “Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review  3, no. 3 
(Summer 1994): 52-53.
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associated with the anti-Turkish policies of the old regime. The UDF. on the other hand, 
could not bring the MRF into a coalition government lest it alienate a large portion of its 
voters.
The 1994 electoral victory of the Socialists and two subsequent years of almost 
total BSP political dominance which rendered the opposition impotent, naturally brought 
the MFR and the UDF together thus ending the political isolation of the Turkish 
community. In early 1996 UDF, MRF, and the People’s Union (a center-right coalition) 
signed an agreement which agreed upon the selection of a jo in t candidate for the 
presidential elections to be held in November. The newly created coalition, called United 
Democratic Forces (UdDF), did not have much effect on the workings o f the Parliament. 
However, its candidate, Petar Stojanov, went on to win the presidential elections in the 
run-off. gathering 60 percent o f the vote as opposed to 40 percent for the Socialist 
candidate. Once the BSP’s power and cohesion was destroyed, the incentives for 
cooperation between the UdDF and the MFR were lost and they parted ways before the 
1997 parliamentary elections. The MFR was once again able to avoid political isolation 
by forging another coalition with several smaller centrist parties.
High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms o f the 
states constitutional system. Compared to most East European countries, the Bulgarian 
population has exhibited a persistent criticism of the implementation of reforms along 
with a deep distrust of democratic institutions and officials. Political parties, parliament, 
courts, and presidency, the core institutions of every democratic society, score low on the 
scale of public trust (See Table 1). In fact, a majority of the public finds that the behavior
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of politicians and officials is even worse than in the communist era.27 These attitudes 
existed along with a dissatisfaction with the way democracy is developing in the country.
In Eastern Europe, satisfaction with democracy is strongly influenced by personal 
political and economic assessments; the greater the political and economic optimism, the 
greater the satisfaction with the way democracy is working. The impact o f satisfaction 
with the way democracy performs is significant, for studies indicate that it is a 
substantive factor that mediates the effect of other variables on regime legitimacy.28 In 
Bulgaria dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs (See Table 2) does not appear 
to negatively affect support for democratic regime and even the legitimacy o f the current 
regime, however inefficient its performance has been (See Tables 3, 4 and 5).29 Indeed, 
support for building a market economy and acceptance of the present and future 
democratic system of rule simply confirms earlier studies asserting that legitimacy of 
democracy is a relatively autonomous variable. However, in Bulgaria public attitudes 
indicating the legitimacy o f democracy have not existed along with a strong rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives (See Tables 6, 7, and 8), an essential component in every set of 
public attitudes and norms that support democracy.
The Bulgarian public exhibited a relatively high degree of approval o f the past 
communist regime, and a significant minority has always supported the establishment of 
a strong rule including a military one. Therefore, it may be speculated that despite the
' 7Ase Grodeland, Tatyana Koshechkina and William L. Miller. "In Theory 
Correct. But in Practice ...” Public Attitudes to Really Existing Democracy in Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic,” Journal o f  Communist Studies and  
Transition Politics 14, no. 3 (September 1998): 1-23.
28Diamond, 77-93.
‘ Performance is construed to broadly include the political outputs and character 
of the regime, as well as the material conditions it generates. Diamond, 77.
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high public support for democracy and its practice, until the late 1990s the Bulgarian 
public remained ambiguous in its acceptance of the existing political system and 
institutions. Frequent political crises and a general lack of economic prosperity as a result 
o f long-delayed market reforms have maintained a relatively high degree of 
dissatisfaction with the way the political system performs, including belief that human 
rights are not respected, disapproval o f the direction of the country, dissatisfaction with 
the development of democracy, and a low trust in institutions. Dissatisfaction with the 
development of democracy in the country and disapproval of the direction of country 
were especially high during the majority rule of the former communists between 1994 
and 1996 (See Table 2). The ascent of the UDF in 1997 brought about a greater public 
approval of the direction o f the country (from negative 63 to positive 21). while 
satisfaction with the development of democracy improved only slightly from negative 81 
to negative 54.
It was noted in the theoretical discussion of this study that legitimacy is shaped by 
a wide array of variables. It appears that in the case of Bulgaria until the late 1990s, 
performance variables, and one might argue historical variables, have not positively 
affected the development and internalization of mass beliefs and commitments that 
sustain the regime’s legitimacy.
Czech Republic
Two-turnover test. Formally, the Czech Republic meets the two-tumover test. At 
the First post-communist elections on June 8-9, 1990, the Civic Forum, a broad and 
amorphous coalition of anti-communist parties and groups, won over 53 percent of the
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Czech votes for the House o f the People. 50 percent of the votes for the House of the 
Nations, and almost 50 percent for the National Council. At the federal level, the Civic 
Forum formed a coalition government with its Slovak counterpart. Public Against 
Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement. As in most of the other 
countries in the region the initial elections in the Czech lands o f Czechoslovakia were 
dominated by broad-based movements and groups. The 1992 elections, however, were 
dominated by political parties. In the National Council the right-of-center political parties 
had a majority of seats and formed a coalition government of the Civic Democratic Party 
(CDP)'°, the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA). and the Czech People's Party-Christian 
Democratic Union (CPP-CDU), which was led by Prime M inister Vaclav Klaus. After 
serving its entire four-year term, the governing coalition returned to power in the 1996 
elections (which were also the First elections in the newly independent Czech Republic), 
although it fell one seat short of an absolute majority. Remarkably, it was the first post­
communist coalition in Eastern Europe to win re-election. However, amid economic 
stagnation and political crisis, the coalition government disintegrated and an early 
election in 1998 brought to power the previously in opposition Social Democrats (CSD).
What distinguishes the Czech governmental turnover from the case of Bulgaria is 
the lack of political and social violence accompanying the change of ruling elites. Indeed 
following the collapse o f the totalitarian regime, marked by the inability of the 
communist elite to mobilize a violent rcsponsejl to rising opposition demands for change,
3(VThe CDP entered into an electoral alliance with the Christian Democratic Party 
(ChDP).
’'Linz and Stepan observe that the members of coercive institutions in 
Czechoslovakia such as the police and army simply did not believe in the legitimacy of 
the orders to use violence against the opposition in November 1989. See Linz and Stepan, 
323-5.
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the parliaments, both on the federal and Czech level, became the principle framework in 
which political interests clashed, bargained, and sought political ends. Once the 
communist elite was removed as the sole holder of power and voters in 1990 elected 
relatively heterogenous groups and parties to the parliament, the potential for violence 
significantly decreased. The weakness of the Communist party after the first elections 
had two important consequences for the likelihood of political violence. First, the very 
low percent of votes the communists gathered in the elections (13.5 percent of the Czech 
votes for the House o f People in the 1990 election) and the way the party simply 
collapsed under society 's pressure deprived the still unreformed party o f the capacity to 
stir a radical confrontation and reverse the process of democratization. On the other hand, 
the relatively low presence of communist deputies, along with the presence of a wide 
range of anti-communist groups, legitimized the parliament as truly representative of 
diverse political interests and thus decreased the incentives for radical and extreme 
political actions. Thus, while the radical anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria found 
itself institutionally marginalized and therefore willing to exploit its growing political 
power on the street, the Czech opposition to the old elite quickly came to dominate the 
process of institution crafting and clearly established the parliament and elections as the 
ultimate arbiter in political conflict. Furthermore, the parliament in the Czech Republic 
became the only institutional forum within which new political actors could interact as 
the party system developed through splits of parliamentary-based parties and coalitions.
Of course, the conspicuous lack of direct public action and political violence does 
not imply an absence o f public im pact on the political process, but simply the 
significance of institutionalized forms of political action. Furthermore, Czech 
governments did not base their legitimacy only on the outcomes of electoral votes but
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also on the support of public opinion between elections. Indeed, while direct action such 
as protests, demonstrations and strikes have been few and confined to the non-political, 
mainly economic sphere, changes in pubic preferences and attitudes have had significant 
impact on government and party fortunes. Writing on the Czech elections o f 1998, Radin 
Marada observes that the political crisis in the governing coalition which, ultimately 
leading to the fall of the Klaus government and the holding of early elections, was 
preceded by a significant swing of pubic opinion. President and trade unions against the 
government and its policies. ’2 Conversely, a public approval of the Bulgarian government 
reaching single digits, and universal hostility o f trade unions and the President against the 
policies of the socialists failed to force the resignation o f the government of Zhan 
Videnov. Only when the prospects of widespread political and social violence threatened 
the very foundations of the political system did the government agreed to resign and hold 
early elections.
Initial agreement among all sectors o f  society on the fundamental rules o f  the 
political game. Not unlike Bulgaria, the opposition in Czechoslovakia was surprised at 
the sudden appearance o f a window of opportunity for democratization. No negotiating 
team was ready to begin talks with the regime. It was two days after the November 19 
brutal suppression of the student demonstration that the opposition in the Czech part of 
the state set up formal structure, the Civic Forum.”  Unlike Bulgaria, however, the lack of
2Radim Marada, “T h e  1998 Czech Elections,” East European Constitutional 
Review 7, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 51-8.
’3For a discussion of the roundtable negotiations in Czechoslovakia see Bernard 
Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia: 1988-91 (Boulder, 
CO: Wetview Press: 1992); Milos Calda, “The Roundtable Talks in Czechoslovakia,” in 
Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank Boenkcr, Ulrike Goetting, and 
Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the 
Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 135-77.
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previous formal organization and experience did not prevent the opposition from 
dominating the talks and imposing the new rules o f the game. Indeed, the talks cannot be 
characterized as bargaining over outcomes but rather as managing the peaceful transition 
of power from the collapsing regime to the opposition. Vaclav Havel, the leader o f the 
anticommunist Civic Forum, and his close advisers simply presented the regime with the 
terms of abdication and transition. By the time the first round of talks was held on 
November 26, 1989, it was clear to almost all participants that the power had slipped 
from the hands of the communists. In the span o f two months, the roundtable decided on 
the election of Havel as president, the formation o f a coalition government with members 
both from the communist party and the opposition, and the recall of deputies from the 
Federal Assembly and their replacement with members from the Civic Forum and its 
Slovak counterpart. Public Against Violence. On the Czech level, the Czech National 
Council was reconstructed like the Federal Assembly. The reconstructed parliament, on 
its part, encouraged the formation of a roundtable on regional, district, and local levels.
Unlike in Bulgaria, the First Czechoslovakia elections in 1990 and 1992 produced 
stable governments that lasted their full terms. Indeed, until 1997 the Czech Republic 
seemed to be the most politically stable country in Eastern Europe. The political system 
went through the complex process of creating new political institutions without the 
emergence of significant players that challenged the nature and direction of institution 
building. The main norms, procedures, and institutions were accepted by all significant 
contending parties and players. The political formation and conflicts outside of 
parliaments that marked the institution-crafting in the rest of Eastern Europe was lacking 
in the Czech Republic; the parliament (first the federal and later the national) became the
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venue for addressing political conflicts and defining the institutional content of the 
political system.
The lack o f a single party with a parliamentary majority to rule alone contributed 
to the emergence o f a condition wherein plurality parties had to seek the support of both 
ideologically close and opposition parties in order to establish stable governments. This 
practice of sharing power and negotiating agreements of support provided diverse 
political players with stakes in the emerging system and ensured their security. After the 
1992 elections, the strongest political party, the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) led by 
Vaclav Klaus, formed a coalition government with the Christian Democratic U nion- 
made of the Czechoslovakia’s People's Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance. After 
the 1996 elections, the governing coalition lost its majority in the parliament. Klaus, 
however, negotiated an agreement with the largest single opposition party in the 
parliament, the Social Democratic Party (CSDP), to support the continuation of the old 
government as a minority government. In exchange, the Social Democrats, led by Milos 
Zeman, were awarded seats in the parliament’s leadership including the Speakership and 
several committee chair positions.
The year 1997 marked the end of relative political stability in the Czech Republic. 
A deteriorating economic situation, rising unemployment, reports about corruption and 
nepotism, and general Western unhappiness with the pace and direction of reforms, led to 
the disintegration of the governing coalition and early parliamentary elections in 1998. 
After the elections, the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party in the parliament 
but did not have enough seats to form a majority government. After numerous 
negotiations failed to produce either center-left or center-right governing coalitions,
Klaus agreed to allow a minority Social Democratic government by not supporting any
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future non-confidence votes. In return, the Social Democrats agreed to give the CDP 
major parliamentary posts and to consult with them on important decisions. ’4
However, growing discontent in 1999 over political and economic stagnation 
marked the limitations of informal agreements between the two largest parties in 
parliament. After nine years of peaceful transition in which the very few mass public 
protests were mostly confined to economic and social demands, the public once again felt 
compelled to mobilize mass demonstrations demanding political change. By the end of 
1999. tens of thousands of Czechs demanded a new government and early elections in the 
largest movement since the end of com m unism /5 Disillusioned with the political elite, 
protests called not only for the resignation of Milos Zeman but also for the ouster of 
C D P's leader Vaclav Klaus. Klaus and Zeman dismissed the movement as irrelevant, but 
nevertheless, responding to growing public and political demands for change, the CDP 
felt compelled to rescind the informal agreement with Zeman and to consider ways to 
replace the minority Social Democrat government—an unlikely option given the fractured 
political makeup of the Czech parliament. ’0 Indeed, by early 2000 the two parties once 
again reached agreement on a plan, which would keep the minority Social Democratic 
government in power. ’7
340 n  the negotiations between the parties following the 1996 and 1998 elections 
see Steven Saxonberg, “A New Phase in Czech Politics.” Journal o f  Democracy 10, no. 1 
(W inter 1999): 96-111.
^ “Thousands o f Czechs Rally to Demand New Leadership,” Reuters (3 
December, 1999).
30Reuters (17 December, 1999).
37,‘Czech Opposition Party Backs Deal to Save Government,” Reuters (25 
January, 2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Coalition governments and informal agreements provided a framework of 
political arrangements that ensured the stability of the transition process in the years 
following the Velvet Revolution.,s These political arrangements, however, worked as 
long as the reform was delivering and the institutions were performing. Although the 
Social Democrats and Civic Democrats were willing to maintain informal agreements to 
support each other’s minority governments, the inability of Klaus' and Zeman’s 
governments to press with reform and deliver on promises and expectations ultimately 
delegitimized the deals between the two largest political parties. In the final account, the 
inter-party informal agreements have been a mixed blessing for the institutionalization of 
the Czech political system. On the one hand, informal deals mark parties’ acceptance of 
the need to provide other players with stakes in the system and indicate their ability to 
work in an environment of diffused power. Nevertheless, the informal deals in Czech 
politics after 1996 proved no substitute for effective politics. Although the agreement 
between Zeman and Klaus provided workable conditions for minority governments, the 
success of each government was ultimately contingent on the substance and success o f its 
policies. In other words, in the context of a pluralistic political system not dominated at 
any time by single political, party agreements proved a necessary but not sufficient factor 
for a stable transition.
The willingness of Czech political parties to negotiate, compromise, and conclude 
functional agreements was facilitated by institutional conditions, which did not exist in 
Bulgaria. From the very beginning of the transition in Czechoslovakia, dominant groups 
and individuals held strong “anti-politics” views. Conflicts were seen as “politics” and
38The provisional government set after the collapse of the communist regime and 
the government formed after the first post-communist elections in 1990 were broadly 
based as well and relied on the support of diverse groups and parties.
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thus to be avoided. Milos Calda observes that as early in the transition as the roundtable 
talks, the anti-communist opposition was concerned more with the issue of parity in 
transitional institutions-betw een Czechs and Slovaks, communists and anticommunists, 
those with party affiliation and those without—rather than with eliminating the 
communists as a political force/'1’ Indeed, in a stage o f the roundtable talks when the 
opposition had to choose an electoral system, Havel rejected a majoritarian model fearing 
that the dominant position of his Civic Forum would enable it to win almost all the seats 
in parliament.40 Before the collapse of communism, Czech dissidents never voiced 
interests in control of government. Instead Charter 77 and the Czech dissident movement 
developed into an alternative framework of social life, a “second polis” which existed 
separate but parallel to the state.41 Following the end o f the communist rule, the former 
dissidents did not initially seek to institute a new political power structure.42 which would 
establish control over state, economy, and society. Therefore, leaders and groups in 
Czechoslovakia tended to easily accept and accommodate newly emerging groups and 
leaders.
v,See Calda.
40Elster, et al. Institutional Design, 115.
4lOn Havel and Klaus’ ideas see Vaclav Havel. The Art o f  the Impossible: Politics 
as Morality in Practice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997) and Vaclav Klaus. 
Renaissance: The Rebirth o f  Liberty in the Heart o f  Europe (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 1997); See also David M. Olson, “Democratization and Political Participation: 
The Experience o f the Czech Republic,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The 
Consolidation o f  Democracy in East-Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). Linz and Stepan, 316-22.
42Linz and Stepan observe that Havel and his closest associates' style was not 
only anti-political but also anti-institutional as little attention was paid to formal 
institutional matters in the transition period. See Linz and Stepan. 331.
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In addition, the constitutional context in Czechoslovakia in the transition period 
further enabled the emerging Czech political parties to adopt non-confrontational 
behavior and rules of the game. At the federal level following the first free elections.
Civic Forum, Public Against Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement 
formed a coalition government. To enact constitutional amendments and other major 
legislation required a three-fifths majority both in the Chamber of the People and in the 
Chamber of the Nations. Under Slovak political pressure, one of the first tasks of the 
Federal parliament was to define the divisions of powers between the federation and the 
two constituent republics.43 Accordingly, talks between the federal government and the 
governments of the two republics took place from August to December 1990, 
culminating in the adoption by the Federal Assembly o f a constitutional amendment on 
power sharing. Although Czech parties failed to redefine the federation, which ultimately 
determined its demise, the experience of dealing with Slovak counterparts socialized 
them in the politics of accommodating multiple interests.44
The dominance o f  instrumental rather than fundamental politics—consensus on 
the ends, but political struggle over the means. Czech politics emerged as much more 
pragmatic than Bulgaria’s. Despite the presence of ideological rhetoric, parties tend to be 
pragmatic in a polity in which even anti-system parties are gradually socialized in the 
rules o f the game.43 Like in Bulgaria, the Czech party system was formed along a left-
43Elster, et al. Institutional Design , 71.
'‘‘‘Of course, this relatively non-confrontational mode of political behavior did not 
prevent the federation from splitting apart at the end of 1992.
4:>On Czech political parties see Wendy Hollis. Democratic Consolidation in 
Eastern Europe: The Influence o f the Communist Legacy in Hungary>, the Czech 
Republic, and Romania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 221-90.
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right axis. Yet, public and elite preferences never gravitated toward the extreme ends of 
the axis. Data presented by Michal Klima indicates that the early transformation of the 
Czech political system was dominated by a centrist orientation.46 Later, with the advent 
of market and political reforms, and the disintegration of the Civic Forum, both the public 
and the political elite moved in a markedly right direction, a development manifested in 
the election to the Parliament o f right-of-center political parties in 1992.47 Klima 
observes that even after the consolidation o f the Czech political system and the return of 
centrist tendencies, overwhelming public preferences for the right-of-center orientations 
remained a stable phenomenon. Recent public opinion polls seem to suggest that these
48preferences remain stable.
Most contemporary political parties in the Czech Republic seem to gravitate to the 
center of the right-left axis.47 Most are to the right on economics and liberal on liberty- 
authority issues. Of course, one should not overstate the similarities between political 
parties. The two major Christian parties, while committed to a free market, defend the 
role of the Church and religious values in social and political life and favor property 
restitution questions. The Social Democrats, in contrast to the center-right parties, while 
tending toward the market, favor more state involvement. The differences among the 
majority of mainstream parties, however, do not lead to intense political confrontations of
46Michal Klima, “Consolidation and Stabilization of the Party System in the 
Czech Republic,” Political Studies 46, no 3 (Special issue, 1998): 495-510.
470 n ly  approximately 20 percent o f deputies identified themselves with the left 
while the rest placed themselves in the center and on the right along the left-right axis.
See Klima, 498.
48“Right and Center Orientation Prevailing Among Czechs.” Czech News Aeencv 
(12 April. 2000).
4<,Olson, 183.
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the type that stalled the formation o f  a stable institution in Bulgaria and postponed 
economic reform.
There are several factors that may go a long way in explaining the relative lack of 
confrontation between political parties in the Czech Republic and their gravitation toward 
the center of the right-left axis. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield hypothesize that 
in countries as the Czech Republic, characterized by relatively advanced economic 
development, high ethnic homogeneity, and stable borders, attitudes toward the market 
are likely to be the most significant dimension in the structure o f political cleavages.30 
Where socio-economic issues dominate the basis o f partisanship, the potential for 
consensus at mass and elite levels is more likely than in societies where ethnic divisions 
and questions of borders and national identity are central to the structuring of political 
cleavages. Indeed, political parties in the Czech Republic, from early on in the transition, 
focused their discourse and partisanship mainly on economic issues.31 The main issues of 
contention were related to econom ic reform, privatization and the associated corruption, 
and the general role of the state in the market.
Even over economic issues Czech political parties adopted a much more 
pragmatic approach than their political discourse might suggest. In the first eight years of 
economic reforms, despite Vaclav Klaus’ neoliberal rhetoric, the government 
implemented policies that seemed to satisfy all politically significant interests and 
ensured that none of them w'ould undermine reforms and newly established institutions.
30Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Structuring o f Political Cleavages 
in Post-Communist Societies: The Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” Political 
Studies 46, no. 1 (March 1998): 115-39.
31 Jan Obrman, ‘T he Czechoslovak Elections: A Guide to the Parties,” RFE/RL  
Research Report 1 no. 22 (29 May, 1992): 1-16; Olson.
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In contrast to Bulgaria, the political elite who designed the transformation policies in the 
Czech Republic was newly formed and liberal, and was not connected with the old 
communist elite and the associated managerial class that presided over the economy. In 
fact, the communist party failed to transform into a significant political player with any 
real impact on the political and economic transformation. Indeed, in this respect the 
Czech Republic is unique in Eastern Europe, as it produced the only genuine social- 
democratic party, the CSSD, which has no roots in the old communist party.
The new political elite embarked on quick privatization aimed at precipitating the 
formation of powerful interests that might have prevented it. The lack o f presentation of 
the old political and economic class in the new leadership, however, made a conflict 
between reformers and managerial class inevitable. Recognition of the significance of the 
hurdle the old economic elite might pose to the reform convinced the reformers to 
provide the managerial class with stakes in the market.32 Indeed, the old economic elite 
acquired control over almost half of the enterprises and maintained their managerial jobs. 
The privatization of big businesses was accompanied by the restitution of old assets 
confiscated after the communist takeover in 1948 and the auctioning of small enterprises.
Despite Vaclav Klaus’ neoliberal rhetoric, the first Czech governments attempted 
to satisfy various interests in their pursuit of comprehensive reforms. From the beginning 
o f the transition, the government embarked on policies designed to build a market 
economy while implementing social democratic policies to maintain basic living 
standards and alleviate the negative consequences of transition. Indeed, as Maark Tomass 
observes, although the neoliberal ideology takes credit for the success o f the Czech
32Maark Tomass, “A Decade of Conflicts in Czech Economic Transformation,” 
Journal o f  Economic Issues 33, no 2 (June 1999): 315-24
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transition, much of the economy was controlled by the government.3'' It must be noted, of 
course, that state control is not in itself instrumental for a successful economic and social 
transformation as the Bulgarian case only too conspicuously illustrates. The Czech 
reformers, however, used the power of the state to stir the reform and ensure that all 
concerns of diverse social and political interests in the society are addressed by 
governmental policies. Hence, the transition to a market economy was not challenged by 
old elites-how ever weak the political elite might have been-and the society as a whole.
In the economic sphere the trade unions did not have reason to protest, and in the political 
sphere until 1998. the society did not see reasons to demand dramatic changes in the 
mode of transition.
Foreign and defense policies are even less contentions areas of political discourse. 
Daniel Nelson and Thomas Szayna observe that security and defense issues have a low 
priority and marked indifference among the electorate. Similarly, the political elite, 
missing the incentive for political gains, rarely engages in debates on security and the 
military.34 The uninterrupted rule o f the Civic Democrats, their allies, and President 
Havel ensured a high degree of continuity in foreign and defense policy. As early as April 
1993, the Parliament received and noted principle guidelines for foreign policy including 
progressive engagement and membership in the European Union. NATO, and the 
W EU.33 On security policies in particular, the Czech political elite sees NATO as the
53Ibid., 322.
34Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas Szanyna, N ATO 's Membership ami Central 
European Politics: Effects o f  Alliance Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
1997), 19-27.
33Miloslav Had and Vladimir Handl, "The Czech Republic," in Richard Smoke, 
ed., Perceptions o f  Security’: Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New  
Democracies (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996): 129-43.
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only institution capable of ensuring the state’s security. Had and Handl identify some 
differences among the elite on the timing and methods of achieving NATO 
membership.30 These differences, however, did not dilute the existing unanimity that 
NATO remained the Czech Republic’s main security goal. When the state was invited to 
join the Alliance in 1997, no political controversies and divisions were generated by 
either the public or the political elite. Consequently, the ascent to power of the Social 
Democrats did not in any substantial way change the state's foreign and security 
policies.37
Inclusiveness o f  political society—decree o f participation o f  diverse social and  
ethnic groups. The disintegration of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia brought 
about an explosion o f political and social mobilization and participation. The emerging 
institutions, however, were able to channel a growing number of diverse interests and 
demands. Newly evolving groups were gradually socialized in the rules of the game and 
accommodated institutionally. After peacefully solving its political, institutional, and 
national conflict with the Slovak part o f the federation by way of peaceful separation, it 
seemed that unlike most other East European countries, the Czech political system would 
avoid the potentially divisive problem of accommodating ethnic and national minority 
interests. Most authors point to the high ethnic homogeneity of the Czech Republic as a 
positive factor in the country’s transition and institutional consolidation. The absence of 
restive minorities in the country or Czech diaspora in neighboring states is seen as
56Ibid, 139-40.
3?During the Kosovo crises in 1999, the Czech Republic irritated the Alliance by 
publicly proposing to mediate in the conflict and it appeared that the national foreign 
policy elite did not speak with one voice on the conflict. This lack of consistency toward 
the crisis, however, did not in any way signify departure from the state’s foreign and 
security priorities and policies.
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eliminating the potential for intense political confrontation fed by interests defined by 
distinct ethnic or national identities. The stable institutionalization of the political system 
was assured by the ability of institutions to absorb new groups and by the receptivity of 
the groups to these institutions. Minority ethnic groups are seen by most authors as hard 
to accommodate by political and social systems traditionally unresponsive to their 
distinct demands and interests.
The capacity of Czech institutions to absorb new groups has been challenged by 
late 1990s in the emergence o f the Roma problem. After the collapse of the communist 
regime, the Romanies—a minority traditionally discriminated against and just over 2 
percent of the population-did not manage to achieve any politically meaningful 
organization that would have enabled them to seek political power and participation. 
Although 32 Roma political parties existed none of them gathered enough votes to send 
deputies to the Parliament.38 The lack of political representation only compounded the 
social, economic, and legal problem s the Romanies encounter in the Czech Republic. The 
disintegration of the communist regime and the subsequent transition toward democracy 
and a market economy destroyed previously the existing pattern of relationship between 
the society and the Roma minority. Romanies have been the hardest hit by the ensuing 
political, social, and economic transformations. Although the unemployment rate has 
been remarkably low for a country in profound economic transition, almost two-thirds of 
the Roma are unemployed due to a lack of essential skills, minimal education, and 
professional motivation. Socially, Romanies suffer from overt public discrimination and
38Jirina Siklova and M arta Miklusakova, “Law as an Instrument of 
Discrimination: Denying Citizenship to the Czech Roma,” East European Constitutional 
Review 7, no. 2 (Spring 1998). Available from http://www.law.nyu.edu; INTERNET.
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are often victims of racially motivated attacks.^ Even more significantly, from an 
institutional point of view, the new Czech citizenship law is intentionally designed to 
exclude the Roma who were previously citizens o f the federation until 1993.60
One of the most dramatic consequences o f democratization in Eastern Europe was 
the emergence of ethnic identities as an instrumental factor in political mobilization. 
Ethnic groups, already holding distinct identities and interests, organized for political 
action and placed demands for inclusion in the newly emerging institutional framework. 
Often the failure of bargaining elites to include and accommodate these groups resulted 
in the most disruptive consequences in transition processes. The Romany minority, 
however, did not organize along a distinct group identity because, as Siklova and 
Miklusakova point out, “they lack a common, consciously shared identity.” The 
overwhelming majority in the group does not claim  Roma nationality and identity 
although that option has been available since 1991. The lack of a common language and 
the dominance of family ties in the framework of social and economic interactions have 
further prevented Romanies from achieving any form of organized political and social 
action. Not surprisingly, the minority had no unified concept of its identity and proper 
cultural, social, and political roles under the conditions of democracy. Neither the 
government nor various Roma organizations have clear visions about the policies needed 
to address the problem of accommodation. What is important from the institutionalization 
point of view, however, is that at least until 1997, the Roma minority did not present a
59United States Department of State, The Czech Republic Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices fo r  1997 (Washington, DC: US Department of State. 1998), 
section 5.
°°See Jiri Pehe. “Law on Romanies Causes Uproar in Czech Republic," RFE/RL 
Research Report 2, no. 1(12 February, 1993): 18-22.
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significant predicament in the process o f  incorporating newly mobilized groups into the 
institutional framework.
It was only in 1997 that the Czech Republic witnessed the emergence of the Roma 
minority as a separate dimension in the transition. As thousands of Romanies tried to 
immigrate to the West and there appeared more frequent reports of racist practices, the 
government came under intense international scrutiny. The Canadian government, 
responding to an influx of Czech Romanies, imposed visa requirements for all Czech 
citizens; some Western European governments threatened to follow suit, and the 
European Union criticized the state for failing to address the legal, social, and economic 
status of the minority. The debate reached embarrassing proportions when the city 
council of Usti nad Labem erected a wall to separate Roma council apartments from 
private apartments. Only after the government and international community intervened 
did the local council agree to demolish the wall. The incident marked the evolution of the 
status of Romanies into a more prominent dimension of institution building in the slate. 
President Havel called for a wider social debate on the issue and the European Union 
defined the treatment of Romanies as a key problem in the Czech quest for membership 
in the Union.61 It appears that after seven years of relatively unproblematic institutional 
accommodation of newly mobilized groups, the problem of the Romany Czechs gained 
the potential o f creating disruptive new cleavages in the pattern of party competition at 
the elite level. Furthermore, a future division at the elite level will be mirrored in a 
similar base of partisanship among the public. Indeed, as the analysis of Evans and 
Whitefiled indicates, along with the issue of social values, attitudes toward Romanies 
“constitute the main aspect of a still weaker but still significant second dimension" of
6l“Czech City Destroys Wall Separating Gypsies,” Reuters (24 November. 1999).
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partisanship.62 It remains to be seen whether the Roma issue will emerge as a significant 
problem in the process of institutionalization. It can be hypothesized that the failure of 
the Romany community to mobilize for political and social action can only be offset by 
sustained and robust intervention by international actors, the European Union in 
particular.
High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms o f the 
state 's constitutional system. Compared to public attitudes in Bulgaria, people in the 
Czech Republic were much more positive about politicians and officials in the transition 
period. An overwhelming majority declared that politicians and officials’ behavior has 
improved since the communist era.6'1 Support for the principles o f democracy and its 
practice, a market economy, privatization, and multi-party system was near universal.
The public exhibited a high approval of the current and future regime (Tables 4 and 5), a 
common trend in most East European countries.
The performance of the regime seemed to have no significant impact on the 
legitimacy of democracy in the country. Indeed, when the political system and society 
began to experience economic downturn, political stalemate, and lack of political 
accountability on the part of the political elite, the public grew' dissatisfied with the 
performance of the regime and the direction of the country (See Tables 2 and 9). On the 
other hand, these negative attitudes did not undermine the stability of democracy's 
legitimacy.
What accounts for the relatively high level of legitimacy is the high level of 
public trust in democratic institutions, despite the presence of dissatisfaction with their
62Evans and Whitefield. 126.
f” Grodeland.
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performance. Indeed, in the Czech Republic democratic institutions enjoyed significantly 
higher levels of public trust compared to Bulgaria (See Table I). Richard Rose and his 
associates observe that trust in democratic institutions is associated with support for the 
new regimes in Eastern Europe.64 Trust is also associated with the rejection of 
authoritarian forms of political organization. In the Czech Republic relatively high levels 
of pubic trust in political and civil institutions seems to boost the regime’s legitimacy. 
Another factor that accounts for the legitimacy of the regime is the Czech Republic’s 
historical experience, unique among East European countries. In the inter-war period, the 
country was a constituent part of Czechoslovakia, a country with a lively democratic 
system and participatory political tradition.
It must be noted, however, that the Czech Republic experienced a significantly 
lower level of political, social, and economic instability compared to Bulgaria and 
Lithuania, and thus public attitudes have not been tested by unsatisfactory regime 
performance. It remains to be seen what would be the effect of the late 1990s political 
and economic crisis on dem ocracy's legitimacy. For the most part of the transition, the 
country achieved a high level of accommodation of diverse interests seeking participation 
and satisfaction. The Czech Republic was the East European country with the lowest 
level of political and social confrontation. The economic and political crisis of the late 
1990s, however, exposed the fragility o f  the achieved consensus and challenged the 
regime capacity to easily address the interests of all social and political groups.
64Rose, et al.. Democracy and its Alternatives, 155.
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Lithuania
Two-tumover test. Formally, Lithuania meets the two-turnover test. Since its 
independence in 1991, Lithuania has held three parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996 and 
2000 in which different political parties gained majority in the parliament and formed 
governments. However, it can be argued that even before seceding from the Soviet 
Union, the republic achieved a relatively high degree of political pluralism. The 1989 
elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and the 1990 elections to the 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet witnessed competition between various political formations, 
including the Lithuanian Communist Party, the nationalist Sajudis movement, and other 
nascent political parties. In fact, Sajudis, a mass nationalist movement seeking 
Lithuania’s independence, emerged as the dom inant group in 1989 by winning 36 of the 
42 seats to the Congress. A year later, in the first pluralistic national elections to the 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in February 1990, Sajudis-backed candidates won 80 percent 
o f the seats. The former communist party (renam ed Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 
[LDLP] in December 1990) gained only 25 seats against 99 for Sajudis.63
These initial competitive elections were dominated by the question of Lithuania’s 
independence from the Soviet Union. The com munist party, led by Algirdas Brazauskas. 
favored a slow approach to achieving independence as the most realistic policy to ensure 
peaceful secession. Conversely, Sajudis, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, centered its 
campaign on the promise of speedy and unconditional independence. Accordingly, on the
foOn the 1989 and 1990 elections see Richard J. Krickus, “ Democratization in 
Lithuania,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds.. The Consolidation o f  Democracy 
in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 297.
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eve of the overwhelming Sajudis electoral victory, the new Parliament voted on March 
11. 1990 to restore the sovereignty of Lithuania/16
After the abortive August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, both Moscow and the 
international community recognized Lithuanian independence. Once the issue o f political 
sovereignty and secession was finally settled the electorate turned their attention to the 
pressing issues o f  economic and institutional reform and at the same time increased their 
expectations about the ability of state and political institutions to deliver the economic 
and social dividends o f the newly acquired independence. Not surprisingly, the inability 
of the ruling Sajudis to stabilize the disintegrating economy, continued political stalemate 
in parliament, and the inability of governmental institutions to implement even basic 
reforms brought about changes in public perceptions and voters brought the former 
communists back to power. In the 1992 elections the LDLP won a landslide victory in the 
new 141-seat Sejm a by capturing 77 seats compared to only 13 for Sajudis.67 
Notwithstanding, this remarkable, in the context of East European transition politics, 
return of ex-communists to power, the 1992 parliamentary elections marked the advent of 
fully competitive electoral politics.
w’On Lithuania’s transition to democracy, see Anatol Lieven. The Baltic 
Revolution: Estonia , Lat\'ia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence ((New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 214-373; Alfred Erich Senn, Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania 
(New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995); Krickus. “Democratization in Lithuania,” 290-330; 
Richard J. Krickus, Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Breakup o f the Soviet 
Empire (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997); V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, 
Lithuania: the Rebel Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1997); Graham Smith, ed.. 
The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination o f  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1994); Ole Norgaard, Dan Hindsgaul, Lars Johansen and 
Helle Willumsen, The Baltic States After Independence (Brookfiled, VT: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company, 1996).
67For the results of the 1992 and 1996 elections see Velio Pettai and Marcus 
Kreuzer, “Party Politics in the Baltic States: Social Bases and Institutional Context,” East 
European Politics and  Societies 13, no. 1 (Winter 1999). 157-8.
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The LDLP went on to govern alone but faced formidable challenges in trying to 
build a market economy and meet citizens’ economic and social expectations. Although 
the LDLP succeeded in bringing a measure of economic stability, the nationalist forces 
(now reorganized as the Homeland Union-Lithuanian conservatives, or the HU-LC) led 
by Landsbergis won the 1996 parliamentary elections by capturing 51.1 percent of the 
seats and forming a government in coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) 
who won 14 seats, the second largest number. The LDLP came forth winning only 11, or 
8.8 percent of the seats.
Lithuania's parliamentary elections in October 2000 marked the ascent to power 
of a new political coalition including the center-right Liberal Union which won 34 seats, 
the center-left Liberal Union of Social Liberals with 29 parliamentary seats and several 
smaller parties. The left-leaning Social Democratic Coalition led by Algirdas Brazauskas 
and including the LDDP, Social Democratic Party, New Democratic Party and Russian 
Union of Lithuania won 51 seats. The Home Union of Landsbergis suffered the biggest 
slip in support and gained only 9 seats.08
In addition to the three post-independence parliamentary elections, Lithuania held 
regular and free presidential and local elections which further institutionalized the 
electoral process as an essential component of the political process. These elections were 
seen by ail political players as legitimate and their results were not challenged. 
Consequently, in the initial phase of transition, the parliament became the crucial 
instrument of system transformation. Indeed, political parties played marginal role until
68For complete results see Terry D. Clark and Nerijus Prekevicus, “First We Take 
Vilnius, Then We Take Palm Beach,” Central Europe Review  2, no. 41 (27 November, 
2000). Available from http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
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after the 1992 parliamentary elections, which fostered the creation o f a more consolidated 
party system.
Initial agreement among all sectors o f society on the fundam ental rules o f  the 
political game. Lithuania's model o f institutional transformation is sim ilar to the process 
of democratization in the rest of Eastern Europe. The institutional structure was built 
through negotiations between the extricating communist elite and the newly emerging 
opposition. The initial phase of transition to independence and democracy was short and 
consensual. The emerging organized opposition, led by the mass movement Sajudis, and 
the reform communists, led by Brazauskas, quickly reached an agreement on the need to 
achieve Lithuania's independence and build a new political system. Indeed, when Sajudis 
emerged in 1988 it represented a coalition between reform communists and non­
communists formed as support for Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev’s policies of 
glasnost and perestroika. Sajudis was formed in the Lithuanian Academy of Science by 
intellectuals pressing for changes in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic constitution 
needed to accommodate Gorbachev's reforms.69 Consequently. Sajudis grew and became 
a mass organization, holding public meetings and establishing relations with all informal 
organizations in the republic.
As in the case o f Czechoslovakia, but unlike in Bulgaria, the newly organized 
opposition in Lithuania built upon a long tradition of widespread dissident movement.70 
Military resistance against Soviet occupation in the 1940s, a mass nationalist movement 
including not only the elite but also lower social echelons, religious dissident activities, 
lively underground literature, and sometimes massive demonstrations and protests
69See Vardys and Sedaitis, 100-5.
70On the dissident movement see Vardis and Sedaitis. 80-100.
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defined Lithuania as one the most anti-Soviet and anti-communist nations in Eastern 
Europe. Not surprisingly Gorbachev’s policies of enlightened socialism presented 
Lithuania with a window of opportunity for political change; both Sajudis and the LCP 
began to push for constitutional and institutional changes that would accommodate 
glasnost and perestroika. Very soon, however, these demands were swept away by much 
more radical demands for political independence and democratization. In 1988 and 1989 
Sajudis sponsored mass demonstrations and began to mobilize millions of Lithuanians 
into a national resistance movement. The Lithuanian communists had to choose between 
trying to moderate the emerging nationalist agenda and risk becoming politically 
irrelevant in the process, or joining the growing movement. By choosing to stay 
politically relevant and reformist, Brazauskas’ party maintained the ability to negotiate 
and reach consensus with Sajudis. By joining the nationalist movement, the LCP also 
ensured that no significant national political force would resist the process of institutional 
transformation and significantly limited the likelihood of violent challenges to reforms 
emanating from local political forces.
The LCP and Sajudis' control over the nationalist and reformist movement in the 
initial phase of transition was by no means certain at the beginning. In late 1989 and early 
1990 numerous political parties and movements appeared, some of which claimed to be a 
continuation of inter-war political formations, including the Democratic, the Christian 
Democratic, and the Social Democratic parties.71 One of these parties, the Lithuanian 
League, represented a formidable challenge to Sajudis in the process of capturing the 
loyalties of a newly mobilized population and formulating the agenda of the opposition.
71On Lithuania’s party system see Algis Krupavicius, “The Post-communist 
Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania’s Parties,” Political Studies 46, no. 3 
(Special issue, 1998): 465-491.
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The League—consisting of long-time political dissidents. anti-Soviet partisans, deportees, 
and political prisoners—emerged in 1987 and adopted a radical program of Lithuanian 
independence and anti-communism.72 W hile Sajudis was careful to present its program as 
part of G orbachev's policies o f glasnost and perestroika, and refused (at the insistence of 
Brazauskas) to include in the official resolution o f its October 1988 founding congress 
any reference to secession from the Soviet Union, the League demanded immediate 
independence claiming that Moscow was illegally occupying the country. In addition the 
League rejected Sajudis’ cooperation with the LCP and called for a boycott of Soviet 
elections and politics. Although by 1990 the League of Lithuania had lost its popularity, 
its short-term impact was to radicalize Sajudis and shift the political debate and agenda to 
achieving national independence.
The radicalization of Sajudis marked the beginning of a process of polarization 
between the movement and the LCP. Initially the communist party kept up with the 
rapidly mobilizing populace by promoting reform within the party and in the society. 
Algirdas Brazauskas, a communist reformer, was elected the leader of the LCP in the fall 
of 1988 to replace Rigaidas Songaila, who represented the wing of the party which 
opposed reforms in the Soviet Union. Consequently, the party embraced many of Sajudis' 
goals and demands. Following the shock o f the 1989 elections, the LCP and Sajudis 
reached a consensus to make major changes to the national constitution, including 
making Lithuanian the official language, increasing national authority over the economy, 
allowing the Catholic Church to operate openly, and abrogating the communist party 's 
monopoly o f power. However, these popular acts by the communist-controlled Supreme 
Soviet did not significantly increase the party’s popularity among the public as it also had
72Vardys and Sedaitis, 111-13.
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to accommodate M oscow 's demands for restraint on the rapidly radicalizing Lithuanian 
politics. Brazauskas' party was in the uncomfortable position of balancing Moscow’s 
threats to intervene and the need to establish itself as a legitimate party representing the 
aspirations of the nation. For example, under Moscow's pressure Brazauskas agreed not 
to declare the national law supreme, while assuring the public that radical constitutional 
changes might take place in the future. Sajudis saw the LC P’s policy as going against the 
tide of public aspiration; consequently, the relations between the movement and the 
communists became strained.
The LCP defeat at the elections to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies 
in 1989 and the prospects of losing the elections to the national Supreme Soviet exerted 
additional pressure on its leadership to embrace an even more radical reform agenda. To 
co-opt the masses Brazauskas began to press Moscow for greater autonomy of the 
republic and the LCP. By then, however, Gorbachev and the reformers, openly 
challenged by hardline communists’ backlash against the policies of perestroika, were in 
no position to accommodate the Soviet republics' calls for further liberalization. In 
December 1989 Brazauskas and 80 percent o f the party's membership broke with the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and established an independent Lithuanian 
Communist Party. The remaining pro-M oscow communists formed a separate communist 
party, the so-called “night party.”73 Although Brazauskas successfully eliminated the pro- 
Soviet hard-liners from the party and decisively defined the LCP as pro-independence, in 
the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet Sajudis won 80 percent of the seats, sending 99 
deputies to the Parliament compared to 25 for the reform communists.
73Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania," 297.
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One of the most significant outcomes of the 1990 elections was that Sajudis and 
the LCP emerged as the two dominant political players able to determine the process of 
institutional transition, eliminating radical forces on the right as well as pro-Moscow 
formations on the left in the struggle to define the national agenda. The elections did not 
signify the end o f cooperation between the two blocs. Sajudis and the LCP supported the 
declaration restoring Lithuania's independence and both advocated basic laws laying the 
foundations of a pluralistic political system. In addition, Sajudis shared the executive 
power by appointing reform communists to governmental positions, including Kazimiera 
Prunskiene as Prime Minister, while Landsbergis was elected Chair o f the Supreme 
Soviet. What accounts for this relatively high degree of consensual politics was the 
question of independence, for even after the declaration of independence was accepted by 
the new parliament, neither Moscow nor the international community recognized 
Lithuanian sovereignty.
The Parliament came under enormous pressure to rescind the declaration of 
independence lest the Soviet Union impose sanctions. After Lithuania's refusal to 
reconsider, in April Moscow imposed economic sanctions. Dramatic deterioration of 
economic conditions due to the sanctions, intense international pressure, and the 
communists’ support for a compromise with the Soviet Union convinced the parliament 
to freeze the declaration and to begin negotiations with Moscow. From the very 
beginning, however, Landsbergis aimed to stall the process and the talks did not go 
anywhere as both sides could not agree even upon the ground rules. Although Sajudis and 
the LCP continued to agree on independence as the ultimate goal, the ensuing 
confrontation with Moscow created the first significant split between the two parties. 
Dealing with Moscow and addressing the growing socio-economic problems caused by
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the sanctions and the early transition to market relations, strained the ability of the 
political elite to maintain the consensual character o f Lithuanian politics. Indeed, there 
emerged great differences not only between Sajudis and the LCP but also significant 
divisions within Sajudis. As early as the second half of 1990 the movement split into 
right-wing and left-wing. Sajudis Common Union and Sajudis Center, respectively.74 
Many of the Sajudis deputies resented what was seen as the authoritarian leadership of 
Landsbergis, and began to form separate factions which threatened the movement’s 
majority in parliament. While at its inception Sajudis included individuals who supported 
the general goals o f perestroika as well as radical nationalists and anti-communists 
demanding independence, the confrontation with Moscow in 1990 radicalized the public 
opinion and helped radicals, especially forces associated with deputies from the city of 
Kaunas, to gain the upper hand in Sajudis. At the same time the LCP, while still 
unconditionally pro-independence, advocated a step-by-step approach to dealing with 
Moscow. This support was supported by Prime Minister Prunskiene who saw talks with 
Moscow as the only way out of the blockade and settling the question of independence.
In January 1991 the pro-Moscow organization Edinstvo and the “night party,” 
organized demonstration in support o f Gorbachev’s declaration of his direct presidential 
role of the republic. Soviet paratroopers with the support of the KGB and the military 
tried to seize power but their attempt, met with the unified resistance of the public and 
political parties, failed. On February 9, 1991, Lithuanians voted in a referendum in 
support of Lithuania's independence. After the August coup in Moscow failed, Yeltsin 
recognized the republic's independence.73
74Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al, 93.
7:>For an excellent eyewitness account of the events sec Krickus, Showdown.
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The 1990-91 confrontation with Moscow exposed the fragility and inefficiency of 
Lithuania's institutional framework. While Sajudis and the reform communists agreed 
not to reintroduce the pre-war constitution there emerged no accord on the nature of the 
future basic law. Negotiations on the new constitution took place in the context of 
confrontation with Moscow and stalemate in parliament and government. The provisional 
constitution adopted after the March declaration of independence developed into 
paralyzing stalemates between government and parliament as both the chairman of the 
legislature and the prime minister had wide and untested authorities and powers and 
competed for supremacy in the conduct of relations with Moscow and in defining social 
and economic policies. However, the attempts o f the right and Landsbergis to exert 
control over government and institution building were extremely weakened by the 
continuing fractioning o f the Sajudis and its declining number o f deputies. As a result, in 
1991 the nationalist right gained control of the movement.
Attempts by the left and the right to develop functioning and effective policies 
inevitably led to political actions that tried to get around the inherent deficiencies of the 
interim constitution. As a result both sides accused each other o f breaking the rule of 
law.76 The polarization o f Lithuanian politics undermined any chances of finding a 
solution to the political impasse. Parliamentary walkouts became a common occurrence 
favored even by the nominally ruling Sajudis as its dwindling numbers in the Supreme 
Soviet hampered its ability to formulate policies and govern. At the same time the 
polarization was not offset by the appearance of any moderate center. There appeared to
76For examples o f both sides’ cavalier treatment of the constitution see Vardys 
and Sedaitis. 192-93.
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be no political formation capable o f creating a political base for any o f the governing 
political institutions.
The only factor that moderated the confrontation between the left and right was 
the Soviet pressure on the republic. For all its volatile divisions, the two sides were 
briefly united during the January 1991 Soviet attem pt to seize power in Lithuania and 
during the August coup o f the same year. Once the question of independence was settled, 
however, the polarization and confrontation reached crisis proportions. In November 
1991 Brazauskas’ party declared its formal opposition to the government.
Sajudis and the reform communists developed conflicting visions of how to 
overcome the political and institutional impasse. While Landsbergis and the right came to 
see early parliamentary elections and the creation o f a strong, executive presidency 
independent from legislature as a way out of the stalemate, the left, both among the 
former communists and the opponents of Landsbergis. advocated the establishment of a 
strong parliament to balance what they came to see as Landsbergis' authoritarian 
tendencies. The attempt to reach a compromise in the fractured parliament was greatly 
complicated as Sajudis continued in the spring o f 1992 to split into new factions and the 
movement was reduced to a minority. Instead o f trying to forge an alliance among the 
multiplying political groups in the parliament and negotiate the basic rules o f  the game. 
Sajudis took its chances with the voters by calling for a referendum on the future 
constitution. The referendum, conducted in the spring of 1992, calling for a constitution 
with a strong presidency dealt a serious blow to Landsbergis and his supporters as less 
than 51 percent of all eligible voters supported the right’s proposal. The defeat at the 
referendum motivated Sajudis to compromise on the constitutional design, and just in 
time for the early elections called by Landsbergis, the parliament produced a document
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assigning significantly less constitutional powers and authority to the future presidency 
than Sajudis hoped for. The draft document produced rather hurriedly—it was laden with 
references o f statutes yet to be adopted, and provisions to be amended after approved by 
the electorate-represented a compromise between the pro-Landsbergis and anti- 
Landsbergis forces rather than a true social contract.77 The draft constitution was 
approved by the voters at a referendum on the day of the parliamentary elections in 
October 1992. The elections dealt another serious blow to Sajudis as the electorate 
soundly rejected the movement’s policies sending only 14 o f  its deputies to the 141-seat 
Seimas compared to 77 for the Democratic Labor Party. The electoral swing from support 
for the nationalist right to support for the former communists was further represented by 
Brazauskas' election as the first post-Soviet era president in February 1993.
The adoption of a new constitution and the renewed mandate of the parliament 
after the 1992 elections did not change the pattern of political confrontation and abuse of 
the basic rules of the game. The left majority in the parliament frequently disregarded 
constitutional provisions and altered laws for short-term political gains. Sajudis. 
extremely weakened by the 1992 election results, once again resorted to walkouts and 
dilatory tactics. The strong rift between the LDLP and the right was reflected in the 
refusal of the left to include opposition deputies in the Seimas" elected offices.7S
Similar to the Czech Republic, but unlike developments in Bulgaria, the 
Lithuanian parliament emerged as the foci of institutional and political change in the 
transition period. Political parties played only a marginal role in the process as the society
77“Lithuania Update.” East European Constitutional Review  1. no. 3 (Fall 1992):
7.
78 • • »"‘Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review  2, no. 3 (Summer 
1993): 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
lacked many of the requisites for a functioning party system. Another important feature 
of the party system in the transition phase is the emergence of a bipolar model, with the 
LDLP at one pole and Sajudis—later H U -LC-at the other. In fact, until the late 1990s the 
party system remained structured on the base of the initial divisions between the reform 
communists and the nationalist opposition. The 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections 
failed to produce an effective centrist party. Instead, the LDLP and the conservatives 
dominated the political process and hardly allowed any political formation to moderate 
the existing political confrontation in the parliament. The lack of significant center parties 
in parliament precluded the emergence of cross-party alliances and cooperation that 
would have tempered the polarized stance and policies of the two dominant blocks. 
Although Sajudis after the 1990 elections and the LDLP after the 1992 elections went 
through a process of factionalization. the emerging new political formations failed to 
create a political alternative to the disappearing right and left governing majorities.
Instead, the fractioning of the ruling parties became a recipe for parliamentary stalemate 
and political confrontation. The parliament elected in the 1996 elections did not seem to 
escape this pattern either. The fragmentation of the ruling conservatives has led to 
frequent government changes and confrontation between the Presidency. Seimas, and its 
Chairman.
The 1992 parliamentary elections also marked a starting point in the 
transformation and consolidation of the party system in Lithuania. It signaled the end of 
Sajudis as a mass national movement and its transformation into a political party. The 
refusal of Sajudis to participate in the elections as a political party signified the low 
degree of institutionalization of the party system in Lithuania. While in the Czech 
Republic the first free elections marked the end of the Civic Forum as a means of
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political participation, the Lithuanian nationalist movement continued to rely on a mass, 
amorphous movement as an institution for aggregating interests and for political 
participation. Despite the constant process o f fragmentation and factionalization of 
Sajudis in the 1990 parliament, the movement refused to consider its transformation into 
a political party built around a specific political program and a national structure. Not 
surprisingly, the movement had very little to show in terms of a comprehensive social, 
economic, and political agenda, and instead had to once again rely on anti-communist 
rhetoric to mobilize electoral support. In contrast to the 1990 elections, however, the 
voters were more interested in policies that would reverse the dramatic economic slump, 
and in any event doubted the ability of Sajudis to govern more effectively than during its 
previous term as a governing party.7'*
Meanwhile the LDLP, after losing the 1990 election, was able to transform itself 
into a modem and legitimate social-democratic party utilizing its existing Soviet 
experience and infrastructure. What accounts for the success of the reform communists in 
Lithuania is the communist party 's high degree of legitimacy. In 1989-1990 the LCP was 
able to transform itself into a reform party and even support the emerging opposition in 
its demands for Lithuania's independence and democratization. In fact, the opposition 
contained many communists, including those in its elite. In addition, the communist party 
was able early on to eliminate hard-liners from its ranks by denying them material 
capacities and organizational support. A crucial advantage of the Lithuanian communist 
party compared with other republics’ parties was the high percentage of Lithuanians in its 
ranks. Thus while in other Soviet republics the local communist party structures were
7 ,On the state of the Lithuanian economy see Sulius Gimius. “The Lithuanian 
Economy in 1992,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (1 6  April, 1993): 28-32.
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seen as imposed by the occupying Russians, in Lithuania it was seen as a national
SOorganization.
During the rule o f the LDLP, Lithuanian politics witnessed the gradual subsiding 
of polarized confrontation between the left and right in the parliament. Contrary to the 
fears of many in the W est that the former communists would reverse the country’s drive 
towards a market economy and democracy, the LDLP implemented, albeit at a slower 
pace, further policies that consolidated institutions and instituted fiscal and monetary 
stability and austerity. The inability o f the central bank to hold the inflation at b ay - 
caused to a great degree by constant political meddling and a split governing party—was 
addressed by the introduction of a currency board in March 1994. The currency board, an 
institution separate from the Central Bank, was committed to converting the national 
currency offered to the reserve currency, the US dollar, at a fixed rate. The currency 
board gradually brought about a great measure of stability to the market, significantly 
improved Lithuania's relations with the International Monetary Board and the World 
Bank, and most importantly, greatly limited the ability of political forces to meddle in 
fiscal and monetary polities. Thus the new institution not only brought some economic 
benefits but also eliminated an area o f  great political confrontation between left and right.
Another reason for the abating confrontation between the left and right in 
Lithuanian politics was the wide social and political consensus on the country’s quest for 
European Union membership. The seven main political parties drafted and voted a 
statement emphasizing that integration into the EU was a top priority for the country and 
pledged to work toward achieving a membership. On June 12, 1995, Lithuania and the 
European Union signed an Associated Agreement, a first step in a process by which the
X0See Krupavicius, 472.
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country would eventually become a member of the Union.81 The agreement envisaged the 
gradual harmonization until 1999 of the national legislation with EU law. The 
negotiations and ensuing commitments brought a new urgency to the governing LDLP’s 
pursuit of compromise with the opposition in parliament. In light of the Associated 
Agreement and the overwhelming public support for an EU membership, the opposition 
declared its readiness to participate in the negotiations and preparation of laws that would 
facilitate Lithuania’s accession, including a constitutional amendment to allow foreigners 
to purchase land in the country.82 Only two small parties, the rightist Nationalist Union 
and the left-wing Peasant Party, refused to embrace such an amendment.
The process of subsiding political confrontation was further accelerated by the 
emergence in the late 1990s of a significant political center which further moderated the 
bipolar model. In the 1997 presidential elections the long-run hold on power by the 
LDLP and the HU(LC) was broken by the election of Valdas Adamkus. a U.S. emigree 
and former American environmental official. While LDLP and the HU(LC) supported 
former Prosecutor General Arturas Paulaskas and Speaker of Parliament Landsbergis 
respectively, Adamkus. backed by several smaller parties, refused to be a candidate of 
one party and sought wider support. Adamkus was elected as Lithuanian president 
defeating Paulaskas by less then one percent margin.8j The new President, while 
generally supportive of the HU(LC) policies, proved to be a moderating force
81 » *See “Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review 4. no. 3
(Summer 1995), 14.
jp • *
' “Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 
1995). Available from http://www.nyu.edu/eecr; INTERNET.
83 After Landsbergis was eliminated at the first round, the HU(LC) made sure the 
LDLP candidate would not be elected president by throwing its support behind Adamkus 
at the second round.
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constraining the excesses o f the governing majority, not even hesitating to ask for the 
prime minister and ministers’ resignations when he saw it fit.
Party realignment at the end of the 1990s further eroded the bipolar model of 
party politics and thus the level of confrontation. From the emergence o f the party system 
in 1990 to 1999, politics were dominated by the struggle between the LDLP and Sajudis 
(later the HU(LC). Three smaller parties, the Christian Democratic Party, the Center 
Union and the Social Democratic Party, were able to gain a significant share of 
parliamentary seats in the three post-independence elections, but were never able to 
challenge the two dominant parties. Continuing economic stagnation attributed to the 
Russian crisis of 1998 and m ajor splits and realignments among well established parties 
created the conditions for the emergence of significant party alternatives to the previously 
dominant HU(LC) and the LDLP.S4 The big winners of the Spring 1999 local elections 
were the relatively new Social Liberals and the revived coalition o f the Peasants' Party 
and the Christian Democratic Union, while the HU(LC) came with the third largest 
number of deputies. The electoral success of the two parties indicated the voters' 
disillusionment with traditional parties and politics and the final coming of age of 
alternative the party system.
The dominance o f  instrumental rather then fundamental politics—consensus on 
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. At least until 1999. Lithuania's party 
system was characterized by bipolarity with the LDLP on the left and Sajudis, later the 
HU(LC), on the right. Like in Bulgaria, the party system is rooted in the division between 
ruling elite and opposition at the initial phase of transition to independence and
84Nerijus Prekevicius and Terry D Clark, “Shifting Party Sands Forecasting 
Lithuania's Political Future,” Central Europe Review  2. no. 27 (10 July, 2000). Available 
from http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
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democracy. Accordingly, the resulting political left-right cleavages do not neatly 
correspond to concrete ideological platforms, but derive from the parties’ post­
communist and anti-communist images. The left-right dichotomy has little meaning in 
national politics as the lines of divisions are not along the classical difference between 
collectivist and liberal policies. Indeed, ideological rhetoric aside, the left and right in 
Lithuanian politics share similarities in agenda and policies that assured a relatively high 
degree of continuity in the transition to a market econom y and democracy.
As it was argued above, the question of secession from the Soviet Union brought 
Sajudis and the reformed communist party, the two dominant political players, close 
together as it was the most crucial aspect of Lithuanian's transition. Both parties’ 
immediate agendas included independence, political, social and economic reform as 
common goals and objectives. The differences in programs pertained to the pace of 
change rather than to its desirability. For example, the former communists cautioned 
against Sajudis’ uncompromising manner of dealing with Moscow and demanded slower 
implementation o f market reforms and more social protection of the affected masses.
Once the question of independence was settled in 1991, the electorate turned its 
attention to the immediate problems of the political, economic, and social transition, thus 
giving political parties a chance to distinguish each other by identifying and delineating 
political cleavages. Despite the increase in ideological rhetoric, the political left and right 
maintained a relatively high degree of program and policy similarities. Most parties, 
including the two dominant ones, displayed a cautious approach to market reforms, 
extensive provisions for welfare protection and social security, and very often they
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formulated populist policies that ran against economic prudence and austerity.83 
Consecutive changes in ruling parties did not lead to a rupture in the pace and direction of 
institutional reforms and the implementation of marketization. Even more importantly, 
there emerged a wide-ranging consensus on the main rules according to which political 
conflicts are carried out. In other words, political players may disagree over particular 
policies governments should pursue, yet most parties agreed on the broad institutional 
structure and the ways authoritative decisions are formulated and implemented. Yet it 
must be noted that although the main political parties recognized the legitimacy of their 
opponents, the ruling majorities did not resist the temptation to exclude opposition parties 
from decision-making processes or to frequently change laws for the benefit of narrow 
party interests.86
The primary cleavages in Lithuanian politics have not significantly threatened the 
consolidation of the institutional structures. Instead, they have been centered on 
differences in the pace and extent o f market reforms; anti-communist and post­
communists images; views of the past and relations with the Soviet Union and later 
Russia; church-state relations; and internationalism versus nationalism.87 While these 
cleavages sometimes bred virulent rhetoric and political gridlock, they did not question 
the legitimacy of the constitutional order and rules o f the game. Even more, weakly
83For an example of economic populism both in the right and left see Krickus,
“Democratization in Lithuania, 309; Peter Rutland, “A Year of Progress,” in Peter
Rutland, ed.. The Challenge o f  Integration (Armonk, NY; M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 123.
86Before the October 2000 parliamentary elections the conservatives changed the 
electoral law expecting to pick up more seats in the Seimas. See Mel Huang, “Changing 
the Rules at the Half,” Central Europe Review 2, No 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from 
http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
87See Pettai and Kreuzer, 166; Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania,” 309; 
Norgaard, Hindsgal, et al, 103; Rutland, 120.
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institutionalized parties did not align political and social interests into cohesive cleavage 
structures and did not formulate consistent party programs or public policies.88 Therefore, 
political parties have sometimes been deeply split on many o f the cleavage issues. The 
conservatives, for example, have long been divided on Lithuania’s future and place in 
Europe with one faction insisting on the country’s speedy modernization and 
incorporation in Euro-Atlantic structures. The other, more nationalist, faction demanded 
that Lithuanian should adopt the pre-war pastoral society and oppose Eastern as well as 
Western influences and entanglements.
Inclusiveness o f  political society—degree o f participation o f diverse social and 
ethnic groups. From very early on in its transition. Lithuania has demonstrated a liberal 
attitude toward political participation on the part of all ethnic groups. The status o f the 
country's minorities, including 350,000 ethnic Russians and 300,000 ethnic Poles (out of 
the republic’s 3.7 million residents), proved to be a non-confrontational issue as the 
Lithuanian parliament as early as November 1989 adopted a resolution granting all 
minorities, including post-W orld War II immigrants and their descendants, Lithuanian 
citizenship based on a simple application procedure.80 In addition, the Supreme Soviet 
passed a law on minorities guaranteeing the right to develop their culture, the use of 
minority languages in public areas and its use alongside Lithuanian, and the right of 
association.00 Later, in 1991, in an attempt to assure ethnic minorities, the parliament
KKAlthough the process o f party system institutionalization and stabilization of 
party elite accelerated discemibly in the period after the 1993 presidential elections the 
party system remained weak
The requirements to gain citizenship were further simplified through 
amendments of the law in 1993 and 1996. See Lithuanian Parliament, Lithuanian Law on 
Citizenship (May 2001). Available from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.
<)0Vardys and Sedaitis, 212.
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amended the law and guaranteed the right to schooling in one’s native language and its 
use in dealing with the government in areas with concentration of minorities. What 
accounts for the liberal attitude of the emerging elite and the masses to the integration o f 
ethnic minorities is the relatively homogeneous ethnic character o f the country. While in 
the Soviet Union. Lithuanians maintained their share o f the republic’s population at 
around 80 percent, thus avoiding the fate of most other Soviet republics which witnessed 
massive influxes of Russian immigrants. Furthermore, after independence, Lithuanians 
accounted for almost 80 percent of the natural growth of population, securing the 
preservation o f the existing ethnic balance.01
Ironically, it was the Poles, not the Russians, who had the more tense relationship 
with ethnic Lithuanians. A long history o f uneasy and sometimes violent co-existence, 
which included both alliance and animosity between the two ethnic groups, created 
suspicion and apprehensions on the part of the Polish minority at the time of transition to 
independence. In the late 1980s, Sajudis failed to attract representatives of ethnic 
minorities as the presence of radical nationalists among its ranks assured the absence of 
appeal to Poles and Russians. The advent of Sajudis and its agenda was seen as 
encroaching on the rights and security o f minority groups. Both minorities were generally 
opposed to the early reform attempts, including the establishment of Lithuanian as the 
official language and more economic independence from the Soviet Union. The Polish 
minority in particular came with demands of its own including administrative and cultural 
autonomy within Soviet Lithuania, more Polish education, and closer relations with 
Poland. To mobilize the minority, its leaders created in May 1989 a separate association 
o f Lithuania’s Poles. The peak of the confrontation between the minority and the
0|Norgaard, Hindsgal, et al, The Baltic States, 171.
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independent movement came when the local Polish elite, joined by ethnic Russian 
bureaucrats in minority dominated districts, supported the January and August coups of 
1991 and demanded the creation o f an autonomous Polish republic in Lithuania. 
Authorities in Vilnus immediately suspended local government soviets during the August 
coup and established direct rule, further antagonizing minorities.92 Indeed, during the 
struggle for independence the only allies the Soviet leadership found in the republic were 
the leaders of the Polish minority, the Russian Yedinstvo, and a minority of hardline 
communists.
Since the emergence o f a pluralist party system, the Polish minority has generally 
remained more active politically while the Russians chose to assert their rights and 
interests through social and cultural associations. A Russian party emerged in 1996 
targeting the nine-percent strong minority but it gained only 1.63 percent of the vote. The 
Polish political parties, on the other hand, successfully mobilized their constituents and 
consistently won parliamentary seats in all elections.9 ’ Krickus suggests that what 
accounts for the relatively lower political mobilization of the Russian minority compared 
with ethnic Poles is economic status. Employment and incomes figures comparing 
Russians and Lithuanians have indicated no difference in social status.94 Accordingly, 
ethnic Russians participate in the political process through established parties. Ethnic 
Poles, on the other hand, are disproportionately employed in industries hard hit by the
92Saulius Gimius, "Lithuanian Conflict with Poles," RFE/RL Resereach Report 
(16 September, 1991).
93Union of Poles won 2 percent in the 1992 elections and 2.9 percent in 1996 
entitling it to 2.8 percent and .7 percent of parliamentary seats, respectively. See Pettai 
and Kreuzer, 157-58.
94Krickus. “Democratization in Lithuania,” 319.
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transition to a market economy and thus greatly vulnerable to social and economic 
change. This, along with the interest to preserve ethnic identity, provides a powerful base 
for political mobilization and autonomous participation.
With ethnic Poles’ political participation and further attempts by the state to 
guarantee ethnic rights and freedoms addressed, a greater number Poles began to accept 
Lithuania's independence. A similar trend took place among ethnic Russians, although in 
the mid-1990s still only a minority of them accepted independence.
There were also other political developments which went a long way towards 
assuring the ethnic minorities in Lithuania and increasing their support for the 
independent state. As noted above, during the transition to independence. Sajudis failed 
to attract ethnic minorities among its ranks and files.93 Although Sajudis advocated 
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities, and once in power continued to 
promote legislation to that effect, its emotional nationalism and uncompromising attitude, 
especially on the part o f Landsbergis, during the negotiations with Moscow and Warsaw, 
contributed to the feeling of insecurity among ethnic Russians and Poles. The elections o f 
the LDLP as a governing party and especially of Brazauskas96 as the President 
contributed to the relaxation of inter-ethnic relations. Brazauskas and his party were able 
to successfully negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country and 
important treaties with Moscow and Warsaw which further addressed the uncertain 
feelings of minorities which were still coping with their new status in a new state.
b97 percent o f  the delegates to Sajudis’ founding congress were ethnic 
Lithuanians.
%Ever since Lithuania sought independence, Brazauskas has advocated a 
conciliatory approach toward Moscow, seen as too powerful and important economically 
to afford a tense relationship.
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High public commitment to the fundam ental values and procedurals norms o f  the 
state's constitutional system. Lithuanian public attitudes displayed many similarities with 
the ones in the rest of Eastern Europe. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs 
(See Table 2) does not appear to negatively affect support for the democratic regime and 
even the legitimacy of the current regime, however unsatisfactory its performance has 
been (See Tables 3 ,4  and 5). Accordingly, there seemed to be an approval of the future 
democratic regime (See Table 5) which is associated with a better performing system, 
while the public felt unsatisfied with the development of democracy (See Table 2).
It must be noted that while the Lithuanian public seemed less satisfied with the 
development of democracy than the Czech's, it expressed a significantly lesser 
dissatisfaction then the public in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Lithuanian public 
displayed the least satisfaction with the direction of the country and with the respect of 
human rights (See Tables 9 and 10). This dissatisfaction, however, did not translate into a 
disapproval o f democracy. As in the other two cases, the legitimacy of democracy is an 
autonomous variable; the public supported a market economy and accepted the present 
and future democratic system regardless of the performance o f the current regime. 
Furthermore, strong support for democracy—like in the Czech Republic, but unlike in 
Bulgaria—existed along a low approval of either a military rule or restoration of the 
communist regime (See Tables 7 and 8). Yet, like Bulgaria, the Lithuanian public also 
displayed a high approval o f the former communist regime and an acceptance of a strong 
leader ruling without parliament, thus exhibiting the instability o f the public’s 
commitment to democracy (See Tables 6 and 11). The public also displayed the familiar 
almost everywhere in Eastern Europe low degree of confidence in the political
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institutions, while political leaders and symbolic institutions, including the church and the 
presidency, enjoyed greater confidence.
Conclusion
In spite of having similar communist experiences and going through comparable 
phases of post-communist institution building, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and 
Lithuania attained political systems of varying institutionalization (See Appendix 1). 
Measured by the two-turnover test, Bulgaria and Lithuania witnessed regular and free and 
fear elections in which no political party or coalition won consecutive elections. The 
Czech republic, on the other hand, did not meet the test, as only two parties, the CDP and 
Social Democrats in coalitions that included various smaller parties, formed governments 
after the 1992 parliamentary elections. Yet, this did not translate into authoritarian 
policies and the governments were almost always checked by effective opposition in the 
parliament as no governing coalition had comfortable majorities. Since 1996 all 
governing coalitions had no parliamentary majorities and had to conclude power-sharing 
agreements with opposition parties in order to form stable governments. Conversely, 
Bulgaria, although meeting the two-turnover test, witnessed successive weak 
governments; only the last UDF government, elected in 1997, stayed in office for the full 
term. In fact, a study of democracy in 17 East European states found that in the ten years 
since the first free elections, the average term of office of post-communist governments
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in Bulgaria is 9 months, while reaching 23 months for the Czech Republic and 15 months 
for Lithuania.07
The differences between the three states are more significant in term s of the 
agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game and 
the dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics. While the Czech 
Republic and Lithuania scored high on both scales. Bulgaria scored the lowest. The 
Czech political elite had the advantage o f creating the fundamental rules o f the political 
game, facing virtually no opposition from the communist elite as the com m unist party 
collapsed in late 1989 and had no meaningful political participation in the roundtable 
which created the new political regime. No organized political party dominated the 
process o f early transition and only after the first elections did political interests begin to 
form political organizations. Thus political actors from early on reached a consensus on 
the rule of the political game and consequently no significant political interests 
questioned the established political order. Furthermore, in the latter part o f the transition 
process and throughout the 1990s the dominant political actors did not differ significantly 
even on questions of instrumental politics. Therefore, the country did not experience 
dramatic changes in both in its domestic and international policies.
Similarly, the early transition phase in Lithuania witnessed a high degree of 
collaboration between the local communist party and the already powerful Sajudis 
opposition movement. Both parties were not only well organized and thus capable of 
negotiating as equals but they were forced to reach a quick consensus on the 
fundamentals of the new political regime as both of them saw Moscow as the significant
97Sten Berglund, Frank Aarebrot, Henri Vogt and Georgi Karasimeonov. 
Challenges to Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years After the Collapse o f  Communism 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2001), 24.
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political challenge rather each other. As in the Czech Republic, both the LDLP and 
Sajudis emerged as legitimate political players seeking consensus on the fundamental 
political rules. In the latter part of the transition process and through the 1990s, however, 
the dominant political actors often sharply differed on the instrumental politics and the 
country witnessed both economic and political instability as reflected by the frequent 
change of government.
Bulgaria, in contrast, witnessed the most serious challenges to the emerging 
political order. The former communist party dominated the transition period and 
established rules o f the political game that were later frequently challenged by political 
actors who had little say in their creation. Thus Bulgarian politics in the 1990s went 
through periods o f political, social and economic instability as the m ajor political actors 
often struggled over not only instrumental but also fundamental rules o f the political 
game.
Instability in Bulgaria was also fed by the public which exhibited low approval of 
the developments in the country and was, more significantly, highly distrustful of the 
institutions of democracy. Similar sentiments were observed in Lithuania, although, it 
must be noted that negative public perceptions did not translate into open defiance on the 
streets as happened in early 1997 in Bulgaria. In both countries, the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions was relatively low and the approval of authoritarian alternatives 
relatively high. Conversely, the Czech Republic enjoyed relatively high public approval 
o f democratic institutions, regardless of their performance. Even when in the rare cases 
the public was dissatisfied with political actors, the resulting protests were challenged 
into civic actions consistent with the established political rules.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
Appendix I
Figure 1 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of domestic institutionalization on an ordinal scale from 
total domestic institutionalization to total lack o f it. The figure measures the position of each country on the already 
discussed domestic variables. The three countries are ranked by summing the live variables by assigning values of 3 to 
the highest ranking on each variable. 2 to the next and I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the 
same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking 
for the period 1990-2000.
Instuiionali/uiion is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country , which meets the two 
turnover test, has the highest degree of agreement on the rules of the game, has a political system in which instrumental 
rather fundamental politics are the norm, has a highest degree of inclusivcncss of the political society, and its public has 
the greatest commitment to the constitutional system. The value of one is assigned to the country w hich scores lowest 
on each o f the same variables.
Figure 1.
Variable Domestic Institutionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total Average
Bulgaria 3 1 1 1 1 7 1.4
Czech R. 1 3 3 3 3 13 2.6
Lithuania 3 3 -> 2 1 11 2.2
Note: Column headings are as follows: ( I ) Two turnover test: (2) Agreement on the rules of the game: (3 1 Instrumental 
rather than fundamental politics: (4) Inclusiveness o f political society; (5) Public commitment to constitutional system
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Tabic 1.
Trust in Civil and Political Institutions
Bulgaria Czech R.
Government 2.7 4.6
Parliament 2 2 3 6
President 4.0 5.1
Courts 2.8 4.0
Parties 2.5 3.7
Army 4.6 4.1
Media 3.7 4.2
Unions 2.5 3.4
Private
enterprise
2.5 4.2
Source: William Mishlcr and Richard Rose. "Trust. Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations o f Civil and Political 
Institutions in Post-Communist Societies." The Journal o f  Politics 59 no. 2 (May 1997). 422.
Table 2
Satisfaction with Development o f  Democracy
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria -23 -6 -17 -49 -87 -67 -81 -54
Czech R. -16 -25 -19 0 -9 -4 -21
Lithuania 23 5 -20 -31 -40 -31 -13
Source: European Union. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer no. 8 (May 2000). Available from http://curopa.eu.int: 
INTERNET.
Table 3
Approval of the Creation o f Market Economy 
(approval minus disapproval responses)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria 22 45 36 18 .1 6 12 23
Czech R. 54 39 24 15 II 6 1
Lithuania 55 44 3? 9 16 5 23
Source: Ibid.
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Table 4.
Approval of Current Regime 
(percentage of public)______
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 2000
Bulgaria 64 55 59 66 58
Czech R. 71 71 78 77 56
Lithuania 34 45
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Ibid. Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer. Trends in Democracies and Markets: Mew Democracies Barometer 
1991-98 (Glasgow: University o f  Strathclyde. 1998). 29: Richard Rose. New Baltics Barometer II: A Survey Study 
(Glasgow: University o f  Strathclyde. 1995). 23-24: Richard Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV: A Surrey Study (Glasgow: 
University o f Strathclyde. 2000): 50-59; Krickus. "Democratization in Lithuania." 310; Vitosha Research. Accountable 
Government: Se lf and Public Perception (June 2000). Available from http://www.online.bg. INTERNET: "Poll Shows 
Institutions. Politicians Approval Rate Drops" (text). Prague CTK  in English (28 March 2000). FBIS Daily Report-Fast 
Europe. 28 March 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-2000-0328). Available from World News Connection: INTERNET; 
"Survey: Czechs Do Not W ant the Return of Communism" (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech (9 November 2000). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 9 November 2000 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-EEU-2000-1109). Available from World News Connection: INTERNET.
Table 5.
Approval o f Future Regime 
i percentage of public)_____
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 2000
Bulgaria 77 72 70 83 78
Czech R. 89 88 SS 88 72
Lithuania 69 61
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 3 I : Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 24: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 52; Vitosha 
Research.
Table 6.
Approval o f Former Comm unist Regime 
i percentage of public)_________________
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 2000
Bulgaria 30 42 51 58 43
Czech R. 23 29 23 24 31
Lithuania 27 47 56
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 27: Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 23: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 50: Vitosha 
Research.
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Table 7.
Approval of Restoring Communist Regime 
I percentage of public)___________________
1993 1994 1995 1998 2000
Bulgaria 25 29 24
C/ech R. 7 9 16 19
Lithuania 7 9
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 33; Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 32; Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 52; Vitosha 
Research.
Table S.
Approval of Military Rule 
(percentage of public)
1993 1994 1995 1998 2000
Bulgaria 15 15 12 9
C/ech R 2 3 3
Lithuania 7 4
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 35: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IE 32: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 56: Alfa Research.
Table 9.
Approval o f the Direction of Country
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria 4 38 -> -37 -39 -8 -63 21
C/ech R. 37 17 24 2S 25 24 9 34
Lithuania 28 -39 -47 -49 -52 -25
Source: European Union. Central and Eastern Enrubaromcter. 
Table 10
Respect for Human Rights in the Country 
(respect minus disrespect responses)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria 41 30 1 -10 _2 -13 5
C/ech R. 34 19 12 7 -I -7 8
Lithuania -6 -13 -54 -52 -59 -58 -50
Source: Ibid.
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Tabic 11.
Approval of a Strong Leader. Ruling Without Parliament 
(percentage of public)_______________________________
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000
Bulgaria 66 45 22 29 53
C/ech R. 24 16 12 13
Lithuania 62 58
Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 37: Rose. New Baltic Barometer II, 32-33: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 56: Vitosha 
Research.
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CHAPTER V
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
Chapter V evaluates the degree o f international integration with the core for each 
o f the three case studies. The first two sections describe the decision o f the EU and 
NATO to integrate East European countries and the process to achieve these goals. The 
chapter evaluates each country’s relations to the core in terms of integration in the EU. 
NATO, and economic interaction with core states, including trade and investments. 
Another section evaluates the stock o f each country in terms of its neighbors’ integration 
in the core.
The European Union
The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s coincided with a very crucial 
phase in the European Community’s history as the member states were striving to 
complete the single European market and finalizing plans for a monetary and political 
union. These processes marked the growing confidence o f the member states in the EC’s 
ability to be the cornerstone of a new European architecture. The Community with its 
history of addressing problems of security and stability through integration, economic 
and social development, and democracy, certainly possessed the right institution to 
include Eastern Europe in the process. Even before the collapse of communism, the 
Community agreed on a common approach to East European states; the approach was 
based on the belief that the promotion o f democracy and reform would increase security
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
on the continent.1 On 9 June 1988 in Moscow the EC and the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA)--an organization integrating the communist economies— 
initiated a declaration committing both sides to cooperation. Consequently, bilateral 
agreements were signed, encouraging economic cooperation in areas such industry, 
agriculture, energy, transportation and environmental protection.2 Until 1988, the opening 
of relations between the Community and CMEA countries was not conditional on 
political reform in the communist countries. The beginning of change in some o f the 
countries, however, led the Community to apply, for the first time, conditionality as a 
way to encourage reform in individual countries. In February 1990, the European 
Commission proposed to the European Council that potential aid to post-communist 
countries must fulfill several conditions, including commitment to the rule of law, respect 
for human rights, the establishment o f a multiparty system, holding of free elections, and 
economic liberalization. In order to assist transformation in the states of Eastern Europe, 
the Community established the PHARE program and began to coordinate multilateral aid 
flowing to the countries.
Already by late 1989, it became apparent the East European countries demanded 
more intensive relations with the EC and most importantly, a membership in the 
Community. Accordingly, the established policies for dealing with the post-communist 
states-PHARE, aid programs and trade cooperation agreements—appeared insufficient to 
either address the new foreign policy objectives o f the states in Eastern Europe or 
promote the Community’s vision o f a new Europe. The new demands from the East,
'On the European Union’s policy toward Eastern Europe see Karen E. Smith. The 
Making o f EU Foreign Policy: The Case o f Eastern Europe (New York: St. M artin’s 
Press, 1999).
2Ibid. 54.
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however, caused a short but dramatic debate on the Community's policy priorities. The 
dilemma was between an enlargement o f the Community to include the countries of 
Eastern Europe or a process of further integration among the current members. This 
debate was resolved by proceeding with a deepening of the Community by creating a 
monetary union, further political integration, and designs for institutional reform to 
address the challenges facing the organization. To accommodate states o f Eastern 
Europe, the Community proposed concluding associated agreements with individual 
countries without the promise of a membership. The associate agreements were called 
Europe Agreements and required that prospective associates meet basic economic and 
political conditions including democratization and transition to market economy. ’ The 
Agreements provided the associated countries with trade concessions and other benefits 
that are normally associated with EU membership. Between 1991 and 1995, the European 
Union signed Europe Agreements with all ten East European countries.
Each Europe Agreement, adjusted for each country, established an institutional 
framework for political dialogue. It also provided for the establishment o f a free trade 
area between the Comm unity and the associated states as well as for financial support, 
and economic and cultural relations. The Europe Agreements, however, did not end the 
post-communist states’ demands for Community membership. Finally, in June 1993, the 
European Council in Copenhagen agreed that the associates could join, provided they met 
some strict political, econom ic, and social conditions. The accession criteria, also known 
as the Copenhagen criteria, required that before gaining membership Europe Agreement 
countries had to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence o f  a functioning
’Ibid., 91.
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market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market 
forces within the Union: and the ability to take on the obligation of membership including 
adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union and the adoption of 
some 80,000 pages of laws, norms and standards that are in force throughout the EU. the 
so-called acquis communautaire.4 No timetable for accession was set up; that would 
depend on the progress in meeting the criteria. The European Council also established a 
structural relationship between the Community and the associated members, thus 
formalizing the burgeoning relationships with East European countries.
The setting of broad membership criteria by the Copenhagen European Council 
marked a departure from the previous U nion's enlargements. Major integration treaties of 
the European Union, including Article O  of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (now Article 49 
of the Amsterdam Treaty) did not determine specific criteria for membership in the 
organization. With the exception of the E C 's southern expansion to Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal when the European Council insisted that prospective members need to respect 
human rights and maintain representative democracy, the expansion in 1973 and the most 
recent one in 1995 included countries with established democracies and market 
economies, so the organization had no reason to define membership conditions. An 
eventual eastward expansion of the EU to include the post-communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, however, caused the Union to face the prospect of incorporating rather 
diverse states exhibiting political, economic, and social levels o f development 
significantly lower than the ones enjoyed in the Western societies. According to the 
European Union statistic agency Eurostat there is a huge variance in wealth between the
4European Commission, European Union Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity 
(Brussels: Directorate General for Enlargement Information and International Relations 
Unit, 2000), 9.
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candidate countries, including the increasing poverty in 1997 in Bulgaria and Romania. 
GDP per capita, when measured according to the Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) 
method, varied from 23 percent of the EU average in Bulgaria (4,400 PPS) to 68 percent 
in Slovenia (13,000 PPS).3 In fact, the imminent enlargement facing the EU poses a 
unique challenge as it is without precedent in terms of its scope and diversity.6 As the 
East European countries are trying to join the Union, the organization itself is becoming 
more complex as it moves toward monetary and political union. In order to address this 
challenge and at the same time maintain the cohesiveness o f the Union, the member 
states established strict criteria for membership while carefully avoiding commitment to a 
timetable for accession.
After recognizing East European countries as eventual future members, the Essen 
European Council in December 1994 em barked on a pre-accession strategy which 
provided the route plan for the integration of the associated states. The key element of the 
pre-accession strategy was the creation o f  a “structured dialogue" between the associated 
states and the EU institutions which would prepare the East European stales for 
accession.7 It provided a framework in which associated states would become more 
involved in the EU activities—including the discussion of issues of common interests 
within the policy field of the organization, increasing familiarity with the process of 
decision making, and synchronizing policies ranging from home affairs to foreign and
3“E. Europe Wealth Gap with EU Steady in ‘97-Eurostat." Reuters ( 11 September
1998).
°The new members will increase the Union's territory by 34 percent and its
population by 105 million.
7European Commission, ‘The European Union’s Pre-accession Strategy for the 
Associated Countries o f Central Europe,” in William Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg, 
eds.. Europe Beyond 2000  (London: W hurr Publishers, 1998): 9-28.
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security policies. The goal was to create a close working relationship between associated 
states and member states prior to the accession negotiations. It should be noted that the 
common foreign and security policy became an area where after 1994 the structural 
dialogue increasingly played an important role in integrating associated states’ 
international policies with member states by aligning themselves with statements, 
initiatives and joint actions in the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP).8 The growing political and economic power of the EU boosted the feeling 
among member-states that the Union should create a more robust foreign and security 
identity. It was only natural that one of the first CFSP joint actions would involve Eastern 
Europe and more specifically the prevention and settlement of conflicts. In 1993, for 
instance, France’s proposal for a treaty to guarantee stability and peace in Europe was 
developed for that aim. The role o f the treaty, called the Pact o f Stability and signed in 
May 1994. encouraged parties to conclude good neighbor agreements covering the 
problems of borders and minorities, and set up regional cooperation agreements. In 
addition, the member-states invited in 1994 the associated countries and the Baltic states 
to join the Western European Union, the military arm of the EU. as associated partners. It 
is, however, difficult to evaluate the independent effect of these steps on the security 
status of the candidate countries as the WEU was virtually defunct and the Pact o f 
Stability included recommendations and requirements already posed by the pre-accession 
process.
Following the Essen European Council, the interaction between the member states 
and associated states reached high levels and the Europe Agreements, the structured 
dialogue, and PHARE became the main tools at the EU’s disposal for helping associated
sSee Karen Smith, 135-48.
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states achieve full membership in the Union. Indeed, the Madrid European Council in 
December 1995 clearly indicated that membership for the associated states was simply a 
matter of time and instructed the European Commission to produce opinions, also called 
avis, on the applicants in terms of how they satisfy the criteria for opening of 
negotiations. The Comm ission’s opinions were to be completed six months after the 
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, a process to reform the Union's 
institutions. The avis not only judge the applicants' readiness for membership but also 
evaluate their ability to meet the membership criteria within the duration of negotiations. 
In other words, the avis provide a snapshot of a country’s preparedness for membership 
and the ability of the country to be ready for membership in the future.
The Commission published the opinions as part of a document. Agenda 2000, 
which looked at the future of the Union's policies, its financial perspectives for the period 
2000-2006, and the EU’s enlargement.9 It recommended that, on the basis of the 
Copenhagen criteria and membership applications from ten East European countries, 
negotiations be launched with the Czech Republic. Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia. Agenda 2000 also established a financial framework for supporting the pre­
accession process in the associated states, including EUR 21 billion for the period 2000- 
2006. 10 The Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 approved the 
Commission's Agenda 2000 and decided to start negotiations with the five recommended
9The opinions, also known as avis, are based on information and analyses 
provided by the applicants themselves. Commission’s experts, international institutions, 
academics and various parts of the policy-making community. Sec, Heather Grabbe and 
Kristy Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastward (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs. 1998). 42.
l0European Commission, Enlargement: Preparing fo r  Accession (May 2001). 
Available from http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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countries. It also allocated financial assistance to the remaining five associated states in 
the amount of EUR 100 million to help them catch up with the first wave countries. In 
March 1998. the negotiations with the first countries officially began. The Commission 
also began a process of detailed evaluation or screening of the situation in ail ten 
countries in relation to Union legislation and the second and third pillars of the Treaty of 
the European Union. The aim o f screening was to help applicant countries increase their 
understanding of the Union’s institutional framework and assist them in identifying the 
issues they need to address as they adopt the acquis.11
In November 1998 the Commission presented the initial evaluation reports of 
progress made by each of the applicants toward membership. The reports set out to 
analyze the progress made by each candidate in implementing the acquis and the 
adoption of reforms in light o f the Copenhagen criteria. Assuming the obligation of 
membership, the ability to take on the acquis and adherence to the aims of the union 
became the fundamental requirements evaluated by the Commission. The evaluation 
reports were to become an important indicator o f the countries' progress toward 
membership and more specifically o f the extent to which national institutions and 
processes were approximating those of the Union’s. Following the publication of the first 
Commission’s opinions on the progress of applicants in 1997. the EC submits annual 
Regular Reports to the European Council on further progress of each country.
The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 decided to open accession 
negotiations in 2000 with a second group of applicants including Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. It must be noted that while the Commission’s reports on
"European Commission, Glossary: Institutions, Policies and Enlargement o f  the 
European Union (Brussels: Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2000). 60.
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the progress made by the first group o f applicants found that they were able to take on the 
obligations o f the acquis in the medium term if they pursued their preparatory efforts 
vigorously, some of the countries in the second group were unable to meet all the 
Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The Council also announced plans to convene 
another Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 to reform the U nion's institutions to meet 
the requirements o f enlargement.
The actual accession negotiations take the form of bilateral intergovernmental 
conferences between the member states and each o f the applicants. Following the 
screening process conducted by the European Commission, negotiations are opened with 
each candidate on the acquis communautaire, which is divided into 31 chapters (for 
instance, company law, energy, external relations, and others).1" The Commission 
proposes and the member states approve unanimously a common negotiating position on 
each chapter. Negotiating sessions are held at the level of chief negotiators for the 
applicant countries and permanent representatives for the member states.
The European Union has also explicitly addressed the problem of security in 
Eastern Europe. Although international relations theory still debates whether dem ocracy 
promotes stability and peace, the Union seemed convinced, very shortly after the collapse 
of communism, that the promotion o f democracy in the East would engender security .1 ’ 
The EU does not see itself as a traditional type of security institution as the organization's 
unsuccessful intervention in the civil wars in Yugoslavia attested. Only after the Cold 
War has the European Union tried to create a stronger common defense and security
i;:For the full list of chapters see, European Commission, European Union 
Enlargement, 35.
1 ’On the EU ’s view on the relationship o f democracy and security see Karen 
Smith, 135-38.
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identity by institutionalizing its pattern of foreign and security cooperation, CFSP, or the 
second pillar of the Union as set out in Article 11 o f  the Treaty of Amsterdam—and 
agreeing on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. However, because the CFSP 
remains so limited, most of the discussions of traditional security matters still take place 
within the context of NATO.
Nevertheless, the Union has proved to be successful in preventing conflicts from 
erupting in the first place. Political, economic, and social integration and the promotion 
of development and dem ocracy-the main strengths o f the EU project—have promoted 
significant change in Europe and eliminated centuries-old patterns of conflict and 
warfare. The extension of EU institutions and values to include the countries of Eastern 
Europe, the leaders believe, holds the promise of spreading peace and stability to the 
entire continent.
The EU and Bulgaria
The relations between Bulgaria and the European Community were initiated as 
early as 1986. But while the Bulgarian government wanted to establish a comprehensive 
economic and trade relationship, the European Commission preferred to limit any 
agreement to trade with only general principles agreed upon for wider cooperation. 
However, intentions to establish relations were soon overtaken by concerns over 
Bulgaria’s treatment o f its Turkish minority, especially after the Bulgarian authorities 
increased their pressure and thousands o f ethnic Turks left the country in 1988-89.14
l4On the early Bulgaria-EC relations see Karen Smith. 60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
Negotiations with the EC were resumed in March 1990 and the two sides signed a 
trade and cooperation agreement a month later. On 22 December 1990 the Grand 
National Assembly adopted a resolution officially declaring Bulgaria's desire to become 
a full member of the European Community.13
On 30 September 1991. the European Council agreed to begin exploratory talks 
for Europe Agreement with Bulgaria. In April 1992 the European Commission asked the 
Council to approve the negotiating mandate. In contrast to Europe Agreements concluded 
previously with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Commission asked that the 
agreement contain, against the strenuous objection of Bulgaria, a reference to human 
rights and democracy. In May 1992, the Council approved the mandate and in December 
negotiations were concluded. The Europe Agreement with Bulgaria was unanimously 
ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament in April 1993. entered into force on 1 February 1995. 
and contained conditions with respect to human rights, democratic principles and the 
principles of a market economy. This conditionality, also present in Romania's 
Agreement, was the first time such a clause was included in a Union’s treaty with third 
countries.
Backed by the unanimous decision o f the Parliament, on 14 July 1995 Bulgaria 
formally applied for membership of the EU, and in the next year the government adopted 
a national strategy for the implementation o f the European Commission's Single Market
l5On Bulgaria's Drive to join the EU see Jasmine Popova, “Bulgaria-EU: The 
New Beginning,” in William Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg, eds., Europe Beyond 2000 
(London: Whurr Publishers, 1998): 135-68.
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White Paper preparing the countries o f Eastern Europe for their integration into the 
Internal Market.16
The beginning of the regular process of evaluating the candidate countries’ 
progress in meeting the membership criteria came in the wake o f the most serious 
political, social, and economic crisis in Bulgaria after 1989. The events of 1996-97 which 
led to the near-collapse o f the national economy and, more significantly, to the near 
breakdown of the still fledgling political and institutional order seriously questioned the 
country’s commitment to meeting the membership criteria. In the avis published as part 
of Agenda 2000 in July 1997, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be excluded 
from the start of negotiations on economic grounds, while, despite the Commission 
concern for the stability of institutions, the country was judged to meet the democratic 
criteria.17 It must be noted that although the Commission divided the ten applicants into 
two groups the way the avis were written provided a degree of differentiation among the 
countries within the groups. Countries were evaluated to face problems and processes of 
different order of severity. Accordingly, although the Report recognized the efforts made 
by Bulgaria’s newly installed reformist government, the country was judged to be clearly 
at the bottom of the group of countries excluded from the negotiations. The avis found 
Bulgaria to meet the democratic criteria for membership but also pointed out that the 
democratic institutions lacked the stability to assure the consolidation of democratic
uThe White Paper, which includes over 1,4000 elements, sets out the body of 
essential market legislation the East European countries need to adopt in order to prepare 
their economies for the internal market. The candidates choose the order o f adopting this 
legislation depending on the countries’ political, economic and social capacities to absorb 
new market legislation.
l7European Commission, Agenda 2000: Fora Stronger and  Wider Union, 1997 
(May 2000). Available from http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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order. The Commission also found the econom y represented the most significant problem 
the country faced in the process o f joining the Union. The country clearly ranked at the 
bottom of the economic performance scale as measured by the scope and degree of 
economic transition. The Report did not expect Bulgaria to meet the condition of a 
functioning market economy until early in the next century. The country was also judged 
to be unable to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Most 
significantly, the Commission judged Bulgaria to have made very little progress and to 
emerge worst off in terms of how near the country is to EU standards and policy norms.
As late as 1999, international and dom estic developments gave the Bulgarian 
government no assurance that the country would be invited to begin formal negotiations 
with the EU. Prime Minister Kostov became increasingly frustrated with what he saw as 
a lack of the EU ’s commitment to a firm early date for including Bulgaria in the second 
group candidates to begin negotiations. The Prim e Minister even suggested that given the 
reluctance o f the West to support the reforms in the country his government might 
reassess its international priorities and objectives.18 Meanwhile the continued crises in the 
Balkans and especially the ethnic conflict in Kosovo further circumscribed Bulgaria’s 
attempts to achieve stable political and economic development and integration with 
Western Europe. In 1999 in its annual report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession 
the European commission deemed the country to  have failed, along with Romania, to
18“Ako Ne Poluchim Pokana Za Pregovori s ES, Shte Preformulirame Tcelta Si: 
Ministyr Predsedateljat Ivan Kostov Pred Reuters” [If Not Invited to Negotiate with EU. 
We Will Reformulate Our Goal: Prime M inister Ivan Kostov Before Reuters] in Kapital, 
9 (3 June, 1999). Available from http://www.capital.bg: INTERNET.
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establish a market economy. The Commission’s annual reports on progress only 
confirmed the already prevailing view that, among the applicant countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania were the laggards and both countries would require longer until deemed ready 
to join the Union. However, what worked in both countries' favor and ultimately led to 
the Commission recommendation to the European Council to extend invitation for 
negotiations was the two states’ behavior during the Kosovo crisis. Despite public 
resistance to the way NATO and the EU were handling the crisis, the Bulgarian 
government sided with the West and supported officially and privately NATO’s actions 
against Serbia. Furthermore, although not a NATO member, Bulgaria agreed to allow the 
forces of the Alliance to use its air space during the air-strikes against Serbian targets.20 
Thus, paradoxically, the crisis that initially seemed to distance Bulgaria from its goal of 
joining the European Union ultimately accelerated the country's accession to the EU. In 
pursuit of stability in the Balkans and in recognition of progress, the Helsinki European 
Council in 1999 decided to include Bulgaria in the second group of candidate countries to 
begin negotiations in 2000. In its 1999 report the Commission summed up the prevailing 
view among the member states that "one of the key lessons o f the Kosovo crisis is the 
need to achieve peace and security, democracy and the rule o f law, growth and the 
foundations of prosperity throughout Europe. Enlargement is the best way to do this.
There is now a greater awareness of the strategic dimensions of enlargement.”21 
Accordingly, despite the lack o f full compliance with the economic requirements for the
1’European Commission, Composite Paper 1999: Reports on Progress Toward
Accession by Each o f  the Candidate Countries, supplement 2/99 (Luxemburg: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000), 19.
-'’“Bulgarian MPs Give NATO Airspace Greenlight,” Agence France-Presse (4
May 1999).
"’European Commission, Composite Paper 1999, 5.
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start of admission, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be accepted as a 
candidate at the Helsinki summit on 10 December 1999.
Despite Bulgaria's inclusion in the Helsinki group o f candidates, it was obvious 
that the country lagged behind the others in its integration in the EU as measured by the 
pace of implementing reforms and adopting the acquis. The European Commission's 
annual evaluation of the applicant countries in 2000 still listed Bulgaria, along with 
Romania, as the only two candidates without functioning market econom ies." Although 
the European Commission, following the Kosovo crisis, declared Bulgaria as meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the country was judged to have serious problems in all 
transition areas. Only in its reports in 1999 and 2000 did the Commission evaluate the 
country to have achieved a level of economic stability and a more satisfactory pace of 
meeting the membership criteria. Yet, even in 2000, Bulgaria, according to the annual 
report, had no functioning market economy. The two countries were deemed to be 
prepared to open negotiations on the fewest chapters of the acquis and by March 2001 
Bulgaria was able to close only eight of the thirty-one chapters." ' Not surprisingly, 
Bulgaria is always paired with Romania as the two countries needing extra time to gain 
EU membership.24
i ■>
"European Commission, Enlargement Strategy Paper: Report on Progress 
Toward Accession by Each o f the Candidate Countries, supplement 3/2000 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001). 37.
2'European Commission, Bulgaria: State o f  Negotiations (6 April 2001).
Available from http://www.euractive.com: INTERNET.
"4The commissioner for EU enlargement Gunter Verheugen declared that all 
candidates, excepting Bulgaria and Romania, would be able to finalize the negotiations 
by the end of 2002 and gain membership by 2004. “Verheugen Sees EU Enlargement 
Without Bulgaria, Romania,” RFE/RL Daily Report (23 October, 2000). Available from 
http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET; “The Big EU Extension to Take Place by 2004.” 
Monitorul Online (5 April 2001). Available from http://www.centraleurope.com;
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Bulgaria's rear position in the Helsinki group resulted not only in the EU’s 
reluctance to integrate the country into the Union but also ensured a differentiated 
treatment of its citizens. While the citizens o f all applicant countries could travel visa-free 
to the members o f the Schengen Convention,’3 Bulgarian nationals, along with 
Romanians, had to obtain visas, a process which caused much indignation among the 
public and increased the cost o f traveling to the West.26 After many failed attempts to 
remove the country from the Schengen list o f states whose nationals require visas to visit 
the members o f the Convention, the EU finally on 1 December 2000 agreed to allow 
Bulgarians to travel to the Union visa-free.27
The Czech Republic and the EU
More extensive relations between Czechoslovakia and the European Union date 
back as far as the early 1980s. In November 1986. the European Council gave the 
Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement on trade in industrial products with 
Prague. The agreement was signed in 1988 and went into effect on I April 1989. Within
INTERNET; A report by ING Barings suggests that the most likely date Bulgaria would 
join the EU is 2008. See ING Barings, EU Enlargement and Convergence, March 2000 
(New York; ING Barrings LLC, 2001), 20.
' 3The Schengen Convention (also known as Schengen acquis), signed in 1990 by 
thirteen EU members plus Iceland and Norway, removed frontiers controls and 
introduced freedom of movement to all individuals who are nationals of the signatory 
states. See European Commission, Glossary, 59.
26“Survey Shows 95 Percent of Bulgarians Feel Affected by EU Visa 
Restrictions,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (21 November, 2000).
27”Schengen Countries Drop Visa Requirements for Bulgarians as o f Tuesday,” 
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (10 April, 2001).
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days o f the new government after the Velvet Revolution in November 1989, 
Czechoslovakia asked the Commission to negotiate a new trade and cooperation 
agreement. In recognition of the speedy reforms taking place in the country, the European 
Commission and Prague concluded a new agreement which went into force on November 
1990. As with the agreements with the other East European states, it included economic 
cooperation in a variety o f areas. By then however, the reformers in Prague already 
defined a membership in the Community as priority of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy; 
in March 1990 Foreign Minister Jiri D ienstbier declared that his country wanted to 
conclude an associated agreement and eventually become a EC member. In May Prime 
Minster Marian Calfa said he hoped Czechoslovakia would join the Community by 2000. 
In addition, in contrast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia was able as early as 1990 to reach 
agreements on visa-free travel with almost all members of the Community.
Czechoslovakia, along with Poland and Hungary, was the first country declared to 
meet the newly formulated conditionality—including the rule of law. human rights, free 
and fair elections, among others—for concluding a Europe Agreement. The agreement, 
however, was seen by the new governments in Eastern Europe, including in Prague, as 
little more than an improved version of the just concluded trade and cooperation 
agreements. Czechoslovakia’s government repeatedly demanded that the European 
Community commit to the country's inclusion in the organization, but to no avail. The 
Europe Agreement between Prague and the EC was signed on 16 December 1991. After 
Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce was com pleted on I January 1993 the Commission 
initiated negotiations of a new Europe Agreement with the Czech Republic. The 
agreement was signed on 4 October 1993 and entered into force in February 1995. By
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then, of course, the European Union had already committed to enlargement. In January 
1996, the Czech government submitted the application for EU membership.
Although the Commission does not formally rank the applicant countries, the 
annual avis provide comparison between the countries’ extent of meeting the membership 
criteria. In its first avis in 1997 the Czech Republic appeared as one o f the star 
performers. Although none of the countries fully met the ability to take on the acquis and 
none was a fully functioning market economy, the Commission evaluated the Czech 
Republic, along with four other countries, to be ready to begin negotiations on joining the 
Union.28 The country along with Hungary were judged to have made the greatest progress 
in terms of their capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Union and the Czech Republic was already ready to take on the main part of the acquis in 
the medium term.29 The Czech Republic became the first post-communist country to be 
admitted in 1995 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a 
recognition of the state 's transformation by the club of the most developed Western 
democracies. The Report also rated the country as a democracy with stable institutions 
and a market economy capable of coping with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the Union in the medium term. It was noted, however, that the Czech Republic 
needed substantial efforts to fully apply and enforce the acquis. Consequently, the 
Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 decided to begin negotiations with the 
Czech Republic in the spring of 1998.
■ European Commission, Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on the Czech 
Republic's Application fo r  Membership o f  the European Union. 1997 (June 2001). 
Available from http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET; Nicoll and Schoenberg, eds., 54-55.
~9European Commission, Enlargement Preparing fo r  Accession.
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Paradoxically, the invitation to begin membership negotiations coincided with a 
serious economic and political crisis in the Czech Republic. The collapse o f several banks 
and a general economic stagnation put an end to what was considered to be an exemplary 
political and socio-economic post-communist transition. Furthermore, the Klaus 
government was less than enthusiastic about what was perceived as a European Union 
bound on circumventing nation-states’ sovereignty: accordingly, the Czech Republic was 
reluctant to align its legislation with the Union’s and reform national institutions in 
preparation for membership. Not surprisingly, the second Commission report released in 
late 1998 noted the state’s lack of preparedness for joining the EU.30 The report observed 
no progress at all in several key areas since its last avis in 1997, including public 
administration, internal markets, anti-trust legislation, justice reform and the treatment of 
Roma. The report called for decisive reforms in the areas o f finance and banking, 
corporate governance and corruption. The Commission also severely criticized the 
quality and adequacy o f the country's National Program for the Preparation o f the Czech 
Republic for Membership of the European Union, prepared by Tosovsky's interim 
government. In fact, the annual report defined the Czech Republic as one o f the lagging 
members of the first group of negotiating countries, well behind the leaders Poland and 
Hungary.
The ascent of the Social Democrats to power marked the end of political 
instability in the Czech Republic and more favorable conditions for consistent efforts to 
meet the membership criteria. Still, the next Commission Report in 1999. although 
recognizing newly energized effort to implement reform, pointed to many o f the same
,()European Commission, Regular Report from  the Commission on Czech 
Republic's Progress Toward Accession, 1998 (May 2001). Available from 
http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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shortcomings included in the previous report.31 It labeled the pace of legislative 
approximation as inadequate and found that there had been only mixed progress to set up 
the institutions needed to implement the limited legislation passed by the Parliament.
Only in its report in 2000 did the Commission establish that the country had significantly 
accelerated the rate o f legislative alignment with the EU acquis and that the government 
had begun to implement major reforms in key areas. ’2
The Social Democrats also ended a period of official Czech doubts about the 
nature and purpose of the European Union as a process. While in power. Prime Minster 
Vaclav Klaus, a self-proclaimed Tacherite, frequently criticized EU developments and 
stimulated a debate in the Czech Republic about issues such as monetary union and the 
social dimensions of the EU. ’3 Klaus resented what he saw as the federalization of the EU 
and the gradual centralization of authority and powers in Brussels at the expense of 
national governments. Instead, he favored admission into the Common Market but 
opposed key aspects o f political unification, particularly the Social Charter. The Zeman 
government, in contrast, adopted a more positive attitude toward integration.
Despite the criticism in the European Commission's 1998 and 1999 reports, the 
Czech Republic's place in the first group of countries negotiating membership was never 
threatened. By March 2001 the Czech Republic had already closed fifteen o f the
’’European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Czech 
Republic’s Progress Toward Accession, 1999 (May 20001). Available on 
http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
'“European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Czech 
Republic's Progress Toward Accession, 2000 (May 2001). Available on 
http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
"G rable and Hughes, 73.
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chapters. ’4 And although the pace o f meeting the membership criteria made the country 
more suited to a second wave of enlargement, EU officials suggested that it may be 
politically impossible to exclude the Czech Republic from the first wave of 
enlargement.0
Lithuania and the EU
Relations between the European Union and Lithuania have developed rapidly 
since the country gained independence in August 1991. The two sides signed a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement on 11 May 1992, which entered into force in 1993. Simultaneous 
with signing the Agreement, the two sides signed a Declaration on Political Dialogue 
creating conditions for political cooperation. Consequently, the Essen European Council 
reaffirmed the Copenhagen decision and extended the pre-accession strategy to the three 
Baltic states and Slovenia.
The EU and Lithuania signed in July 1994 an Agreement on Free Trade and 
Trade-Related Matters, which stipulated for the establishment o f a free trade area during 
a transitional period lasting a maximum of six years beginning in January 1995. Even 
more significantly the two sides signed a Europe Agreement on 12 June 1995. which 
entered into force on 1 February 1998. As with the agreements with other East European 
countries, it provided a legal framework for political dialogue and gradual integration of 
the country in the Union, and promoted the expansion of economic and trade relations
j4European Commission, Czech Republic: State o f Negotiations (April 2001). 
Available on http://www.euractive.com; INTERNET.
3:,ING Barings, 22.
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between the two sides. The Europe Agreement recognized Lithuania's aspirations to 
become a member o f the Union and created conditions for the country’s participation in 
the pre-accession strategy.
Lithuania applied to join the EU on 8 December 1995. On 25 March 1998 the two 
sides adopted an Accession Partnership to help the country’s reform efforts and 
preparations for accession. In its first report the European Commission did not 
recommend Lithuania as one of the countries to begin negotiations to join the Union. In 
terms of the political criteria the avis rated Lithuania among the best performers along 
with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In terms of economic 
development, however, Lithuania, given its later start on economic reform, was judged to 
lag behind the most advanced countries, but to be ahead of Bulgaria and Romania. The 
country was evaluated as lacking a functioning market economy: the country's economy 
was deemed to be unable to withstand competitive p ressu res/6 The Commission urged 
the country to increase its effort in preparation to take on the acquis and adhere to the 
aims of political, economic, and monetary union. In accordance with the EU 
recommendations, the Lithuanian government accelerated its efforts especially in the area 
of meeting the acquis. '7
Later reports by the European Commission observed accelerated reform efforts in 
Lithuania as the country gradually shortened the distance from the first wave countries.,s
,6European Commission, Regular Report fro m  the Commission on Lithuania's 
Progress Toward Accession, 1997 (May 2001). Available from http://europa.eu.int: 
INTERNET.
'7Gediminas Vitkus, “National Parliamentary Control of EU Policy in Lithuania.” 
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review no. 2 (1998): 65-76.
,xSee European Commission, Regular Report from  the Commission on 
Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, 1998 (May 2001). European Commission,
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Most significantly, in its 2000 report the Commission deemed the country to be a 
functioning market economy, thus eliminating the last factor, which informally defined 
the country as an economic laggard. ’0 Yet. while the country was judged to face no 
political obstacles to entry, economic, institutional and legislative issues continued to 
keep the country behind the first wave countries. The 2000 report presented Lithuania 
among the states which best met the Copenhagen political criteria but still lagged behind 
even the other Baltic states in terms of economic development and market, legislative and 
institutional reform—although it must be noted that the country was well ahead of 
Bulgaria and Romania.40 In any event, the country was making a smooth transition and 
by March 2001 it had closed thirteen chapters, only two less than the Czech Republic: a 
remarkable success given that Lithuania started the negotiations in 2000.41
NATO
There was a short-lived hope in Eastern Europe following the Cold W ar that 
collective defense as a means o f ensuring national security would give way to a collective 
security system which would address new instabilities and threats. Vaclav Havel's
Regular Report from  the Commission on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, 1999 
(May 2001). Available on http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
'°European Commission, Agenda 2000: Enlargement Strategy Paper, no. 50. 
Available on http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
40On the state of the Lithuanian economy see European Commission. Commission 
Presents Forecasts fo r  the Candidate Countries, file IP/01/595 (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2001); ING Barings, 64-65.
4lEuropean Commission, Lithuania: State o f  Negotiations (April 2001). Available 
on http://www.euractive.com; INTERNET.
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eagerness to see the Warsaw pact dismembered was as strong as his enthusiasm for a 
Europe free of military alliances. In the spring of 1990, addressing the Council of Europe, 
the Czech president called for the dismantling o f both alliances. Just a few months prior 
Havel was a dissident and now was responsible for formulating his country 's transition to 
democracy. The dissident movement believed that communism and Soviet dominance 
were to blame for the artificial division on the continent. The existence o f NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact was the military dimension of an ideological confrontation. Now that 
communism was in retreat--at least in Eastern Europe if not in the Soviet Union, and 
Moscow was gradually withdrawing its troops—it was only natural, the former dissidents 
thought, that military blocs should become irrelevant.4'
Paradoxically, it was Hungary, a country still ruled by communists, with its 
decision to seek closer links with NATO and calls for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
that signified the Cold War was not only about ideology nor was NATO only about 
security against the Soviets. In early 1991, following the dissolution o f the Warsaw Pact, 
Hungary was joined by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in its calls for NATO to 
provide security guarantees to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Later that 
year, the newly independent Baltic states sought closer ties with the Alliance as well.
Soon NATO membership came to be seen as a panacea for Eastern European countries’ 
inherent instability and insecurity as emerging elites in the region realized that NATO
42Ironically, President Havel insisted in early 1990 that the Warsaw Pact be 
preserved only temporary as a means of bringing the Soviet Union into a new CSCE 
security system in which both blocs would dissolve. For a discussion of the early 
relationship between NATO and the post-communist countries see Christopher Jones, 
“The Security Policies o f the Former Warsaw Pact States: Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction," in Andrew A. Michta an Ilya Prizel, eds., Postcommunist Eastern 
Europe-.Crisis and Reform  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 111-149.
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would be the only institution capable of providing robust security guarantees in a still 
dangerous world.
Only months after the revolutions in Eastern Europe. NATO invited the six 
Warsaw Pact members to visit the North Atlantic Council, its highest body, and establish 
regular diplomatic relations. NATO’s response to the emerging willingness of East 
European states for membership committed the Alliance to a closer cooperation with the 
post-communist countries but avoided any discussions of enlargement.43 The new 
Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads o f States and Government in Rome in 
November 1991 outlined a new approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation, and 
collective defense capability, and including cooperation with East European countries as 
an integral part o f the Alliance's strategy.44 M ore specifically, the summit established a 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to oversee the emerging relationship and 
involve the post-communist countries in a cooperative framework. The first meeting of 
the NACC took place on 20 December 1991 and included six Eastern European countries 
as well as the three Baltic states. The members adopted a “Statement of Dialogue, 
Partnership, and Cooperation” that endorsed enhanced cooperation between NATO and 
the former Warsaw Pact members. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in January 1992, 
NATO decided to include the former Soviet republics in the NACC.
43On the early post-Cold War evolution o f the Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: Office o f Information and Press, 1998), 27-31: 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO H andbook (Brussels: Office of Information 
and Press, 1995). 21-40; Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military 
Relations,” in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995): 45-72.
■^The new Strategic Concept replaced the 1967 strategy of “Flexible Response” 
and moved away from mass mobilization and toward enhanced crisis management 
capabilities and peacekeeping operations. See Simon, Partnership fo r  Peace, 48.
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Although the Alliance took significant steps to address East European states’ 
growing appeal for extensive cooperation it hesitated to address their pressing demands 
for immediate membership, made all the more urgent by the unsuccessful August 1991 
Moscow coup and the continuing war in Yugoslavia. In January 1994 in Brussels, NAC 
launched a major new initiative, Partnership for Peace (PfP), aimed at enhancing stability 
and security in Europe. Although the PfP did not promise immediate membership it 
established a long-term commitment to expansion. The PfP marked a shift from a 
multilateral dialogue to a bilateral relationship between individual partners and the 
Alliance in the form o f Individual Partnership Programs (IPP).
The Brussels Summit in December 1994 decided to initiate an extensive study to 
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the 
implications of membership. The NATO Enlargement Study, released in September 
1995, emphasized that candidate countries should meet five criteria: democratic elections, 
individual liberty and the rule of law; demonstrated commitment to economic reform and 
a market economy; adherence to OSCE norms and principles involving ethnic minorities 
and social justice; resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and establishment o f 
democratic control o f the military. NATO also required new members to assume the 
financial obligations of joining and establish interoperability with NATO structures. In 
fact, there are striking similarities between many of the NATO and EU admission criteria 
including level of democratization, minority issues and economic progress. Based on the 
study's findings, the Alliance conducted an intensive dialogue with interested partners, 
providing member states with valuable information about East European countries’ 
preparation and intention for membership. This in turn, provided potential candidates
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with experience in dealing with the Alliance and knowledge of the responsibilities and 
obligations of membership.
At the Sintra Summit in May 1997 the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), whose purpose was to launch a new stage of cooperation. 
The EAPC provided the overall framework for political and security-related cooperation 
under the PfP. Along with practical cooperation, the EAPC provided a mechanism for 
self differentiations so that partner countries would be able to decide individually the 
level and areas o f cooperation with the Alliance. In other words, states were able to 
choose whether to pursue membership or enhanced cooperation in specific areas.
At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations and reaffirmed its openness to new 
members. The Summit also strengthened the role of the partners in PfP decision-making 
and planning, and adopted an enhanced PfP.43 The enhanced PfP was intended to have a 
more operational character, as well as increased opportunities for the candidate-countries 
to participate in decision-making and planning relating to PfP activities. The accession 
talks with the three partners were followed by the signing and consequent ratification of 
accession protocols. The three countries gained formal membership on 12 March 1999.
NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999, introduced the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP), a design which went further than the Study of NATO Enlargement in 
defining what the candidate countries needed to do in preparation for membership.40 The
43The Madrid Summit, in an attempt to engage Russia, also created a NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO
Handbook (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1998), 31.
46On the M AP see Ambassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber, “The M embership Action 
Plan: Keeping N ATO ’s Door Open,” NATO Review 47 no. 2 (Summer 1999): 23-25; 
Stephen Blank, “M AP Reading: NATO’s and Russia's Pathways to European Military
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MAP gave the candidates a list o f five issues—political and economic, defense and 
military, resources, security, and legal—from which each country will select the most 
valuable and work on them assisted by the Alliance to improve their ability to meet 
membership criteria. In fact, with the MAP initiative. NATO created its own acquis 
against which the Alliance could assess the progress made by each partner.47 The 
Alliance set to draw up an annual report for individual partners providing feedback on 
their progress in the areas covered in their individual national programs. The reports were 
to become the basis for an annual meeting of the NAC with each aspiring candidate.
Bulgaria and NATO
The beginning of Bulgaria-NATO relations was laid down by a decision of the 
Bulgarian government in 13 July 1990 to accept the invitation extended by the London 
Declaration of the NACC to establish diplomatic links with the Alliance. Compared to 
the other East European countries, however. Bulgaria remained ambivalent toward 
membership in NATO as there was no domestic consensus on the foreign policy 
priorities of the country. The Socialist Party, internally split on foreign policy priorities, 
either insisted that the Alliance should first transform and even agree to accept Russia as
Integration,” occasional paper no. 61 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, February 2001). Available from http://www.wilsoncenter.com: 
INTERNET; Jeffrey Simon, “N ATO ’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Prospects 
for the Next Round of Enlargement,” occasional paper no. 61 (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2000). Available from 
http://www.wilsoncenter.com; INTERNET.
47It must be noted that in contrast to the EU accession process, a NATO decision 
to accept new members remains overwhelmingly a political one. Simply fulfilling the 
MAP criteria is no guarantee for membership although a failure to meet the objectives 
will almost certainly disqualify a country from prospective membership. See Blank, 5-7.
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a member before Bulgaria’s accession to the Alliance or outright resisted any moves to 
establish long-term relations with NATO.48 On the other hand, the pro-Westem UDF 
remained internally divided and ineffective in making the case for membership. In fact, 
the only consistent and forceful voice o f support to the idea of joining the Alliance was 
the first democratically elected president, Zhelju Zhelev.
Bulgaria’s ambivalence on relations with NATO between 1990 and early 1997 
left the country unprepared for integration in the Alliance. The Parliament passed a 
declaration in December 1993 on the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country and on 14 
February 1994 the country signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.49 The 
Socialist Party, however, undermined any attempt to establish solid relationship with the 
Alliance and after its overwhelming electoral victory in 1994 put the relations on hold. In 
1996, after rounds o f discussions with NATO in accordance with the PfP guidelines 
concerning prospective desire to join the Alliance. Bulgaria concluded that it did not want 
to pursue membership.3"
The collapse of the Socialist government in early 1997 marked not only the 
ascendance of the UDF but also a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy 
priorities. One of the first acts of the interim government o f Stefan Sofiyanski was to
48See Videnov, 3-5; Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
“ Kontceptcija za Natcionalnata Sigum ost na Republika Bylgarija” [National Security 
Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria] (Sofia, 1995), 34. Available from the Bulgarian 
Embassy in Washington, DC.
49Nikolay Slatinski and M arina Kaparini, “Bulgarian Security and Prospects for 
Reform,” NATO Review  no 2 (March 1995): 28-32.
3°Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” Strategic Forum no. 142 
(May 1998). Available from http://www.ndu.edu; INTERNET.
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declare Bulgaria’s aspiration to join the Alliance.51 After the UDF won the parliamentary 
elections and formed a stable majority government, the country became quite active in its 
quest to establish a strong relationship with the Alliance and ultimately gain membership. 
The government quickly established an infrastructure to catch up with the other 
candidates. On 17 March 1997 Bulgaria adopted the National Program for Preparation 
and Accession to NATO and set up an Intergovernmental Committee on NATO 
Integration. Yet, it was obvious that the country had lost valuable time and the final 
document of the Madrid Summit, which did not even mention Bulgaria as a potential 
future member, caused disappointment in the country but came as a no surprise.
Indeed, political will aside, Bulgaria was hardly prepared to join NATO. While 
the country met some of the criteria listed in the NATO Enlargement Study, including 
democratization, protection o f individual liberties, among others, and governmental 
control over the military, Bulgaria failed to take any substantial steps to reform the 
military.5'  Until 1997 consecutive governments had not started the restructuring of the 
military retained close to the pre-1989 level of over 100,000 troops and an extremely 
bloated. 3.000 strong defense ministry personnel. Since the country until 1997 did not 
seriously consider joining NATO no efforts were made to achieve interoperability and 
train personnel for work with NATO members. No efforts were made to coordinate its 
defense budget, planning, and resource management.
The government of the UDF a made considerable effort after 1997 to implement 
wide ranging military reforms, and more importantly, end Bulgaria’s self-imposed
5,Council o f Ministers o f the Republic of Bulgaria, 17 February 1997-Decision 
o f the Council o f  Ministers fo r  Full NATO Membership (November 2000). Available 
from http://www.md.govemment.bg; INTERNET.
5;:Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO.”
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isolation and convince the Alliance of the benefit o f the country's membership. Bulgaria 
approved its National Security Concept in April 1998, a Military Doctrine in April 1999, 
a Defense Plan in October 1999, and Partnership Goals in April 2000.55 The government 
also established an inter-departmental structure, co-chaired by the foreign and defense 
ministers and an integration council in the Ministry of Defense, to coordinate NATO 
integration.
At the time of the UDF’s ascendance to power in early 1997 the size of the 
military was still at pre-1989 force levels and structure. The new defense reform 
envisioned to cut its size from roughly 100,000 to 45,000 by 2004. It also called for 
restructuring of the forces in three corps and their gradual modernization to meet NATO 
standards.54 Although the reform plans were well conceived, attempts to trim the size of 
the military force encountered a lack of political support and the Parliament failed to 
support Plan 2004.55 Thus by early 1999 Bulgaria still retained a defense establishment of 
112,000. only slightly lower than pre-1989 levels.56 The military is still characterized by
5 Sce Simon. “NATO’s Membership," 10.
54Ministry of Defense o f the Republic of Bulgaria, Military Doctrine o f  the 
Republic o f Bulgaria. Available from http://www.md.govemment.bg; INTERNET; 
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria, Plan 2004 (June 2001). Available from 
http://www.md.govcmment.bg; INTERNET; Jeffrey Simon, “Transforming the Armed 
Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum  no. 172 (June 2000). Available 
from http://www.ndu.edu; INTERNET; Simon, "Bulgaria and NATO.”
55Bulgaria's Joint Chiefs o f Staff insisted that the country needed 65,000 strong 
military and clashed with the civilian authorities over the reform pririties. See Momchil 
Milev, “Bylgarskata Armija Prez Pogleda na Pentagona” [The Bulgarian Military 
Through the Pentagon’s Eyes], Kapital 15 (17 April, 1999). Available from 
http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET. Momchil Nedelchev, “Shefyt naGenshtaba Plashi s 
Ostavka” [Chair of Joint Chiefs o f Staff Threatens to Resign], Kapital 1 (9 January. 
1999). Available from http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET.
56Simon, “Transforming.”
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poor training, low unit readiness levels, and poor morale throughout the officer corps and 
the enlisted ranks. As a late reformer, the country also suffered from the lack of 
institutional experience dealing with the member countries and PfP partners. Problems 
ranged from the absence from the numerous NATO and PfP programs designed to 
integrate partners' militaries in the Alliance’s institutional framework to a lack of military 
participation in various peace-keeping operations providing real operational experience, 
to the lack o f language skills essential in any coalition effort.57
The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 provided the biggest boost to Bulgaria's attempts to 
join the Alliance. Even before the beginning of the air campaign, the government
• ~ 5Sintensified its consultations with NATO officials in anticipation o f armed conflict. 1 
President Stojanov and Prime M inister Kostov also met with their Balkan counterparts 
and issued appeals to Serbia’s leader Milosevic to accept NATO's plan for solving the 
crisis in Kosovo.3'* Later, during the air campaign, the government and the Parliament 
granted the Alliance the use of B ulgaria's airspace for attacks against targets in 
Yugoslavia. The government recognized that the Kosovo crisis, although posing 
numerous security challenges to the country, presented a unique opportunity to prove the 
irreversibility of Bulgaria’s transformation, its choice to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic
57Until 1997 Bulgaria was the only PfP partner with no participation in the IFOR 
and SFOR operations in Bosnia. Only after July 1997 did the government send a 25-man 
engineering platoon to join the Dutch troops in SFOR and later more troops joined. 
“Bulgaria-Bosnia-Blue Helmets,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (7 July, 1998).
58”Bulgaria-NATO Consultations,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agencv  (13 October,
1998).
^ “Bulgaria, Romania Urge Milosevic to Accept NATO Force,” Agence France - 
Presse (22 February, 1999).
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area, and more immediately, the strategic value of an aspiring NATO m em ber/’0 Indeed, 
Bulgaria's support and cooperation with the Alliance significantly enhanced the country’s 
standing, allowing to catch up with the rest of the partners in their quest to gain 
membership. In return for its wartime support, the NAC at the Washington summit in 
April 1999 extended a limited, in space and time. Article 5 guarantee to Bulgaria.61 Even 
before this explicit statement of commitment, the Alliance on numerous occasions 
conveyed its interest in the security and stability o f the country.02 This was not lost on the 
Bulgarians and the government widely publicized any statement of support and 
com m itm ent/”
The end of allied air strikes over Yugoslavia did not diminish the growing 
cooperation between NATO and Bulgaria. The need to maintain multinational forces in 
Kosovo and the beginning of a new conflict, this time in neighboring Macedonia, gave 
Bulgaria another chance to enhance its status among the aspiring membership candidates. 
In March 2001 the government agreed to sign an agreement allowing NATO forces to use
0()Anatoly Verbin, “Bulgarian Government Tested Over Kosovo.” Reuters (19 
April, 1999); In a interview, Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist, argued that the 
“crisis in Kosovo makes Bulgaria a real candidate for NATO membership.” “Krizata v 
Kosovo Napravi Bylgarija Vidima” [Kosovo Crisis Made Bulgaria Visible), Kapital 13 
(5 April. 1998).
6‘in a "Statement on Kosovo,” the NAC committed the Alliance to the security 
and territorial integrity of the countries challenged during the crisis by Serbia's regime. 
Quoted in Simon. “NATO’s Membership,” 19.
62Steve Holland, “NATO Vows to Guard Border States from Serbs,” Reuters (25 
April, 1999).
6'Interview of foreign minister Nadezhda Michailova. “NATO Razprostira 
Sistemata si za Sigumost i nad Bylgarija” [NATO Extends its Security System Over 
Bulgaria], Kapital 41 (19 October, 1998); In an interview. Prime Minster Ivan Kostov 
said that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had send a letter stating that “NATO is 
ready to guarantee the security of Bulgaria in a case of attack by Yugoslavia.” Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
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Bulgarian territory, including the establishment of military bases, in the event of a Balkan 
crisis.64 Remarkably, all political parties represented in the Parliament supported the 
agreement and it was approved without the usual resistance from the Socialist Party.63 In 
fact, the successful conclusion of the Alliance's air campaign against Serbia marked the 
transformation of the B SP’s position on the country's membership of NATO. After a 
relatively short and uncontroversial intra-party debate, the Socialists decided to embrace 
NATO membership as the only politically attainable means to guarantee national 
security.66 The change in the BSP’s long-standing opposition to NATO was an attempt by 
the party leadership to transform the party into a modem social-democratic organization 
and position itself as a potential coalition partner ahead o f the 2001 parliamentary 
elections.67 Even then, however, the Socialists remained the only party represented in the 
Parliament which insisted that the country should hold a referendum on NATO 
membership.
Ultimately, the policies of the government during the Kosovo crisis along w ith its 
efforts since 1997 significantly enhanced Bulgaria's prospects of joining NATO. Yet. the 
country's late start of reforms and systemic economic and political weaknesses continued 
to hinder its ability to convince the Alliance of the worth of its membership.
w“Deal Will Let NATO Forces to Use Bulgarian Territory," Reuters (29 March,
2001 ).
63“Socialists Decide to Vote for Ratification of Agreement with NATO."
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (4 March, 2001).
“ “BPS Declares Itself in Favor o f Active Partnership with NATO," Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (7 March, 2000); “Ex-Communist Socialist Back Bulgaria’s NATO 
Bid.” Reuters (6 March, 2000).
67“Socialists Break with Past, Back NATO.” Reuters (7 May. 2000).
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The Kosovo crisis tested not only the political parties’ resolve to seek 
membership in NATO but also public consensus on Bulgaria-NATO relationship. As 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian public resisted the air campaign against 
Serbia: 77 percent were against NATO’s military intervention against Belgrade and 77 
percent were against Alliance equipment or personnel crossing Bulgaria/’8 Furthermore, 
although a majority o f the public had supported the country’s membership in NATO, 
during the air campaign the majority of Bulgarians refused to recognize that failure to 
grant the Alliance access to the country's territory and air space would most likely hurt 
Bulgaria’s membership hopes.69 Thus the Kosovo crisis indicated that public support for 
Bulgaria’s membership in the Alliance, although routinely over 50 percent in the latter 
part of the 1990s, has no deep commitment based on understanding of the costs and 
duties associated with participation in NATO. On the other hand, the same crisis 
provoked all political parties to finally go through an internal debate on eventual 
membership and ultimately led to the intra-party consensus on the priority o f seeking to 
join the Alliance.
NATO and the Czech Republic
After the collapse o f communism in Eastern Europe, it seemed as if 
Czechoslovakia was ready to accept some modified role for the Warsaw Pact, especially 
in the area of arms control and multilateral security consultations and as a counterbalance
68“Bulgaria-Survey-Kosovo,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (23 March, 1999).
6<)“Vyzdushen Dostyp Po Po-Trudnija Nachin’’ [A ir Space Access, the Hard 
Way|. Kapital 16 (24 March, 1999).
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to unified Germany. Thus, although the government negotiated for the quick withdrawal 
of Soviet troops stationed in the country, it took a cautious approach to the Pact.70 The 
new national leadership accepted that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO would exist until 
the international community established a new Europe-wide security system based on the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The reluctance o f the Soviet leadership to contemplate reform of the Pact, the 
military crackdown in Lithuania in January 1991, and the refusal of NATO members to 
design any non-NATO based security arrangements convinced the Czechoslovakia 
leadership to define membership in the Alliance as a high security priority. As early as 
February 1991, President Havel urged closer cooperation between Czechoslovakia and 
NATO.71 Indeed, Vaclav Havel became the most ardent proponent of NATO enlargement 
as essential to the peace and stability in Eastern Europe.
Along with the clearly defined political will to join the Alliance, the Czech 
Republic, initially as part o f Czechoslovakia and later as an independent state, was quick 
to implement drastic military and security reforms which were virtually complete by 
1994.7" The government asserted total civilian control over the military and carried out a 
thorough restructuring of the force structure and command. While in 1993 the country 
had over 106,000 troops, the next year it downsized the forces down to 87,000 and
70Andrew Cottey, 61 -69.
7l“Weekly Records o f Events,” Report on Eastern Europe 2 (15 February. 1991).
72David M. Glantz, “Military Training and Education Challenges in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary,” Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies 11 no. 3 (September 
1998): 1-55; Jeffrey Simon notes that by 1994 the Czech Republic had made the most 
progress among the Central European countries in developing civilian control over the 
military. Simon. “Partnership for Peace,” 65.
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further to approximately 60,000 in 1999.7’ The reform, however, also included a 
substantial decline in military expenditures, which hampered any efforts to achieve 
modernization of the armed force interoperability with NATO standards.74 In 1997 the 
military budget accounted for 1.7 percent o f the GDP--a decline from 2.6 percent o f the 
GDP in 1993-94.75
Although the Czech Republic was one o f the first East European countries to seek 
NATO membership, the country seemed to have achieved no strong consensus on the 
issue. Vaclav Havel emerged as the driving force behind the drive toward membership 
but his efforts met no strong support by the rest o f the political elite. Indeed, as early as
1993. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus questioned the need of his country to seek 
membership at any price given the declining relevance of the Alliance and the high cost 
eventual membership might incur.76 The political elite, save Havel, did not initially 
campaign vigorously for membership until after the Alliance decided in late 1993 to 
enlarge eastward.77 As security and defense policy enjoyed very little priority and 
attention among the political leadership of all main political parties, the society as a
"’Jeffrey Simon, 'T h e  New NATO Members: Will They Contribute," Strategic 
Forum no. 160 (April 1999). Available from http://www.ndu.edu: INTERNET.
74“Czech Army to Use Russian Weapons for Many More Years." Reuters (29 
March. 2001).
73Simon, “The New NATO Members.”
76“NATO Supreme Commander Meets Czech Leaders.” RFE/RL News Briefs (21- 
25 June, 1993), 19.
77Thomas S. Szayna, “The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a Free Rider." 
in Andrew A. Michta, ed., Am erica's New Allies (Seattle: University of W ashington 
Press, 1999), 124.
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whole seemed to ignore the country’s policies aimed at joining the Alliance.78 The lack of 
any substantial problems and confrontations accompanying the reform of the national 
military forces also made it impossible to tum  Alliance membership into a hot political 
issue to be exploited by both ruling coalition and opposition. Even the Social Democrats, 
who initially opposed Czech membership, gradually came to accept it as inevitable and 
politically noncontroversial.
In accordance with its will to join NATO, the Czech Republic from early on 
became very active in international peacekeeping operations in order to demonstrate its 
military worthiness as a potential ally and to gather experience in the NATO operational 
environment. Very significantly, the country contributed to the coalition efforts during 
the 1991 G ulf War by dispatching a special chemical warfare-protection battalion to the 
G ulf region.74 From 1993 to 1998 Czech military observers were deployed in 15 United 
Nations or OSCE missions in the territory o f  11 countries. The country has also been 
taken part in operations in the former Yugoslavia since 1992.80 The participation in these 
missions provided the Czech Republic with valuable operational and political experience 
in multinational NATO settings. The military expanded bilateral relations with Alliance 
members by signing defense cooperation agreements with all major members and 
conducting military exercise with France.81
78Nelson and Szayna, 19-24.
79On the Czech Republicss participation in peace-keeping operations see Rene 
Nastoupil, “Current Czech Defense Policy,” Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies 12 no. 2 
(June 1999), 117-18.
on
Nelson and Szayna observe that in 1993-94, the country had 1 percent of its 
armed forces committed to UN missions. Nelson and Szayna, 27.
8lCottey, 82.
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Despite concerns over the rational behind the creation of the PfP, the Czech 
Republic was among the first countries to embrace the initiative by signing it in March
1994. By then the first Czech strategic concept already identified integration in Euro- 
Atlantic institutions as the means to deal with any major threat to its security. " However, 
in contrast to the other Central European countries, the Czech government was slow to 
develop the conceptual framework o f the country’s security and defense policies. The 
Parliament failed to approve any of the concepts advanced by the Ministry of Defense, 
once again confirming the low priority defense and security policies enjoyed among the 
elite. Only the impeding Madrid Summit in 1997, which was to decide on NATO 
expansion, made the country approve a hastily framed Defense Strategy.s3 In fact, the 
invitation issued by the Alliance found the Czech Republic without basic documents 
outlining security and military strategies or the country's place and role in the Alliance. 
Only after the formal invitation to join did the Czech Republic accelerat its efforts to 
establish the conceptual foundations o f its defense and security policies.
NATO’s invitation to the Czech Republic issued by the Madrid Summit was 
followed by increased criticism of the country’s preparedness to gain membership. 
Although Prague met the political and economic criteria for joining the political 
leadership was seen as unsupportive to further reforms in the field of defense and 
security. Member states, particularly the United States, repeatedly pointed to falling
K2Szayna, 134,
Ben Lombardi observes that Prague followed incoherent policy; the government 
approved defense doctrine of the armed forces before the national security policy and the 
national defense strategy had been determined and implemented. The Security Policy was 
approved several months after the defense doctrine. Ben Lombardi, “An Overview of 
Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal o f  Slavic Military 
Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1999), 25.
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defense expenditures, lagging modernization and interoperability of forces, and the 
general lack of political support to the reformers in the General Staff.84 Only after public 
NATO pressure did the government agree to increase military expenditures by 0.1 
percent to reach 2 percent of GDP by 2000.83 The resulting tensions between members 
states and successive Czech governments did not end with the country’s formal accession 
to the Alliance.86 It reached a high point during the Kosovo campaign when the 
government, fresh from achieving the ratification of the country’s entry into NATO,87 
broke ranks with the allies and offered to mediate in the conflict.
Lithuania and NATO
After gaining independence in 1991 Lithuania found it difficult to escape the 
realities of geo-politics. As a small country and former part of a larger state, it confronted 
an uncertain security environment with limited resources, including no standing military 
force. Therefore Lithuania faced the dual challenge of building state institutions and a 
defense establishment in close cooperation with the other Baltic states, Latvia and 
Estonia. Cognizant of the country’s security vulnerability as a newly independent state
84Glantz. 51.
8:>Simon, “The New NATO Members.”
86“NATO 2002 Need Not be Held in Prague, Threatens USA,” Czech News 
Agency (29 March, 2001); Robert Anderson, “Washington Bars US Companies from 
Czech Fighter Tender,” Financial Times (23 May, 2001). Available from 
http://www.ft.com; INTERNET.
87Czech Republic’s entry into NATO was ratified in April 1999 by the Lower 
House of the Parliament 154 against 38 with only the Communists and the Republicans 
voting against and 6 Social Democratic MPs abstaining. It was followed by its ratification 
by the Upper House and the President in May.
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which had just seceded from the Soviet Union, Lithuania's leadership quickly came to 
believe that national security could be guaranteed within a transatlantic defense system. 
This perception is shared by the public and as late as 1998, 72 percent of Lithuanians 
believed that their country could not effectively defend itself in the event of a military
ou
attack. Thus even before NATO developed a comprehensive framework to integrate 
East European countries in the Alliance, Lithuania sought to establish military and 
security cooperation with member states.89 Lithuania also participated in the creation of a 
Baltic Council along with Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic Sea Council in 1992, both 
designed to address the need for cooperation in the Baltic region and more ambitiously, 
the problem of “soft” security.
On 4 January 1994, Lithuania sent a formal letter applying for a membership to 
NATO. The same month, the country signed a Partnership for Peace Framework 
Document, thus formally joining the PfP. In cooperation with the other two Baltic states, 
Lithuania created in 1994 a peacekeeping battalion-BALTBAT—following a join 
initiative to increase their individual and jo in t security. The Baltic states also heavily 
involved NATO members in the initiative as a way to address their lack of experience 
and resources, including basic military hardware.'10 From Lithuania's perspective.
88Paul Goble, “Divided on Security,” RFE/RL Newsline (27 August. 1998). 
Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET.
80On security cooperation between Lithuania and NATO and EU members see 
Olav F. Knudsen, ed.. Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 1999); Charles M. Perry, Michael J. Sweeney, and Andrew C. 
Winner, Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Implications fo r  U.S. Policy 
(Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2000)
°°On the goals and structure of BALTBAT see Annikab Bergman, “BALTBAT: 
The Emergence of a Common Defense Dimension to Nordic Coordination,” working 
paper (Copenhagen, Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. August 2000).
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national security under the conditions of scarce capacities and uncertain environment 
could be assured only by cooperating with NATO. Indeed, as late as 1995 the country's 
military numbered only 7,000 troops and its defense posture relied heavily on preparing 
citizens for self-defense on a massive scale.91 Accordingly, the 1996 Law on the 
Fundamentals of National Security—which lays out the country's basic defense concept 
and command structure—explicitly required that Lithuania’s national security “be 
developed as part of the transatlantic defense system.”9* Consequently, the country 
established coordination between 14 government institutions and five working groups to 
specifically work toward joining the Alliance.9 ’
Because Lithuania's defense capabilities were and still remain very limited, the 
political elite very early on recognized that traditional national self-defense was not 
achievable and pursued regional and institutional means to guarantee the state’s security. 
Even before its international recognition. Lithuania and the other two Baltic states 
established an institutionalized framework for cooperation first by signing a Baltic 
declaration for cooperation in 1990 and later the establishment of Baltic Council of 
Ministers in 1994. Increasing interaction with Baltic and Nordic ministers of foreign
Available from Columbia International Affairs Online. http://www.cc.coIumbia.edu; 
INTERNET.
91 Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon. “Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement.” 
Strategic Forum no. 57 (December 1995). Available from http:// www.ndu.edu; 
INTERNET.
92Perry, Sweeney and Winner, 104.
93Simon. “NATO’s Membership Plan”, 11-12; Lithuania went as far as to create a 
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs position responsible for overall coordination of national 
efforts in the framework of NATO integration. See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Lithuania, Fact Sheet—April 2001 (29 April 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt; 
INTERNET.
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affairs and defense led to cooperation on air space, borders, and Baltic Sea rescue 
operations.94 In addition, Lithuania enthusiastically joined any institution and initiative 
considered to enhanced the country’s chances of joining the Alliance. In June 1994 
Lithuania became an Associate member o f the Western European Union—seen by the 
national leadership as a backdoor to the A lliance-just months after applying to join 
NATO and signing the PfP agreement.
Recognizing that the major challenges facing the Baltic states result from their 
small size and requires cooperation and coordination in building their armed forces and 
addressing security threats, Lithuania participated in the creation of a jo in t Baltic 
peacekeeping force-BALTBAT—and a joint Baltic naval squadron and airspace 
surveillance system—BALTRON and BALTNET. The three states went as far as to create 
in 1999 a joint military academy, Baltic Defense College or BALTDEFCOL. in 
Estonia.93 In order to prove its worth as a potential ally, the foreign policy and defense 
elite cultivated an extensive military relationship with Poland by establishing a combined 
peacekeeping unit and an airspace management regime. Lithuanian troops were 
committed to BALTBAT and international peace-keeping forces.'*’ In fact, since 1994
94See Knudscn, ed„ Stability' ami Security: Perry. Sweeney and Winner.
93In a interview, Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis hypothesized that 
regardless o f whether the Baltic states are in NATO or not ’‘if one of us is attacked, 
there’s no doubt that the other two will also be attacked, maybe later.’’ Mel Huang, "So 
Far So Smooth,” Central Europe Review 2, no. 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from 
http://www.centraleurope.org; INTERNET.
96On Lithuania’s international military cooperation see. Walter C. Clemens, The 
Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 209-11.
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over 600 Lithuanian peacekeeping troops have served with United Nations missions in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.97
NATO’s decision at the 1997 Madrid Summit to invite only three countries was 
met with disappointment, yet not surprise, in Vilnius. The Summit communique, which 
left the door open to more candidates and specifically mentioned Lithuania as one, 
however, was considered significant progress. Furthermore, the signing of a Charter of 
Partnership, agreed upon between the U.S., Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in January 
1998, although not providing security guarantees, was seen by Vilnius as an important 
document reflecting America's political commitment to the future o f the three countries. 
The agreement stipulated for consultations among the signatories and other countries in 
the event that “a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is 
threatened or at risk.” Seeing 2002 as the date o f the next NATO expansion prompted 
Lithuania to concentrate its efforts on increasing the size and effectiveness of the national 
military. Accordingly, the military budget was consistently increased and was planned to 
reach almost 2 percent in 2001, up from 1.13 in 1999 and .85 percent in 1997." National 
armed forces were planned to grow from the January 1999 total of 12.200 to 23.000 by 
2008.99
Membership in NATO has consistently enjoyed strong support in Lithuania not 
only among the political elite but also among the public. The leadership has believed that 
EU and NATO integration are mutually reinforcing processes, thus integration in the
97Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Lithuania in International Peace 
Operations (23 February. 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt: INTERNET.
"M inistry o f Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Fact Sheet-April 2001 (29 April,
2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt; INTERNET.
"Sim on, “Transforming,” 6.
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Alliance would provide not only hard core security benefits but also would significantly 
facilitate integration in the European Union. Accordingly, changes in governing political 
parties and coalitions led to no essential changes in foreign and security policy as 
governments, regardless of their ideological make up, maintain the priorities of their 
predecessors. Thus NATO membership has been consistently one of the top foreign 
policy objectives of the political elite. This consensus is sustained by a public, which 
routinely ranks the Alliance among the most trusted international institutions and sees 
NATO as the best guarantee o f national security. According to a public survey conducted 
in 1998, 55 percent of Lithuanians approved of their country's quest for NATO 
membership.100 Another survey, conducted in August and December 2000, found the 
approval of a NATO membership at 49 percent as only 22.3 percent disapproved.101 Very 
significantly, more Lithuanians. 26 percent, in 1998 believed NATO membership alone 
would give their country the best chance for security, while fewer, 23 percent, backed 
neutrality and another 23 percent backed membership in both the EU and the Alliance as 
the best security option.10'  The only slip in public approval o f NATO occurred during the 
Alliance's air campaign against Serbia when for the first time the support for joining fell 
to 43.5 percent.10’
looCited in Perry, Sweeney and W inner, 104.
101 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Fact Sheet-April 2001.
l0'See Paul Goble, “Divided on Security,” RFE/RL Newsline (27 August, 1998). 
Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET.
l03“Polls Show Balts Against NATO Airstrikes on Yugoslavia,” Agence Franee - 
Presse (8 April, 1999).
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Trade with the European Union
Trade relations between the European community and the Soviet bloc were 
limited as throughout the Cold W ar Moscow refused to recognize the Community and 
worked to undermine the integrative processes taking place in the Western part o f the 
continent. The Soviet Union created its own organization, the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), in order to achieve similar integrative processes among 
the East European states. For its part, the Community was reluctant to contribute to 
Soviet domination over other communist states by extending trade relations to the East. 
Only after the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1975 did Western Europe open itself 
modestly to trade with the communist states.104 Accordingly, at the wake o f 
communism’s fall the value of trade between individual East European countries and the 
countries of the EC was negligible.
The European Community quickly responded to the collapse of communism by 
liberalizing trade with the East and concluding bilateral trade agreements. What followed 
was the massive reorientation of East Europe’s trade from the East to the West. This 
process reflected not only the desire of newly independent states to limit Soviet, and later 
Russian, influence over them and the collapse o f the Soviet economy, but also the explicit 
policy of the European Community to use trade as one of the means to promote a market 
economy and democratization in the former Soviet bloc, and ultimately its integration in
l04On the trade-offs involved in the Helsinki process see Ariel Bloed, ed.. The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents 
(Boston: Kluewer Academic Publishers, 1993), 1-117.
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the W est.103 The combined effect o f rapidly declining restrictions on goods from the East 
and new exchange rates increased trade flow in both directions.
Even in this early phase of increased trade between the EC and the East, however, 
differences in the levels o f economic development among the post-communist countries 
led to different levels o f trade flows. While Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech 
Republic, could exploit not only its geographic proximity to the West but also its 
relatively advanced stage of economic development and dramatically increase trade with 
the West, the relatively backward Bulgarian economy witnessed a hard time taking 
advantage of the opening of Western markets. Lithuania, unlike the other two countries, 
was a formal part of the Soviet economy and encountered harder times reorienting its 
trade to the East. Well into the 1990s Lithuania's international trade continued to be with 
the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS), mainly Russia.106 In fact, both Bulgaria 
and Lithuania throughout the 1990s remained greatly dependent on Russia as a source of 
energy and natural resources.107
The early liberalization of trade between the EU and post-communist countries, of 
course, accounts only partially for the structure and volume of trade between the two 
sides. The consequent market reforms, and more specifically their success or failure, 
determined the general economic growth and the ability o f the economy to compete in the
l0:,John Pinder, “The European Community and Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe,” Jeoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, George Sandford Pridham ct al., 
Building Democracy ? The International Dimension o f  the Democratization in Eastern 
Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994): 119-43.
I06A s late as 1999 Russia was still Lithuania’s largest trading partner and 
accounted for 19.5 percent of the country’s imports. See, Vilniaus Bankas A.B.
Lithuanian Macroeconomic Review I (April, 2000) 46, Table C 1.
I07ln 1998, 21 percent of Bulgaria’s imports came from Russia. See, ING Barings, 
53, Figure 51.
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Western market. Accordingly, the success of market reforms in the Czech Republic not 
only boosted the country 's economic development as reflected in the growth of G DP but 
also increased the ability of the national industry to diversify and increase its exports to 
the European Union, including the export of high value-added products. The growing 
economic prosperity through 1998 also boosted the demand for imports from the EU. 
Thus the Czech Republic witnessed a steady growth of trade with the core countries both 
in total value and as a percentage o f its total international trade (See Table 12). Bulgaria, 
on the other hand, was reluctant to implement radical and quick market reforms until 
1997 and the ensuing economic slowdown prevented the national economy from taking 
advantage of the opening of Western markets. In fact, unlike the Czech Republic and 
Lithuania. Bulgaria did not achieve stable economic development and growth and this 
inevitably reflected in both the total volume of trade with the West and the W est’s share 
of Bulgaria’s total trade (See Table 12).
Lithuania is clearly placed between the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in terms of 
volume and share o f its international trade with the European Union (See Table 12). 
Starting the reforms after the other countries and implementing relatively slower and less 
radical market policies than the Czech Republic's. Lithuania, nevertheless, was able to 
achieve economic stabilization and resume growth relatively quickly. Although, like 
Bulgaria, its exports to the West were dominated by low value-added, low-skill products, 
Lithuania was able to increase the total value of trade with the West. The country’s total 
value of international trade is comparable with Bulgaria’s but given that Lithuania's
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population is not even half as large, it reflected the general stability and healthy growth of 
the national economy.108
Foreign Investments in the National Economy
Along with trade liberalization, foreign investments in the post-communist 
countries were seen by the West as another means of promoting the political, economic 
and social transformation. The European Commission, after the fall o f communism, 
quickly became the body coordinating the flow of financial assistance provided by the 
industrialized countries, the International Monetary Fund and the W orld Bank as well as 
the institutions specifically designed to assist the transition in the East European 
countries, including PHARE and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD).109 The official financial aid and investments, however generous, 
were not enough to satisfy the countries' hunger for massive resources in the reform 
process. Indeed, the EU financial transfer was designed to increase the countries' ability 
to attract private investments on their own by providing technical assistance, making 
visibility studies, co-financing infrastructure projects, and assisting in the development of 
capital markets, among others. The geographic proximity of those countries to the West,
I OS‘ Along with the general backwardness of Bulgaria and Lithuania's economies 
relative to the Czech’s, another explanation of the inability of the two countries to 
increase their exports to the EU is the relatively large share of their agriculture as share of 
the GDP. The European Union, traditionally very protective of its fanners, failed to 
liberalize restrictions on imports o f agricultural products, including from the associated 
members. On the share o f the farming sector in the three countries see ING Barrings, 
Figures 49, 55,67.
10*)On the coordinating functions o f the European Commission in providing aid to 
Eastern Europe see Smith, The Making o f  EU, 66-82.
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the liberalization of trade, the prospects o f future inclusion in the EU, and the relatively 
low labor cost, made those countries a natural destination o f foreign capital and 
investments. Here again, however, differences in political and economic development led 
to wide disparities among the countries’ capacities to attract capital. While the Czech 
Republic, following the success of reforms, quickly became a prime destination of 
foreign direct investments, Bulgaria and Lithuania greatly lagged behind (See Tables 13 
and 14). Lithuania and Bulgaria attracted comparable amounts of foreign investments, 
but once again, the larger size of the Bulgarian population translated into much smaller 
foreign direct investment stock per capita in the period 1989-2000 (See Table 14). Most 
of the direct investments in Bulgaria were made only after the beginning of the 
comprehensive economic reforms in 1997, several years after the start of transition to the 
market in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. While in the period 1989-2000, the Czech 
Republic attracted $1,884 of foreign direct investments per capita, and Lithuania, starting 
the reform a few years later, attracted $626 per capita, Bulgaria was able to achieve only 
$388 per capita in the same period.
Stock
The end of the Cold War not only uncovered the diversity of the Eastern 
European countries’ legacies, experiences, capacities and goals but also removed the 
homogenizing Soviet and communist influences and exposed them to a variety of 
environments and external challenges facing each society and the political elite. Soon 
after the beginning of reforms, many authors began to identify differences in external 
factors as partially accounting for the variances in transformation outcomes. In fact.
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students o f post-communism, ever seeking more precision in identifying the diversity of 
what was communist Europe, branded new regions to substitute for the generic "Eastern 
Europe." Following the collapse of Soviet dominance, diverse developments ranging 
from successful transitions to inability to establish a stable democracy, to open ethnic 
warfare validated the need to approach the study of post-communist countries through 
recognizing the unique characteristics of each country’s regional environment. That post­
communist countries were a former part of the Soviet sphere of dominance and now they 
are still at the periphery of the Western core does not fully ascertain their position on the 
core-periphery continuum or their capacity to become part o f  the core. Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic and Lithuania's ability to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
depends not only on their political elite and societies’ political will and commitments but 
also on their neighboring countries’ degree o f integration in the same institutions. In the 
best case, a country w ould be enveloped by states, which are members of NATO and the 
EU: in the worst case, a country would be surrounded by states that have adversarial 
relations with the core. When surrounded by core countries, a post-communist state 
willing to integrate in the core would be receptive to the flow o f ideas and institutions 
across its border, while, if conflicts flare in neighboring states, the country would be 
interested in the resolution of those conflicts and would try to limit flows across borders.
Not surprisingly, those hard realities of geopolitics clashed with some of the 
fundamental requirements for regional behavior imposed on the associated states by the 
EU and to a lesser degree by NATO. The EU demanded that candidates actively pursue 
regional cooperation and good neighborhood relations. It made no sense, the member- 
states argued, in the Union opening its doors to new members if the aspiring states did
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not open their doors to each other.110 Both the Union and NATO demanded that 
candidate countries not simply improve relations and cooperation with neighboring states 
but solve all serious issues of contentions with them, including borders and minorities. 
Accordingly, the EU mobilized resources, mainly through PHARE, to assist cross-border 
projects and solutions to common problems designed to create a pattern o f practical 
cooperation and integration. In other words, the European Union insisted that it would 
accept only states that in practice embraced the Union’s ideas of openness to outside 
influences, flows and institutions. The post-CoId W ar environment, however, presented 
the East European states with risks and challenges that inhibited some of the fledging 
democracies’ willingness to fully embrace cross-national interaction and openness.
Bulgaria's Stock
The three countries in the study are located in three distinct regions representing 
very different challenges to their security and transitions—Bulgaria in the Balkans, the 
Czech Republic in Central Europe, and Lithuania in the Baltic region. Among the three 
countries, Bulgaria’s regional politics and developments represented most trying 
challenges to the country 's policies o f transition and integration in the Western core. 
Almost as soon as Bulgaria’s transition had started in the early 1990s, the region 
witnessed the beginning of the most violent and destructive European conflict after the 
Second World War—the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The wars brought about not 
only the institutional isolation of Serbia from the larger process o f democratic transition
ll0Hans van den Broek, “Preparing for the Enlargement of the European Union,” 
in William Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg, eds., Europe Beyond 2000  (London: W hurr 
Publishers, 1998): 3-9.
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and integration with the West taking place in Eastern Europe, but also led to the state's 
physical segregation as core countries and neighboring states imposed political, military, 
and economic sanctions for a better part o f the last decade. Thus Bulgaria had to limit its 
interaction with a country located between itself and the core countries. Furthermore, the 
wars caused frequent disruption of the road and river travel through Serbia and Bulgaria's 
trade flow with the West had to be diverted through longer and more expensive routes.111
Another Bulgarian neighbor, Macedonia, posed a challenge of a different kind. 
Gaining sovereignty for the first time in its history, Macedonia faced major difficulties in 
state-building and nation-building. Consequently, the country failed to develop an 
extensive relationship with both the EU and NATO, and only recently did Macedonia 
express a willingness to join both, although remaining far from being ready to start even 
initial negotiations. In addition to its relative isolation from the larger integrative 
processes in Europe, Macedonia also failed to reach a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria 
on the terms of their relationship. Although Bulgaria was the first state to recognize 
M acedonia’s independence, Sofia refused to recognize Macedonians as a separate 
nationality and the Macedonian as a language rather than a mere Bulgarian dialect thus 
effectively dooming the prospects of an extensive relationship. Consequently, political, 
social, and economic relations between the two countries remained stagnant until finally
11 ‘During the NATO’s air strikes against Serbia in 1999, the Bulgarian
government estimated that Bulgaria foreign direct investments would be half of the 
envisioned for the year and the originally forecast for a 5 percent growth had to be scaled 
down to 3.7-4 percent. Mike Dolan, “Balkans Count Rising Cost of War at EBRD," 
Reuters (18 April, 1999).
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an agreement in 1999 in which Bulgaria recognized the existence o f  a Macedonian 
language, opening the way to a more intensive bilateral cooperation.112
To the north, Bulgaria borders Romania, an EU associated member and candidate 
for NATO membership. In its transition, Romania achieved similar to Bulgaria's degree 
of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions as both countries concluded their Europe 
Agreements and were invited to begin negotiations to join the Union at the same lime. 
Both countries have also achieved a similar pace o f adopting the acquis and are almost 
always singled out as the only two states without chances of being accepted in the EU 
before 2005. In their quest to join NATO, Romania holds a slight advantage as Bucharest 
defined membership in the Alliance as a top foreign policy priority long before Bulgaria 
decided to seek it in 1997. In fact at the Madrid Summit, which extended invitation to the 
first three new members, the Alliance specifically pointed to Romania as a strong 
candidate for the next wave of expansion.
To the south, Bulgaria borders Greece and Turkey: both members of NATO. 
Greece has also been an EU member since 1982 but remains the poorest member-state, 
even after successive Union enlargements. Being a relatively underdeveloped EU 
member prevented Greece from becoming an agent o f institutional and value flows into 
Bulgaria as Athens failed to establish significant political, social, and, most significantly, 
financial and trade presence to the north .11. Its weak position also precluded Greece from 
successfully promoting Bulgaria’s interests before both NATO and EU. The other
l!2“Bulgaria, Macedonia Sign Language Accord,” Agence France-Presse (22 
February, 1999).
ll3On G reece 's failure after the Cold War to assert itself and influence outcomes 
in the Balkans see Efstathicos Faciolas, “Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist 
Approach.” European Security 6 no. 4 (Winter 1997): 130-156.
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southern neighbor, Turkey, although more powerful economically and geopolitically, has 
remained outside the EU dimension of the Western core as its attempts to join the Union 
have been thwarted for not meeting the political and economic membership criteria.
The EU and NATO’s requirements that candidate countries solve bilateral 
conflicts with neighboring states and actively seek regional cooperation and integration 
presented Bulgaria with a difficult dilemma. Almost constant armed conflict to the West 
and historically rooted regional problems challenged the country's political will and 
capacity to undertake practical steps toward cooperation and integration before political 
solutions were found to existing conflicts and problems. Furthermore, the Balkan region 
has historically witnessed a very low level of economic and political interaction and 
flow.114 Persistent ethnic conflict, political instability, and underdevelopment made the 
likelihood of increasing cooperation and integration among the countries in the Balkans 
extremely low ."3 Indeed, several post-Cold War attempts to forge closer cooperation 
through the creation of regional organizations have met the resistance of some Balkan 
countries, which failed to achieve their goal. In the case o f Bulgaria these regional 
initiatives were seen as institutions diverting the country from its foreign policy 
priori lies—the EU and NATO. Thus although Bulgaria participated in the early 1990s in 
the creation of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)—an institution designed to 
facilitate political and economic cooperation among the Black Sea countries—Sofia
1 l4Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans (Totowa. NJ: Bames & Noble 
Books, 1983).
1 ,:>As late as 2000, Bulgaria’s trade with the Balkan states represented only 6 
percent o f its total external trade. Deutcshe Bank Research, Bulgaria (May 2001). 
Available from http://www.dbresearch.com; INTERNET; This trend is consistent with 
the historical record as Braun observes that in the early 1980s the intra-Balkan trade 
represented merely 6 percent of the total international trade of the Balkan states.
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resisted any proposals to forge integration among the members, including the creation of 
a free-trade zone and an inter-parliamentary body.116 Similarly when the European Union 
and the U.S. created the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative in the mid-1990s, and 
in 1999 the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to financially assist the reconstruction 
of South East Europe in the wake of the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria perceived these 
initiatives simply as yet another resource to utilize in the process of joining the EU rather 
than as institution designed to forge cooperation and integration among the Balkan states. 
The inability of the Stability Pact to live up to expectations as a latter day Marshal Plan 
notwithstanding, the Pact’s leadership often complained about Bulgaria’s attitudes toward 
the initiative.117 Similarly, when the head of the Stability Pact suggested that a framework 
was created to monitor and address corruption in the Balkan countries, President 
Stoyanov reminded him that Bulgaria already negotiates with the EU on a chapter of the 
aquis dealing with this issue.118 All in all, while Western institutions see these initiatives 
as facilitating the implementation of the EU and NATO membership requirements for 
practical cooperation and partnership among neighboring countries.110 Bulgaria saw them
llf’In an interview for the Turkish Turkiye in early 1992, President Zhelev 
expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the BSEC and cautioned that Bulgaria's 
priority is joining the European Community rather than regional organizations. Huseyin 
Tanrikulu (text). Istanbul Turkiye in Turkish (29 February 1992). Translation by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-East Europe. 6 March 1992 
(PrEx"7.10: FBIS-EEU-92-045; p. 4).
ll7“Bulgaria Wants Revisions of Stability Pact,’’ Reuters (3 May, 2001). Bulgaria 
threatened to withdraw from the Pact unless the country was removed from the Schengen 
visa list.
1,8Bulgarian National Radio (31 July, 2001).
1 l0On the shortcomings o f the West’s attempts to create peace through 
cooperation and assistance see International Crisis Group, “After Milosevic: A Practical 
Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace” (29 April, 2001). Available from 
http://www.crisisweb.org; INTERNET.
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as attempts to postpone the country's integration in the Western core.120 Although the 
ascent to power o f  a reform government in 1997 ended Bulgaria's relative international 
isolation and ushered Sofia into a more active foreign policy, the country embraced 
regional cooperation strictly as a means of enhancing its chances of Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Indeed, most of Bulgaria's Balkan policy was in response to various crises in 
the region rather than a long-term policy of regional integration.121 Not surprisingly, even 
when the Balkan states were able to create institutions of the type the EU and NATO 
envisioned as creating the fundamentals of a more integrated region, it was often found 
that those organizations had no viable missions.122
The Czech Republic's Stock
The Czech Republic borders Poland, Germany. Austria and Slovakia. Two of the 
countries-Germ any and Austria—are members of the EU, and Poland and Slovakia are 
associated members. In addition. Germany is a member of NATO and Poland was invited
u>On the Western perspective see the interview of Mediapool agency with the 
head of the Stability Pact, Bodo Hombach. “Investitorite Chakat Kraja na Konflikta v 
Makedonija" [Investors Await the End of Macedonia Conflict] Mediapool (6 July, 2001). 
Available from http://www.mediapool.bg; INTERNET.
121 Alistair Bell, “Balkans Summit Backs Kosovo Autonomy." Reuters (13 
October, 1998); Elisaveta Konstantinova, “Bulgaria, Turkey. Romania Discuss Kosovo." 
Reuters (1 1 July, 1998); Costas Paris, “Greece, Bulgaria, Romania Appeal for Kosovo 
Peace." Reuters (4 October, 1998); “Balkan Foreign Ministers to Meet on Kosovo," 
Reuters (10 M arch, 1999).
’"Southeast European states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia. 
Romania and Turkey—created in 1998 a joint peacekeeping force envisioned to have up 
to 4,000 troops and a headquarters to be rotated in each country. A year later, however, 
the NATO Secretary-General Robertson suggested that the newly-established 
peacekeeping force should not be deployed in a Kosovo operation. “Balkan Peacekeeping 
Force Should Not be Deployed in Kosovo: Robertson." Reuters (13 January, 1999).
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to join the Alliance along with the Czech Republic in 1997. Slovakia is an active 
participant in the PIP program seeking membership in 2002, while Austria chose to 
remain outside of NATO. Among the three case studies, the Czech Republic possessed 
the best stock throughout the decade following the demise of communism. In fact, the 
country’s regional environment improved when the separation between the Czech and 
Slovak parts o f Czechoslovakia paradoxically increased the quality of the Czech 
Republic’s stock as the independent state o f Slovakia substituted for the potentially 
unstable, and institutionally isolated from the West, Ukraine. Thus the Czech Republic 
found itself surrounded by either core countries or states seeking integration in the core. 
Furthermore, the neighboring states seeking to join the core—Poland and Slovakia—were 
among the most advanced East European countries as reflected, more so Poland than 
Slovakia, by their advanced stage of integration in Western institutions. The Czech 
Republic's favorable geographic position and stock combined with success of political, 
social and economic reforms translated into a quick institutional and economic 
reorientation of the country toward the Western core.12 ’ Geographic proximity to Western 
markets and a relatively advanced national economy enabled the Czech Republic to 
attract Western capital, which further boosted competitiveness o f the economy and its 
integration in the world market. In the decade following the start o f economic reforms.
,2’Czech reorientation toward the W est was both economic and political. 
Accordingly, Czech-Russian relations cooled significantly; the heads of states met very 
few times, regular consultations between deputy foreign ministers from both countries 
ceased in 1998 and the Russian Foreign M inister visited Prague in 2001 after seven years 
of no show in Prague. “Russian Foreign M inster Visits Prague After Seven Years,” Czech 
News Agency (31 January, 2001).
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the country accumulated almost three times as much foreign direct investment per capita 
as did Lithuania and almost five times as much as did Bulgaria (See Table 14).124
The direction of Czech trade, too, quickly shifted from East to West. Even in the 
early stage of reform, over 50 percent of international trade was with the European Union 
consequently, by the end of the decade it reached over 70 percent of the total. O f the EU 
members, Germany, from early on, emerged as the Czech Republic’s largest trade partner 
absorbing 35 percent of the exports and providing 35 percent of the total imports.1-3 Very 
significantly, the Czech Republic greatly decreased its dependence on Russian sources of 
energy and by 2000 Russia accounted for only 6 percent of the total imports.126 
Conversely, Russia still remained a main source of imports, particularly energy and raw 
materials, to Bulgaria and Lithuania, accounting for 21 percent o f total imports to each 
country.
The reorientation of the Czech economy towards the Western market was 
consistent with the overall national policy of seeking quick and complete integration in 
the Western core. This policy was based on a single-minded strategy, which saw' 
demands by Western states and institutions for more cooperation and integration among 
the Eastern European countries as attempts to postpone or even reject integration in the 
West.
l24Josef Tosovsky cautioned in 1995 that the national economy cannot absorb the 
huge inflow of foreign capital and warned that short-term speculative capital is producing 
strong inflationary pressures. “Bank Governor Says Capital is Flooding Czech 
Economy.” RFE/RL Research Report (7 June. 1995).
I25ING Barings, 57; Russia became a very minor Czech trade partner, accounting 
for only 2,5 percent of the total exports in 1998, down from 3.4 percent in 1994. Czech 
Statistical Office, External Trade Structure by Country Group, Updated Figures, table 
no. 6 (August, 2001). Available from http://www.czso.cz; INTERNET.
I26lbid., 57.
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The spectacular success of Czech reforms convinced the political elite that the 
country was well positioned to enter all Western institutions and it did not need to wait 
for the other post-communist countries until they caught up with the Czech Republic.127 
Therefore, when Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary initiated in February 1991 the so- 
called Visegrad G roup-designed to facilitate cooperation in a variety o f areas, ranging 
from scientific research and trade issues to security— Prague saw it only as a consultative 
organ.128 The Czech leadership consistently rejected calls by its Hungarian and Polish 
counterparts for a common and coordinated approach to their quest to join Western 
institutions and for more regional cooperation.129 Accordingly, only after great pressure 
from the West did Prague agree to create a Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) 
among the Visegrad states, which went into effect in March 1993.1‘1°
l_7The admission, in November 1995, of the Czech Republic to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, an institution of the most advanced 
democracies, as the first of the post-communist countries can be seen as a recognition of 
the country’s transformation effort by Western democracies.
I2sln an interview for the French newspaper Le Figaro, Prime Minster Vaclav 
Klaus described the Visegrad Group as an artificial process created by the West. Xavier 
Gautier, “Prime M inster on Partion of Czechoslovakia” (text). Paris Le Figaro in French 
(12 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-Easi Europe, 13 January 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-008-93; p. 22-23); On the 
Czech ambivalence about the Visegrad Group see Cottey, 126-41.
l2)The Czech Republic refused to submit a common application for membership 
of the EU with Poland and Hungary and applied individually only after the other two 
states did so.
l ,aTrade among the CEFTA states is not particularly high. As o f early 1997 the 
Czech-Slovak trade, based on long-standing economic and historic links, accounted for 
more than one-third o f the total intra-CEFTA trade. Sue Tapply and Carolyn Tang, 
“Central Europe: Trade Group Gathering Strength,” RFE/RL Research Report (4 March,
1997). Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET. On the creation of the free- 
trade zone the Czech ambivalence see Karoly Okolicsanyi, “The Visegrad Triangle’s 
Free-Zone,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 3 (15 January, 1993): 19-22.
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The Czech political elite throughout the 1990s challenged the proliferation of 
Central European cooperative arrangements, claiming that the Czech Republic was a 
Western rather than Central European state. The government reluctantly agreed to 
participate in 1993 in the so-called Central European Initiative including most post­
communist states in the region plus Austria and Italy.Ij>1 Later, when CEFTA began to 
include more East European countries, the Czech Republic saw this development as 
another attempt by the EU to slow down the enlargement process.132 Instead Prague 
consistently demanded a speedy Union expansion.
More recently, when Austria in early 2001 suggested the setting up o f a “Strategic 
Partnership" among the countries o f Central Europe along the lines of the defunct Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, the Czech leadership once again expressed skepticism of the idea of 
creating yet another institution in which an EU member state would play a leading role 
rather than work for EU expansion.' ’4 Prague's suspicion of any regional arrangement 
that might divert the country from its course toward the Western core, however, did not 
lead to isolation from the neighbors as two of them were already in the core and the other 
two were among the frontrunners to join it. Indeed, most of the Czech Republic's
1 ' ’Alfred Reisch, ‘The Central European Initiative: To Be or Not to Be," RFE/RL 
Research Report 2, no. 34 (27 August, 1993): 30-37.
’ ''W hile some East European and EU leaders saw CEFTA as a step toward 
integration into Western institutions, Czech officials insisted that the Area is nothing 
more than a free-trade agreement rather than a “preparatory school for the EU." Nigel 
Stephenson, “CEFTA Premiers to Hold Prague Summit,” Reuters (10 September, 1998).
’"Initially the Czech Republic hoped for EU expansion in the year 2000 and as 
this date became increasingly unrealistic the leadership consistently pressed for speeding 
up the process. “Havel in France Seeking Support for EU Expansion.” Agence France- 
Presse (2 March, 1999).
l34Lubos Palata, “ In the Em pire’s Shadow,” Transitions (6 June, 2001). Available 
from http://www.tol.cz; INTERNET.
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interaction, especially economically, was with its neighbors. In that sense, by rejecting 
regional institutional arrangements and single-mindedly pursuing integration in the 
Western core. Prague did not seek to alter its relationship with its neighbors but rather to 
transfer this relationship to a different institutional environment—the Western institutions.
Lithuania's Stock
Lithuania shares borders with Latvia to the North, Belarus to the Southeast,
Poland to South and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to the southwest. None of 
Lithuania's neighbors is a member of the EU and of them only Poland in 1997 was 
invited to join NATO. Poland and Latvia are also EU associated members negotiating to 
join the Union. Latvia along with Lithuania is a PfP member and actively seeks 
membership in the Alliance. Of all neighbors, Belarus is the most institutionally isolated 
state as it has not sought membership in either NATO or the EU .1'5 Belarus' lack of 
democratization and social and economic reform have relegated the country as the only 
authoritarian political system  in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the country has been shunned 
by the European core and no significant relationships have been established between the 
Western institutions and the government of Belarus. In fact, bilateral relations have 
frequently been strained and confrontational.116
1 sBelarus is PfP member but has stated no intention of joining the Alliance and 
therefore developed no M AP after the 1999 Washington Summit.
‘ '‘’Following NA TO ’s expansion in 1999, Belarus' president Alexander 
Lukashenko suggested that his country will strengthen its military forces in collaboration 
with Russia to counter-balance the admission o f the three former communist states to the 
Alliance. “Belarus to Strengthen Forces to Balance NATO Enlargement,” Agence 
Franee-Presse (12 March, 1999).
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The period leading to independence demonstrated to Lithuania’s leadership the 
utility of joint action and coordination of policies with neighboring countries toward the 
Soviet Union.1'7 Being a republic in the USSR and having no standing army or stable 
democratic institutions forced the political leadership to seek the cooperation and 
assistance of the international community and, in particular. Poland and two other Soviet 
republics-Latvia and Estonia.1’8 Having successfully gained independence, the Baltic 
states were initially committed to a high level of mutual cooperation and assistance. This 
commitment represented a sharp break with the inter-war pattern of antagonism and 
mutual suspicion, which partially accounts for the changing fortunes o f Lithuania.
Estonia, and Latvia since gaining independence after the First W orld W ar.1 The West, 
for its part, intensively cultivated the idea of Baltic unity. After 1991 Western institutions 
and states preferred to negotiate and deal with the three states simultaneously and at the 
same encouraged integration and cooperation among them as a precondition for joining 
those same institutions. The EU ’s policy, in particular, indicated that it perceived the 
three countries as a unified group whose closer links would make the accession to the 
Union easier. Accordingly, the Baltic states created a Baltic Assem bly in late 1991, the
1 'Clemens, 39-52; Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al.: Krickus.
1 ,sOn May 12, 1990 the tree republics established the Baltic States Council, 
designed to forge political cooperation and assist the member states in consolidating their 
sovereignty in the face of Soviet hostility to the countries’ independence. It ceased to 
function in mid-1993. Egidijus Vareikis and Jurate Zygelyte, ‘T h e  Eastern Baltic 
Subregion: Conflict and Cooperation,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review  no. 2 (1998): 
145-64.
l39On the inter-war attempts to forge Baltic cooperation see Zaneta Ozolina, “The 
Impact of the European Union on Baltic Co-operation,” occasional paper (Copenhagen, 
Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, January 1999). Available from 
Columbia International Affairs Online; INTERNET.
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Baltic Council of Ministers in 1994, the Baltic Free Trade Agreement, biannual summits 
of the heads of states, and other regional institutions.140
Paradoxically, however, the three states found it increasingly difficult to 
cooperate as the EU and NATO started to make specific decisions about their respective 
enlargements. Then, the progress o f reforms, the implementations of acquis and even 
geographic location, rather than their sub-regional integration, increasingly came to 
determine their chances of joining the institutions o f the Western core.141 The EU 
decision in 1997 to begin accession negotiations with Estonia, but not Lithuania and 
Latvia, clearly split the Baltic states and further strained their resolve to cooperate with 
one other.
The Baltic states also were gradually included in a Nordic framework of 
cooperation. This framework must be seen in the context of two parallel tracks, including 
the so-called “5+3" cooperation between the Nordic states-Finland. Sweden, Norway. 
Denmark, and Iceland—and the Baltic states; and bilateral cooperation, which in the case 
of Lithuania included extensive interaction with D enm ark.14'  After 1991 the Nordic states 
focused on creating a pattern of regional institutions and cooperation and acted as model 
for the creation of the Baltic Council between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A Danish
140According to Ozolina. in 1990 alone, the Baltic states signed 36 agreements on 
mutual cooperation. Ozolina. 6.
141 It must be noted that although Lithuania is frequently singled out as a laggard, 
ahead o f Bulgaria and Romania but behind the other associated members, what works in 
the country’s advantage is its geographic position. Thus, in scenarios envisioning a large 
EU enlargement of up to ten countries, Lithuania is always included among the countries 
to join the EU with this group. Drawing a line between Lithuania and Poland and L atv ia- 
two countries deemed to be better prepared to join—only to remove in a couple of years 
later, makes no political sense. For this argument see “ Knocking at the Clubhouse Door.” 
The Economist 360, no. 8237 (1-7 September, 2001): 22-24
I42See Knudsen, ed„ Stability and Security.
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initiative also led to the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, 
which included all Baltic coastal states, as well as Norway and Iceland. The CBSS was 
designed to improve cooperation and coordination in the region and promote democracy, 
the rule of law and economic development in the post-communist countries. Consistent 
with the traditional political culture of the Nordic states was the emphasis this institutions 
and bilateral cooperation arrangements put on "soft security”--cultivating post­
communist countries in the peaceful resolution of common problems and promotion of 
mutual trust.
While embracing various regional arrangements and institutions, Vilnius pursued 
multiple track policies in its major foreign policy goal-joining NATO the EU. 
Responding to calls in the West to accept at least one Baltic state in NATO Lithuania 
initiated a campaign to convince the member states of its worth as a future ally. Vilnius, 
giving relatively more weight to NATO membership than the other Baltic states, turned 
its attention to Poland and tried to cultivate strong political, economic, and military 
relations as the more practical way to obtain membership of the Alliance as well as the 
EU.143 Simultaneously, Lithuania began increasingly to see itself as a Central European 
rather than a Baltic country and Poland was seen as a natural intermediary in the process 
of interacting with Central Europe.144 Accordingly, trade between the two states
,43Perry, 104-7: “Lithuania, Poland to Cooperate on European Integration Bids,” 
RFE/RL Newsline (18 December, 1998).
l44Mare Haab, "Potentials and Vulnerabilities o f the Baltic States: Mutual 
Competition and Cooperation,” in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, eds.. The Baltic 
States in World Politics (Richmond, VA: Curzon Press, 1998), 1-24.
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increased and while Poland accounted for 5 and 4 percent o f Lithuania’s total export and 
import in 1994, in 1999 it accounted for 4.5 and 7 percent respectively.143
Lithuania also maintained strong trade exchange with Latvia; in 1999 it accounted 
for 12.7 and 4.6 percent of Lithuania's total exports and imports, up from 5 percent o f its 
total trade in 1992.146 In fact, Lithuania, to a much greater extent than either the Czech 
Republic or Bulgaria, maintained extensive trade relations with its neighbors, a pattern 
established during the Soviet years.147 Latvia, Belarus, Poland and Russia accounted for 
29.9 percent of the country’s exports and 33.4 percent o f its imports in 1999.148 Of them. 
Russia remained the largest trade partner with 6.8 percent o f total exports and 19.5 
percent of imports, mostly energy and raw materials. I'w
The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Russia in general represents one of the 
most important elements of Lithuania’s stock. Because o f the small share of the Russian 
minority in Lithuania and its early decision to grant them all citizenship rights, relations 
between Vilnius and Moscow are, with the exception o f the Kaliningrad enclave.
l45Knudsen, 212; Vilniaus Bankas, 46.
l46Vilniaus Bankas, 46; Ozolina. 7.
I47ln 1992, 57.7 percent of Lithuania’s trade was with Russia. United Nations. 
Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical 
Division, 1995 International Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations 
Publications, 1996), 142.
I48lbid.
l4<,The high level of economic interaction between the two countries, however, 
meant that the 1998 Russian economic crises had a significantly negative impact on 
Lithuania’s economy. During the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Lithuania’s export to the 
East declined 20-30 percent. “Long Haul to Prosperity,’’ Financial Times (29 November, 
1998). Available from http://www.ft.com; INTERNET; See also “Baltics Hit by Fallout 
from Russian Financial meltdown,” Agence France-Presse (28 August. 1998); Jonathan 
Leff, “ Baltic Markets seen recovering from Record Low ‘98,” Reuters (16 December,
1998).
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reasonably good. In fact, Moscow, ever since independence, has had the least problematic 
relations with Lithuania compared with the other two Baltic states. Yet, having been a 
part of the Soviet Union puts Lithuania in a precarious position as its security and 
development are greatly affected by Russia's behavior. While relations for most of the 
1990s had been relatively calm, they have frequently become hostage to the unsettled 
nature of Russian politics and rapidly changing regional and European dynamics. The 
need to establish good neighborly relations as a precondition for joining the Western core 
and Russia's need to assure rail and road passage to Kaliningrad through Lithuania forced 
both countries to cultivate a stable relationship. Yet moves by Vilnius to integrate the 
enclave in a sub-regional Central European pattern o f cooperation has aroused Russia's 
fears about its territorial integrity.130 Lithuania, too, sometimes becomes a victim of its 
newly found independence from its former hegemon and unnecessarily challenges 
Russia’s sensibilities.131 Thus, although the relationship between the two countries 
remains extensive, it still remains capable of greatly affecting, both positively and 
negatively, the stability of Lithuania and its chances o f joining the Western core. The 
unpredictability of Russia’s future political and economic development and the power 
discrepancy between the two countries places Lithuania in a hard position as Vilnius has 
little ability to determine the success o f bilateral relations. For instance, although the two
l50Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Baltic States in the Age Of NATO 
Enlargement," occasional paper no. 49 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, July 1998), 5.
131 In late 2000, in compliance with a law passed in June, a commission appointed 
by the Lithuanian government announced that USD 20 billion is the equivalent of 
damage Lithuania incurred under Soviet occupation. The government, after receiving the 
figure, was expected to initiate negotiations with Russian about the compensation. Inga 
Pavlovaite and Mel Huang, “News From Lithuania," Central Europe Review  2, no. 35 
(16 October, 2000).
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states signed a border treaty, the Russian parliament still refuses to ratify it in the hopes 
of maintaining Moscow’s influence on Lithuania's foreign policy.152
Conclusion
The three states have clearly achieved different levels of international 
institutionalization (See Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5). While all of them had relatively sim ilar 
communist experiences and in the 1990s declared almost identical foreign policy 
priorities and goals, differences in socio-economic development, political developments 
and regional environments endowed them with varying capacities and opportunities to 
achieve their stated objectives. Among the three cases the Czech Republic clearly 
achieved the highest degree of integration in the Western core, being among the first 
post-communist states to conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Commission, 
being invited to join NATO in 1997 and beginning negotiations on EU accession in 1998. 
The country was also able to quickly reorient its economic relations toward the W estern 
core without the economic hardship associated with market reforms. The ability o f the 
Czech Republic to attain the highest degree of integration was created by its stable 
political and economic development as well as its geographic location as the post­
communist state closest to the Western core. Indeed, geographic location seemed to have
^ " ‘Duma Urges Yeltsin to Review Russia-Lithuania Border Treaty” (text). 
Moscow Interfax in English (26 September 1997). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia , 26 September 1997 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-SOV-97-269). Avaliable from World News Connection; INTERNET.
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a significant impact o f a country’s ability to integrate. 153 Paradoxically, all three 
countries were reluctant participants in regional integrative and cooperative 
arrangements, as these were perceived as diverting them from integration in the Western 
core. Here, however, geographic location made the Czech Republics' cost of avoiding 
non-EU and NATO integration relatively low, as ail o f its neighbors are either already 
members o f these institutions or actively seeking to join them. In other words, regional 
integration and cooperation was achieved in the context o f the country’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration and cooperation.
In contrast, Bulgaria and Lithuania achieved relatively weaker integration in the 
same core (See Figure 2). Lithuania, having achieved independence from the Soviet 
Union after the other two countries, faced major challenges in its integration efforts as 
along with its efforts to join the West it had to build state and political institutions from 
scratch.134 Consequently, Lithuania initially lagged behind the other two states in 
concluding a Europe Agreement and membership in all-European institutions such as the 
Council o f Europe and OSCE. Economic and political stabilization, however, enabled the 
country to speed up the process of joining the Western core; the country was quickly 
recognized as a potential NATO member, and although having started negotiations to 
join the EU two years after the Czech Republic, Vilnius speedily caught up with the first 
group of candidates in terms of adopting the acquis. And as for the impact on country
l3 ’Public opinion seemed to have little independent effect on the three countries’ 
integration in the W est as all publics maintained consistent approval of integration in 
both the EU and NATO (See Tables 15 and 16).
l34On the challenges of building state institutions in the Baltic states after 
independence see Ole Norgaard, Lars Johannsen, Mette Skak and Renee Hauge Sorensen, 
The Baltic States A fter Independence (Northamanpton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,
1999), 161-65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
stock, although Lithuania’s geographic location was not as advantageous as the Czech 
Republic's, what played in Lithuania’s favor was the pre-existing integration, especially 
economic integration, among the countries in the region.
O f the three cases, Bulgaria attained the lowest level o f integration in the Western 
core (See Figure 2). Although Sofia concluded an European Agreement the same year as 
the Czech Republic did, slow economic reform and political instability until 1997 
relegated Bulgaria to the group of countries which are consistently seen as achieving EU 
membership only after the other ten candidates become members. In addition, until the 
ascent to power of the Kostov government in 1997. Sofia was not considered a serious 
NATO candidate, and even then its chances were seen as no better than most of the other 
candidates. The weakness of national capacities to integrate in the Western core were 
compounded by the handicaps of its international stock. The almost constant armed 
conflict to the west and the low level of integration of the neighboring countries in theC  C O
Western core further weakened Bulgaria's ability to integrate internationally. Historically 
low levels of cooperation and integration with neighboring states and constant regional 
threats and risks hampered Bulgaria’s willingness to stimulate interaction within the 
region.
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Appendix 11
Variable Flow
Figure 2 represents an attempt to provide a comparison of the three states' (lows on an ordinal scale. The figure 
measures the position o f each country on the already discussed international variable How. The three countries arc 
ranked by summing the five variables by assigning values o f 3 to the highest ranking on each variable. 2 to the next and 
I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more slates share the same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 
scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000.
The country's llow is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value o f three to the country, which has the 
highest integration in NATO and the EU. the highest amount o f foreign direct investments per capita, and consistently 
highest public approval o f membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The value of one is assigned to the country 
which scores lowest on each of the same variables.
Figure 2. 
Variable Flow
NATO EU FDI EU
Trade
Public
Approval
Total Average
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 3 7 14
Czech R. 3 3 3 3 3 15 3.0
Lithuania 2 2 i 1 3 10 2.0
Variable Slock
Figures 3 .4  and 5 represent an attempt to provide a comparison of the three slates' stocks on an ordinal scale. The 
figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed international variable stock. The three countries 
are ranked by summing the values each of the three stales' neighbors has in terms of their integration in the EU and 
NATO. The country's slock is estimated by using a 0-4 scale. The value of 4 is assigned to a country which has a 
membership in the institution. 3 to a country which is in the process of negotiating membership. 2 to a country 
interested in joining. I to a country which has maintained a very weak relationship with the institution, and 0 to a 
country which had a hostile relation with the institution. The assigned values represent the countries' rankina for the 
period’1990-2000
Figure 3. 
Bulgaria's Stock
NATO EU Total
Romania 2 3 5
Serbia 0 0 0
Macedonia 1 -> 3
Greece 4 4 8
Turkey 4 •> 6
Total Score: 22; Overage Score: 4.4
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Figure 4.
Czech Republic's Slock
NATO EU Total
Poland 4 3 7
Germany 4 4 8
Austria 2 4 8
Slovakia 3 3 6
Total Score: 29: Overage Score: 7.25 
Figure 5.
Lithuania's Stock
NATO EU Total
Latvia 3 3 6
Russia 1 2 3
Poland 4 3 7
Belarus 1 2 3
Total Score: 19: Overage Score: 4.75
The Czech Republic has the highest international slock o f 7.25. Lithuania scores 4.75. anil Bulgaria has the lowest 
stock of 4.4.
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Tabic 12
Trade with the European Union 
(percentage o f total)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 20 36 28 34 37 38 41 47 52 53 54
Czech R 53 57 61 60 61 64 67 69 71
Lithuania 7 19 18 26 37 40 42 44 48
Source: ING Barings. 53-65: United Nations. 1998 International Trade Statistics Yearbook I. Trade By Country (New 
York: Publishing Division United Nations. 1999). 136. 262. 580.
Table 13.
Foreign Direct Investment
(net inflows recorded in the balance of payment, in millions o f  US dollars)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1989-2000
Bulgaria 98 138 507 537 806 820 3.152
Czech R. 2.526 1.276 1.275 2.641 4.912 4.500 19.424
Lithuania 72 152 328 921 478 295 2.307
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Annual Report 2000 (June 2001). 18. Available from 
http://www.ebrd.org: INTERNET.
Table 14
Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita. 1989-2000 
(in US dollars) _____
Bulgaria 388
Czech R. 1.884
Lithuania 626
Source: Ibid.
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Tabic 15
Public Approval o f Membership in NATO 
(in percentage)________________________
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 52 46 50 57 46 52
Czech R 60 56 59 47 59 68
Lithuania 83 28 55 49 64
Source: United States Information Agency. "Support for NATO Membership Strong Among Invitees," European 
Opinion Alert, no. L-J4-98 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction. 26 June. 1998): United States 
Information Agency. "Bulgarians Favor Joining NATO." European Opinion Alert, no. M -107-98 (Washington. D.C.: 
Office of Research and Media Reaction. 7 July. 1998): Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Lithuania. Fact Sheet-April 2000 
(June 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt: INTERNET: Perry. Sweeney and Winner. 104: Ministry o f  Foreign 
Affairs of Lithuania. Over 60 Percent o f  Lithuanian Residents Support Lithuania's Aspiration o f  Joining NATO  (June 
2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt; INTERNET: "Poll Suggests "Only" 40 Percent Favor Entry Into NATO" 
(text). Bratislava TASR in English (25 August 1999). FlIIS Daily Report-East Europe. 25 August 1999 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-EEU-1999-0826). Available from World News Connection; INTERNET. "Poll Shows 46',7 Strongly Support 
Joining NATO" (text). Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English (30 November 1999). I B  IS Daily Report-East 
Europe. 30 November 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-1999-1130). Available from World News Connection:
INTERNET: "Bulgaria’s Stoyanov to Attend NATO Council Meeting. Danube-Carpathian Summit." Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (27 April. 2001); Roman Blasck. "Perceptions o f Security Risks by the Population of the Czech 
Republic." Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1998). 91.
Table 16
Public Approval of Membership in the European Union 
(in percentage)____________________________________
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 75 49 57 60 86
Czech R 72 43 49 35 55 45
Lithuania 35 40 42 27 39 47
Source: European Union: United States Information Agency. The New European Security Architecture (W ashington.
D C Office of Research and Media Reaction. September. 1995). 27. "Poll Shows Czech Public's "Lukewarm"
Attitude Toward EU" (text). Prague l.idovc Noviny in Czech (8 November 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Serv ice. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 8 November 2000 (PrEx 7 10: FB1S-EEU-2000-1109). Available 
from World News Connection: INTERNET: "Public Support to Early EU Entry Crows in Lithuania" Itext). Tallinn 
BNS in English ( I February 2001). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 1 February 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-2001- 
0201) Available from Word News Connection: INTERNET: "Estonians and Latvians Skeptical About Merits o f  EU 
Accession" (text). Riga l-eta in English (2 1 May 2001). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 21 May 2001 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-SOV-2001-052). Available from World News Connection; INTERNET: "Poll: Lithuanian Support for EU 
Drops" (text). Tallinn BNS in English (9 June 1999). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 9 June 1999 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-SOV-I999-6IO). Available from Word News Connection: INTERNET: "Low Support for EU Membership in 
Baltic States." Agence France-Prcssc (2 December. 1999): "Czech Support for EU Entry Declines." Reuters (4 May. 
1999)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
218
CHAPTER VI 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE SECURITY
Chapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate 
sections are devoted to each of the three states’ levels of security. Each section surveys 
the objective security o f  each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the 
evolution of the official conceptualization of national security and the evolution of 
popular perceptions o f security. The last section compares the levels o f security achieved 
by each country.
Bulgarian Security
The end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe presented Bulgaria with 
fundamentally different security challenges. Bulgaria's entire security arrangement was 
based on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, would 
provide unconditional assistance in the event of military conflict. Thus Bulgaria lost not 
only its sources of cheap raw materials, energy, and reliable markets but also its 
traditional partners to provide security. This explains why initially the Bulgarian 
leadership was reluctant to let the Warsaw Pact go. The only notable exception was 
President Zhelev, who, from early on, argued that the Pact was already a political corpse 
and insisted on closer ties with the West.1 Zhelev made several visits to the West, 
including Western Europe, the United States and Japan in 1990-91 to demonstrate the
‘“Pact Outlived Its Time” (text). Prague CTK  in English (I February 1991). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East 
Europe, 1 February 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-022: p. 7).
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country's reorientation away from Moscow. While the governments in the first two years 
after 1989 were broadly supportive of this reorientation, they had a hard time 
contemplating an alternative to the existing security arrangements in a new security 
environment. Thus Bulgaria did not initially consider the unilateral dissolution o f the 
Warsaw Pact as a valuable option.2
When the end of the Warsaw Pact became inevitable in 1991. Bulgaria was at a 
loss to produce an alternative security policy. While acquiescing to the loss of traditional 
security guarantees, Sofia attempted to ensure national security by enhancing national 
military power, improving relations with neighboring states and nurturing a new, more 
equal relationship with the Soviet Union.3 Although the government recognized that the 
new approach required good relations with NATO, it doubted Bulgaria would become a 
member of the Alliance.4
■>
"Foreign Minister Boyko Dimitrov rejected the idea that Bulgaria might join 
NATO and instead called for the simultaneous dissolution o f both alliances. Ricardo 
Estarriol, “Foreign Minister Views European Issues” (text). Barcelona La Vanguardia in 
Spanish (date not given). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Daily Report-East Europe, 29 March 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-061; p. 8-9).
'Defense Minister Yordan Mutavchiev suggested that after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria must rely on its own defense forces and bilateral treaties with the 
Soviet Union. Zvyatko Belenski and Ivan Staevski, Our Military Doctrine is Defensive" 
(text). Sofia Otechestven Vestnik in Bulgarian (21 November 1990). Translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 30 November
1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-231; p. 16); Pesident Zhelev’s spokesman, Valentin 
Stoyanov, argued that Bulgaria will seek security through improved relations with Balkan 
neighbors, positive relations with East European countries, including the Soviet Union, 
but mainly through internal stability. “New Military, Security Doctrine Discussed” (text). 
Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in Bulgarian (3 February 1991). Translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 1 February
1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-026; p. 2).
4See interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Viktor Vulkov. Vikhra Rizova, 
“Bulgaria Has Renounced the Satellite Syndrome" (text). Sofia Anteni in Bullgarian (26 
June 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-East Europe, 3 July 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-128; p. 5-7).
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The loss of the traditional security framework which guaranteed Bulgaria’s 
security in the context o f fundamental political, social and economic transformation in 
the country coincided with the emergence o f acute regional security challenges. The 
beginning of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the accompanying civil wars presented the 
country with unfamiliar threats and risks to which the leadership had no readily available 
responses. The Bulgarian leadership faced the necessity of formulating new policies and 
strategies to address the new challenges in a completely new international environment.
The conflicts o f Yugoslavia’s disintegration involved, among others, Serbia, a 
state with which Bulgaria had a long history of rivalry, and Macedonia, a country which 
Balkan states have traditionally sought to possess or dominate.3 Sofia feared that the 
conflict might spill over and engulf the entire region.6 Feeling extremely vulnerable. 
Bulgaria’s policy, until at least 1996. o f addressing the likelihood of a wider military 
conflict was to try to persuade its Balkan neighbors to avoid any involvement in the 
Yugoslav conflict. This policy explains why Sofia was the last state among the associated 
members of the EU to provide troops to various peacekeeping operations in the region. It 
considered such involvement risky and exacerbating conflicts among Balkan states.7 
Accordingly, Bulgaria was the first state to recognize Macedonia’s independence in
^Joseph Rothschild. Return to Diversity: /\ Political History o f  East Central
Europe Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Barbara
Jelavich, History o f  the Balkans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
6On the Bulgarian perspective on military implications of the Yugoslav conflict 
see Michail Srebrev, “Southern Europe: Concerns and Implications from a Bulgarian 
Perspective,” in Charles L. Barry, ed., The Search fo r  Peace in Europe: Perspectives 
from  NATO and Eastern Europe (Fort Lesley: National Defense University Press, 1993).
7See interview with Acting Foreign Minister Dimiter Ikonomov. Ryszard Bilski, 
“Stop the War” (text). Warsaw Rzeczpolita  in Polish (25 February 1993). Translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 4 March 
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-041; p. 4-5).
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1992, thus trying to prevent the repeat of past attempts by various Balkan states to 
dominate the area. The growing international isolation of rump Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria's commitment to observe political, economic, and military sanctions against 
Belgrade denied Sofia opportunities to work with Serbia on any of the outstanding issues 
between the two countries and. in general, rendered impotent any Bulgarian attempts to 
affect developments in this part of the region.
The disintegration o f the Warsaw Pact left Bulgaria alone to face Greece and 
Turkey, two states Bulgaria was supposed to confront militarily in the event of war 
during the Cold War. W ithout external security guarantees. Sofia became increasingly 
concerned about military imbalances in the region. These concerns became more resilient 
as. in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, excess weapons from 
NATO members in Western Europe, including advanced systems, poured into Greece 
and Turkey. In addition Sofia complained that Yugoslavia never signed the Treaty and 
thus was under no international obligation to limit its military power or participate in a 
confidence-building framework.
Consecutive Bulgarian governments adopted different policies to address the 
perceived threat. The short-lived first non-communist government of Filip Dimitrov in 
1991-92 reoriented Bulgarian foreign policy toward greater cooperation with the West 
and Turkey. In this period, however, Bulgarian leadership, with the notable exception of 
President Zhelev, did not actively seek NATO membership as a means of guaranteeing 
national security.9 Dimitrov’s policy led to improved ties with Ankara, which was
8See statement by President Zhelev in the daily Balgarska Annia  (18 November. 
1991), 1.
9In his election address before the 1991 parliamentary elections, UDF leader and 
future Prime Minister Filip Dimirtov listed Bulgaria's integration in the EC as a number
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
pleased to see changing treatment of the country’s Turkish minority.10 The two countries 
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness, Cooperation and Security in May 6, 
1992. Along with economic and social agreements, the two governments arranged to 
develop bilateral confidence-building measures. Accordingly. Sofia and Ankara signed in 
December 1991 the Sofia Document on Mutually Supplementing Measures to Strengthen 
Confidence and Security and Military Contacts Between Bulgaria and Turkey, in which 
they agreed to give each other advance notice of military exercises taking place within 60 
kilometers of the borders, an exchange of military observers, etc. Military strength along 
the border was reduced on both sides. The Sofia Document was later strengthened by the 
Edime Document on Some Additional Measures for the Strengthening of Security and 
Confidence and Military Contacts, signed in 1992." The Edime Document reduced the 
threshold for military activity notices and expanded the cooperation in military training 
and contacts.
Similar attempts were made to establish security ties with Greece. The Bulgarian- 
Greek Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood, Cooperation and Security was signed 
in October 1991 to last for period of 20 years. The two countries also signed in December 
1992 a confidence building agreement committing to lowering the Vienna Document’s
one foreign policy priority, but failed to even mention NATO. “Election Address” (text). 
Sofia Demokratsiya in Bulgarian (16 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 20 September 1991 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91 - 183; p. 9).
l0Dunkan M. Perry, “New Directions for Bulgarian-Turkish Relations,” RFE/RL 
Research Report 1, no. 41 (16 October, 1992): 33-40.
" “Military Accord with Turkey,” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 48 (4 
December, 1992), 58.
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threshold on the number o f troops, tanks and artillery pieces involved in military 
exercises.
Despite Bulgaria's early attempts to address its security concerns by seeking more 
extensive security ties with the West, in general, and regionally with Turkey and Greece, 
the Bulgarian leadership continued to see the country as dangerously exposed in a 
uncertain security environment. Political and military leaders continued to compare the 
national force structure and armaments with those of Turkey and Greece.12 Discussions 
of the deteriorating state o f the Bulgarian military and the increasing scope of military 
hostilities in Yugoslavia frequently evoked comparisons to the accelerated modernization 
of the Greek and especially the Turkish military forces as a result of the cascading 
transfer of weapons systems from Western Europe.
Although Bulgaria dramatically increased its ties with the West, the lack of 
security guarantees forced the country to fall back on previously tested security ties. In 
contrast to most other East European countries, Bulgaria did not see Russia as security 
threat to its independence and territorial integrity. Accordingly, in August 1992. Bulgaria 
and Russia signed a Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Relations, which went 
beyond similar treaties between Russia and its former Warsaw Pact allies, as two o f the 
articles in this treaty were security related. Article 4 states that consultations will be held 
if a particular situation endangers international peace and security, and Article 5 that 
"none of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used for military aggression 
or other violent activities against the other contracting party."1 ’ Some Bulgarian
l2Statements by President Zhelev and General Tsvetan Totomirov. Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (2 October, 1994).
n Kyril Haramiev-Drezov, "Bulgarian-Russian Relations on a New Fooling,” 
RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 15 (9 April, 1993): 33-38.
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politicians interpreted the treaty as leaving the possibility of Russian military assistance 
to Bulgaria.14 Sofia was also highly encouraged by the fact that the treaty was signed 
during a visit o f Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Sofia, his first visit to a East European 
country as a head o f state. Yeltsin also promised his guests more oil deliveries and greater 
access to the Russian market.
The signing of the treaty coincided with an increased sense of insecurity among 
the public. W hile in 1991 and 1992 the world closely followed developments in 
Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian public seemed preoccupied with the domestic transition 
process and disinterested in the disintegration o f the neighboring state.13 National media 
provided little coverage of the conflict and politicians found it only too convenient to 
avoid taking a stand on events over which the country seemed to have no control, 
influence, or interest.
In early 1993, however, Bulgaria was forced to take a more definite stand on the 
conflict in Yugoslavia, as the West demanded that the Bulgarian government meet its 
obligations under international law and enforce the embargo on the neighboring country. 
Yugoslavia was regularly defying international sanctions and using the Danube River to 
smuggle in badly needed supplies. Pressed to meet its obligations and fearful o f 
provoking conflict with its neighbor, the government of Berov requested from the EU and 
the U.S. security guarantees and assistance but received none.16 In February 1993, 
Bulgaria ruled out the unilateral use of force to halt the convoys along Danube.
l4Ibid„ 37.
b Kjell Engelbrekt, “A Vulnerable Bulgaria Fears W ider War.” RFE/RL Research 
Report 3, no. 16 (22 April, 1994): 7-12.
l6Ibid„ 8
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Only in 1993 did part of the Bulgarian political leadership, notably the UDF, 
begin to seek NATO membership as a guarantee for national security. After the BSP 
formed a majority government in 1994, however, the issue of joining the Alliance 
became extremely politicized as the Socialists concluded that NATO was not the answer 
to national security concerns. Although the new government maintained formal relations 
with the Alliance, it was clear that the formal membership was not a foreign policy 
priority.17 The Socialist government proved to be much more conservative in it foreign 
policy as its displayed a tendency to fall back on alliances and affinities that had been 
based in the course of history. During the Cold War Bulgaria and Greece developed close 
ties, an affiliation based on the shared mistrust of Ankara. Following the UDF 
government’s policy that led to strained relations with Russia and especially with Greece, 
after Bulgaria recognized Macedonia the Socialist government embarked on restoring ties 
with Moscow and fostering an even closer relationship with Athens. Thus Bulgaria tried 
to address its security needs by establishing closer relations with what it saw as 
historically tested allies while gradually isolating itself from the broader process of the 
East European countries' forging of increasingly extensive relations with the West. In 
fact. Bulgaria's shunning o f NATO membership was accompanied by difficult relations 
with other institutions including the EU, the International Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank.
Better relations with Moscow and Athens did not, however, translate into 
perceptions o f more security on the part o f the ruling elite. Politicians and military elites 
continued to compare the structure and power of the national military forces with those of
I7Videnov; See also Council of Ministers of the Republic o f Bulgaria. 
Kontceptcija.
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neighboring countries.18 Even Yugoslav troops, although deployed to fight Muslim and 
Croat forces, remained one o f the best-equipped armies in Europe and thus superior to the 
deteriorating Bulgarian military. At the same time, NATO w as perceived to have 
encouraged an arms race on the Balkans to Bulgaria's disadvantage by further cascading 
weapons from Central Europe to Greece and Turkey.19 This perception was shared not 
only by the Socialists but also by the opposition UDF.20
The Socialist government defined national security in narrow, traditional terms 
reflecting the government’s preoccupation with external threats and risks. In the National 
Security Concept approved by the Videnov government on 13 July 1995, national 
security is defined as the lack o f  immediate threat of military aggression, political 
control, or economic coercion to the state and the society.21
The Concept identifies international and domestic factors determining the state of 
national security. While the docum ent recognizes the growing multiplicity of
l8Liubomir Denov, “At One Stroke, NATO Pushes Us Into a New Arms Race."
24 Chasa (27 October, 1994): 10; Vasil Lyutskanov, “Army Needs Urgent 
Modernization, Or We Will Be Hopelessly Behind in One or Two Years” (text). Sofia 
Trial in Bulgarian (6 February 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 10 February 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95- 
028; p. 4).
l9“At One Stroke, NATO Pushes Us Into a New Arms Race" (text). Sofia 24 
Chasa in Bulgarian (27 O cotober 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS-Dailx Report-East Europe. 1 November 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-
211; p, 6).
20Nikolay Slatinski, form er Chairman of the National Assem bly’s National 
Security Committee, worried in early 1995 that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
exacerbated an already great regional imbalance to Bulgaria’s detriment by allowing 
modernization o f weapons system and cascading of military hardware to Greece and 
Turkey. Given the economic and social crisis in the country, Bulgaria was seen as unable 
to compete and keep up with these countries. Slatinski and Caparini, 32.
2lCouncil of Ministers o f  the Republic of Bulgaria, Kontceptcija, I.
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international threats and risks, it firmly identifies the traditional, specifically regional, 
hard-core threats—regional civil wars and their spill-over potential, historical conflicts 
among some Balkan states, serious asymmetry of institutional security guarantees among 
states, demands for territorial changes, and the emergence o f new states after 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration-as the most significant security challenges to national 
security. The document warns that the growing asymmetry between the military power of 
Bulgaria and most of its members may lead in the future to aggression against the 
country. Very significantly, the Concept fails to state that Bulgaria does not see an 
immediate threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty stemming from the conditions 
existing in the region.
Although the Videnov government did not identify any country as threatening 
national security, it implicitly regarded Bulgaria’s traditional enemies, especially Turkey 
and Yugoslavia, as posing a threat to national sovereignty. Although no country in the 
Balkans had declared any territorial claims to Bulgaria, the government and part of the 
society seemed to assume them .'2 Both failed to realize that Yugoslavia had no intentions 
of antagonizing Bulgaria and, in any event. Belgrade was in no position to mount any 
effective military challenges to the East. In addition, Sofia’s preoccupation with the 
growing military disparity between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on 
the other, indicated a misreading of the security dynamics between Athens and Ankara.
In fact, the two countries came to blows in the midd- 1990s over their deep divisions
'"In an interview with the Kontinent daily, Turkey’s president Suleyman Demirel 
was asked to assure the Bulgarian public that his country had no evil designs on Bulgaria 
or the Balkans. “Suleyman Demirel, Interview” (text). Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency 
in English (10 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 13 December 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93- 
237; p. 10).
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involving Cyprus, air space, territorial waters and treatment of minorities, and both were 
only happy to maintain unproblematic relations with Bulgaria.
Discussing domestic factors, the Concept identifies the pace and direction of 
political and economic reform, the social effects of those reforms, and the strength of 
state institutions, especially judiciary, police and army as the major factors affecting 
national security. It also includes demographic factors, environmental problems, 
organized crime’s effects, and the “non-Bulgarian spiritual invasion of the society."23
The document contains implicit criticism of the previous governments’ policies, 
which led to severe economic and social problems, in turn severely exposing the country 
to threats and risks. It also points out that the country neglected traditional allies in its 
pursuit of integration in international institutions without regard for national autonomy 
and interests. According to the Concept, the state’s goal is to guarantee its territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, to ensure the conditions for economic development and to 
guarantee the democratic character of the society, among others.24 The decisive way of 
achieving this is through the sustained process of increasing national power, active 
cooperation and coordination with international partners and stimulating the nation’s 
patriotism and loyalty to the state through sustained economic and social prosperity. 
National interests can be protected by relying mainly on the national military forces. 
Moreover, military security is seen as determined by the strategic, political and military 
factors in the international environment, on the one hand, and national military capacities, 
on the other. Although the concept defines cooperation with international institutions and 
friendly states as an additional way to guarantee security, it makes no explicit
23Ibid„ 10.
24Ibid„ 11-12.
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commitment to seeking integration in NATO as a major foreign policy goal. Instead, it 
suggests that Bulgaria may seek NATO membership only after the Alliance transformed 
itself into one of the elements of a pan-European security framework in which Russia will 
have a major role. Accordingly, while membership in the EU and the WEU is defined as 
a priority, the relationship with NATO is seen as a partnership.
The Videnov government’s Concept reflected the emergence of a deep division 
among the political elite over the nature of national security and how best to achieve it. 
While the Socialists’ conception perceived the issue in largely traditional ways, 
emphasizing the accumulation o f mostly military power and the maintenance o f alliance 
with friendly states, the UDF opposition insisted that integration in both the UN and 
NATO is both consistent with Bulgaria’s quest to join a com munity of states sharing 
common values and the best way to guarantee the country's security and prosperity.25 
The BSP government correctly concluded that membership in both organizations is only 
a distant possibility and was skeptical of the organizations' ability and willingness to 
address the country’s security needs."6 Yet Bulgaria, in their view, was facing immediate
-:,On the UDF’s view of Bulgarian membership in NATO in 1994 see interview 
with then Deputy Defense Minster and a future Defense M inster in the Kostov 
government, Boyko Noev. Lyubomir Denov, “ Boyko Noev: The Time for Neutrality Has 
Passed” (text). Sofia 24 Chasa in Bulgarian (1 1 March 1994). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 15 March 1994 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-050; p. 2).
"f>The Socialists’ mouthpiece Duma commented that the signing in 1994 of a 
memorandum by the Bulgarian government and visiting U.S. Defense Secretary William 
Perry was serving America’s strategic interests in the Balkans, but none of Bulgaria’s. 
“Bobi M ichailov is Not Guarding the State's G oal” (text). Sofia Duma in Bulgarian (20 
July 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report- 
East Europe, 26 July 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-143; p. 7-8).
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and grave threats and challenges.27 The government saw neighboring states as 
competitors, some of which—Greece and Turkey—were already members of a security 
organization which Bulgaria had no chance of joining in the neat future. Bulgaria fell 
back on already tested security arrangements by reviving its close relations with Russia
1 0
and cultivating more extensive cooperation with Greece."
In addition to its reverse in foreign and security policies, the government also 
ended the gradual reduction in military budgets implemented by previous governments.
At the wake of communism’s collapse, Bulgaria was spending $2.46 billion on its 
military, accounting for more than 4.5 percent of the GDP (See Table 17).29 After 
declining to 2.5 percent of the G DP in 1994, the Videnov government refused to 
implement further military reforms and maintained the armed forces' structure and high 
budgets. In fact while in Eastern Europe military budgets were declining, Bulgaria 
continued to have high military expenditures, becoming a heavy burden on the stagnated 
econom y.’0
"7The public seemed to share the Socialists' perception of the likelihood of NATO 
accession. In 1995 only 31 percent o f the public believed that accession within five years 
was likely. United States Information Agency, The New European Security. 15: The 
public also seemed to have little confidence in international organizations. 35 percent 
trusted OSCE, 29 percent trusted WEU, and 33 percent expressed trust in NATO. Ibid.. 
33.
■>s
"’Russia was more than happy to reward Bulgaria’s lack o f interest in NATO. In 
July 1995 Moscow sent to Bulgaria free of charge 100 T-72 tanks along with armored 
fighting vehicles. Kontinent (27 February, 1995), 7.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 84.
'°It must be noted that differences in accounting practices explain the 
discrepancies between figures provided by Bulgaria’s Ministry o f Defense and Western 
sources such as The Military Balance. Thus according to the Ministry o f Defense 
between 1990 and 1996 the budget for defense averaged slightly over 3 percent of the 
GDP and in 1997 and 1998 it declined to slightly over 2 percent. In any event, until 1996
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The public seemed to share some of the government's assumptions about security. 
The relatively strong relationship with Russia established by the bilateral treaty in 1992 
and enhanced by the Videnov government after 1994 was an unproblematic issue in 
domestic politics. In 1992 only 6 percent o f the public perceived Russia to represent a 
threat to Bulgaria and by 1994 only 5 percent seemed to share this percep tion /1 In fact, 
the Bulgarian public did not see any o f the great powers as posing any threat to its 
security. In 1992 and 1996. only 3 percent perceived Germany to be a threat, and 4 and 9 
percent respectively saw the US as a threat.32 In other words, neither a single great power 
nor a conflict among great powers w as seen to be a likely threat to national security. 
Conversely, in 1992, 61 percent of the public perceived neighboring countries as 
representing a threat to peace and security in Bulgaria, although by 1996 this feeling o f 
threat was shared by only 31 percent. Threats emanating from the region and within 
countries were perceived to be the m ost likely challenges to national security. The 
beginning of the Yugoslav conflict generated a sense of grave insecurity; the negotiated 
end of the war in Bosnia and the consequent deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces 
in late 1995 only slightly abated the public’s security apprehensions. Raging and dormant 
ethnic conflicts in the region heightened security fears about the possible threat posed by
the military budget remained high by East European standards. For budgetary estimates 
see Ministry of Defense of the Republic o f Bulgaria, Parliamentary’ Oversight and 
Democratic Control o f  the Bulgarian Armed Forces and Ministry o f  Defense, study no. 
3/1998 (June 1999). Available from http://www.md.govemment.bg; INTERNET.
’’in most other East European states the perception of threat from Russia actually 
increased. Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose, Public Perceptions o f  
Threats to Security in Post-Communist Europe (Glasgow, Scotland: University of 
Strathclyde, Center for the Study o f Public Policy, 1997). 6.
32Ibid., 6-11.
33Ibid., 12.
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Bulgaria’s own ethnic groups (See Table 18). Remarkably, in the decade following the 
collapse o f communism the public never ceased to see ethnic minorities as a possible 
threat to territorial integrity and national security.
The public’s perceptions of external threats to national security were compounded 
by a growing sense of personal and social insecurity. The Bulgarian economy witnessed 
one of the most dramatic declines in Eastern Europe. In the first six years the country 
experienced significant shrinking of its GDP, high inflation and constantly growing 
unemployment (See Tables 19 and 20). These developments inevitably led to social and 
economic dislocations whose consequences challenged the relative sense of social 
security the public was accustomed to during the years of communism. In the years 
following the end of communism, infant mortality rates reached numbers higher than the 
one in 1989 (See Table 21). In addition, life expectancy for males reversed its previous 
tendency of steady increase and slightly declined (See Table 22). In the years 1990-1996 
Bulgaria experienced a dramatic drop in its Human Development Index (HDI), from .854 
to .758, thus sliding from 40lh to 63rd place among states (See Table 23). '4 Serious crime, 
previously a rare occurrence, quickly became one o f the most important social issues and 
was placed among the greatest threats to social peace and personal security (See Table 
24). These developments increased the public’s perceptions of domestic threats to the 
levels of social and economic security enjoyed during the last years of communism. The 
rule of the Socialists in 1994-96 coincided with the greatest public dissatisfaction with 
the development o f democracy and the direction of the country in the period analyzed in 
this study. Accordingly, the populace also perceived little respect for human rights in this
34Developed by the United Nations, the HDI combines life expectancy, 
educational attainment and income indicators to give a composite measure of human 
development in various countries.
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period of Bulgaria’s transition. Increasingly, as the economic and social crisis deepened, 
the public came to see the consequences o f this crisis as the more significant threats to 
security even as external threats continued to be identified by the Socialists as the most 
significant among multiple threats.
The ascendance o f UDF to power in early 1997 dramatically changed Bulgaria's 
approach to cooperation with and integration in the international community. Bulgaria 
saw membership in NATO, the EU and the WEU not only as a reliable source of security 
guarantees but also as a natural expression o f the country's foreign policy orientations. 
Accordingly, the Kostov government not only reoriented the country’s foreign policy but 
also altered its approach to security.
The National Assembly approved in April 1998 a new National Security Concept 
which reflected the new government’s security policies and priorities. °  Like the Concept 
of the previous government, the new Concept identifies both external and internal factors 
affecting and determining national security. National security is defined as a condition 
“when the major rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the 
state borders, the territorial integrity and independence of the country, when there is not 
any danger of armed attack, violent change in the constitutional order, political dictate or 
economic compulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and 
civilian institutions is guaranteed.’” 6 Although the Concept sees a considerably decreased 
danger of direct military aggression against Bulgaria, it still emphasizes the importance
35Govemment o f the Republic of Bulgaria, National Security Concept (June 
1999). Available from http://www.md.govemment.bg; INTERNET.
36Ibid., 3.
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of military and force factors in international relations. '7 In contrast to the previous 
government’s approach, however, the new Concept recognizes the inability of the 
country to ensure its security on its own or to seek security through neutrality, because of 
insufficient financial, economic and military potential. Instead it identifies integration in 
international organizations and participation in the globalization process as the means to 
address these shortcomings. Along with identifying the national scarcity of security 
resources, the document points out that national security is affected by world economic, 
political, scientific and environmental processes as well as regional developments. Thus 
it becomes very unlikely that unilateral decisions, including military ones, are imposed in 
regional and bilateral conflicts. The Concept points out that these developm cnts-scarcity 
of national resources, the significance of world processes, and the institutional, rather 
than unilateral, solution of problem s—prompts Bulgaria to seek security through 
transition to democracy and a market economy and integration in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, including the EU and NATO. Significantly, the lack o f security and stability 
until recently were caused by the failure of the previous government to pursue these same 
policies.’8 In other words, it is not mainly the external threats that affected the state of 
national security but the failure to advance reforms and the refusal to integrate in the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The new Concept, like the old one, devotes much attention to threats in the 
Balkans, especially the ones associated with the conflicts in Yugoslavia. The effects of 
the crisis in the neighboring country are seen not in the form of a direct military challenge 
but rather as the existence of conditions for the development o f organized crime and
37Ibid.. 1.
’8Ibid., 2.
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corruption and for the isolation of Bulgaria from the process of integration in the Western 
institutions. These conditions jeopardize the stability of the Bulgarian state institutions 
whose integrity is a precondition for national security. In other words, the regional threats 
to national security are not in the form o f direct military challenges to the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty o f Bulgaria but in their effects on the capacity of the country to 
reform and integrate in Western institutions. Bulgaria’s perception of regional and limited 
threats to its national security were also evident in its Military Doctrine, which did not 
envision any direct military threat but defined any armed conflict in the Balkans as 
potentially presenting the challenges already identified in the Security C oncep t/9 
Significantly, after the UDF’s ascendance to power, political leaders and officials ended 
their references to any military unbalances between Bulgaria and its neighbors as Greece 
and Turkey were already seen as soon-to-be allies. Even the Socialists, although 
fundamentally opposed at least until 2000 to a membership in NATO, were unable to 
generate public support for their security and foreign policies. In fact, while in opposition 
after disastrous electoral results in 1997, the BSP did not develop any cohesive foreign 
policy vision of its own.
The new security concept was adopted shortly before a new escalation of armed 
conflicts in the Balkans. In early 1999 NATO initiated air strikes against Yugoslavia, the 
second such action in less than four years. This time the military action was even closer 
to Bulgarian territory, in Kosovo and Serbia, and presented an even more dramatic 
challenge to national perceptions of security. Both the rhetorical and already institutional 
commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, forced Bulgaria to take a firm stand on the
'^The military doctrine was approved on 8 April, 1999. Government o f the
Republic of Bulgaria, Military Doctrine o f  the Republic o f  Bulgaria. (June 1999). 
Available from http://www.md.govemment.bg; INTERNET.
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conflict. In contrast to the 1991-96 period, when Bulgarian governments saw neutrality 
and noninterference as the best guarantee of national security, the Kostov government 
firmly committed the country to the A lliance’s strikes, including providing overflight 
rights, imposing sanctions on Serbia in accordance with EU associate members' 
obligations, and urging Belgrade to accept the international community’s conditions.40
It must be noted, however, that the government's decision to support the West in 
the conflict was taken over the public’s disapproval of NATO’s action and of the 
government’s involvement in the conflict.41 UDF was the only party which unequivocally 
supported the NATO air campaign, while the BSP strongly objected and frequently tried 
to end the agreement between the Alliance and the government. Public resistance 
reflected the perception o f an acute threat to national security and exposed the public’s
40In a sharp reversal of previous Bulgarian policy o f neutrality toward Yugoslavia, 
President Stoyanov stated that Bulgaria's long term interests did not coincide with the 
interests of today's leadership of Yugoslavia and described the conflict as “a collision 
between the democratic community and the last communist regime in Europe." "Bulgaria 
Sides with NATO Over Kosovo,” Agency France-Presse (16 April, 1999): In an 
interview for Le Mond, President Stoyanov noted that in the past seven years Bulgaria 
had been a hostage of Milosevic’s policies and that it is time to solve the Serbia problem. 
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (5 May, 2001); In an interview for the daily Trud. Prime 
Minster Ivan Kostov stated that Bulgaria cannot have a neutral policy toward the Kosovo 
crisis for neutrality would bring about more threats to Bulgaria. Valeriya Velva. “You 
Stop Violence with Violence” (text). Sofia Trud in Bulgarian (3 May 1999). Translated 
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 3 May 
1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-1999-0503). Available from World News Connection: 
INTERNET.
4lIn March 1999, 72 percent of the public was against NATO military 
intervention in Yugoslavia and 77 percent were against NATO equipment and personnel 
crossing Bulgaria. ‘‘Bulgaria—Survey—Kosovo,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agencv (23 March. 
1999).
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belief that neutrality to conflicts in the Balkans is still the best guarantee for Bulgaria’s 
security.42
Although the perception of insecurity was widespread, the public did not exactly 
identify the nature of the threat posed by the Kosovo conflict. Yugoslavia did not issue 
any specific warnings about Bulgaria’s support to NATO's action as Sofia’s behavior did 
not substantially differ from the policies of the other Balkan countries which provided 
political and practical assistance to the Alliance. Moreover, Bulgaria did not turn into a 
destination for refugees leaving Kosovo, and aside from several stray American missiles 
landing on Bulgarian territory43 the short war did not inflict any damages on the 
country.44 Yet the public was afraid the country would be dragged in the conflict.43 
Despite government assurances that Bulgaria was ready to face any challenge with the 
assistance of Western Europe, and despite the widely publicized NATO commitments to 
national security, the public remained skeptical.40 Conversely, the ruling elite saw the
42In the same survey, 58 percent of the public viewed the conflict in Kosovo as 
the worst threat to national security. While one-third considered NATO guarantees a 
reliable protection only 59 percent said Bulgaria would be better protected if it did not 
allow its territory to be used in a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Ibid.
43“Fifth Stray NATO Missile Hits Bulgaria.’’ Agence France-Presse (7 Mav.
1999).
'‘‘‘During the air campaign the Bulgarian military was not placed on higher alert 
although some special security measures were implemented, including additional security 
for the nuclear plant in Kozloduy. Galina Sabeva, “Bulgarian Leaders Work to Grant 
NATO Request,” Reuters (19 April, 1999).
43Anatoly Verbin, “Bulgarian Government Tested O ver Kosovo.” Reuters (19 
April, 1999).
46Durign the crisis Bulgaria and the Alliance held intensive consultations, and in 
late 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent a letter, which, according to Prime 
Minster Kostov, provided security guarantees to the country. “ Bulgaria—NATO 
Consultations,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
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crisis as enhancing Bulgaria’s security as it prompted Euro-Atlantic institutions to further 
assist Bulgaria's quest to join the West.47
What partly explains the heightened sense of insecurity among the public during 
the Kosovo crisis is to be found within the states. Even before the conflict, the public 
exhibited a high level of economic and social insecurity even as the government was able 
to implement reforms, stabilizing the country after the disastrous rule of the Socialists. 
Although the economy resumed growth and inflation was brought under control, rising 
unemployment, stagnating individual incomes and the inability o f the government to 
bring crime under control increased social tensions. Very importantly, after a short period 
of high public support after the 1997 parliamentary elections, the public's approval of the 
government, political institutions and the direction of the country declined significantly.48 
The public tended to blame politicians and ineffective institutions for falling standards of 
living, corruption and crime. Indeed, life expectancy continued to fall, infant mortality 
remained high, and the HDI increased only slightly but rem ained way below the 1990 
level (See Table 23). Thus, the Kosovo crisis simply com pounded public fears that 
national political leadership and institutions would be unable to deal with yet another
47As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Kosovo crisis prompted the EU to 
initiate accession negotiations with Bulgaria. For the political e lite ’s view see President 
Stoyanov’s interview with Le Mond. Bulgarian Telegraph A gency  (5 May. 2001).
48 A poll by the National Public Opinion Center in 1998 found that the Bulgarians' 
perception of the incidents o f crime and the risks to which the person in the street is 
exposed has not changed in the last four years. Three out o f 20 respondents said they or a 
member of their family was victimized during the last year. ' ‘B ulgaria-C rim e—Poll,” 
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (16 July, 1998). In another poll the same year found that 55 
percent of the population believed corruption in the law enforcem ent authorities is the 
greatest obstacle to fighting crime. “Bulgaria—Corruption—Fight Against Crim e,” 
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (7 July, 1998).
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crisis that threatened security.49 According to the public, national and social capacities 
were insufficient to address multiplying threats.
Czech Security
The collapse o f communism in Eastern Europe was seen by the leadership in 
Prague not only as the end of totalitarianism but also as the end of the Cold War which 
had been the major threat to peace and security on the continent. As discussed in the 
previous chapter. President Havel, who at this first phase of transition emerged as 
Prague’s foreign policy leader, called for the transformation of both the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO. Prague believed that after the Cold War. post-communist states needed to be 
gradually incorporated into a Europe-wide security system in which there would be no 
divisions.30 In the initial post-communist period, the security policy efforts of Prague 
were focused on transforming the CSCE into a pan-European security organization that 
would guarantee European security.31 The reluctance to call for a quick dissolution o f
49According to a poll by the National Public Opinion Center conducted before the 
Kosovo crisis, the government scored high marks for its foreign, defense and security 
policies, but only 28 percent approved of its efforts in public peace and fighting 
corruption, 66 percent disapproved the government’s income policy, 63 percent of its 
handling of unemployment and 62 percent disapproved health care policies and the 
corruption in the executive. Public support for the government’s foreign and security 
policies, however, ended with the beginning of the Kosovo crisis. “G ovem m ent-O pinion 
Poll,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (16 November, 1998).
3°Havel’s interview for Die Welt. Manfred Schell, “Havel Discusses European 
Political Future” (text). Hamburg Die Welt in German (10 March 1990). Translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 12 March 
1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-048; p. 13-15).
5lCotey, 149-53.
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both alliances was provoked by latent fears about the role of a reunified Germany.32 
Thus, while Czechoslovakia was striving for a more independent foreign policy and the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territories it was also seeking to modify the existing 
security arrangements in a new security environm ent.33 Soon, however, Czechoslovakia 
came to accept the enduring need for a robust security institution on the continent, a role 
that only NATO could provide.
In this early phase, two issues dominated Czechoslovakia’s foreign and security 
policies—the presence of Soviet troops and the policy known as the “return to Europe.”34 
The national leadership identified the presence o f  Soviet troops in the country as the only 
immediate threat to the country’s national security and sovereignty. Prague recognized 
the USSR as the main threat due to the possibility that Moscow would try to reimpose its 
dominance over Eastern Europe and reverse the reforms in post-communist states.
32During a visit to London, Havel suggested that Germany should rid its 
neighbors of fears of new expansion. “Havel Calls for Dissolution of Military Pacts" 
(text). Prague CTK  in English (22 March 1990). FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 23 
March 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-057; p. 17-18).
3'Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier suggested Europe needed to transform its 
security architecture. In the first phase the two blocs would continue to exist but lose their 
military significance. In the next phase, there would emerge a United States of Europe. 
"Dienstbier Discusses European Security” (text). Prague CTK in English (4April 1990). 
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 5 April 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-066; p. 17). 
Even in early 1991 when it was obvious that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact was a 
matter of time, Prague still did not call for Czechoslovakia’s NATO membership. “Havel 
on Slovakia, Country’s Role in Europe” (text). Vienna ORF Television Network in 
German (5 May 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Daily Report-East Europe, 7 May 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-088; 9-14).
54In an interview for Lidove Novini, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier stated that 
Czechoslovakia’s most important foreign policy tasks in 1990 were the renewal of the 
sovereignty of the state and the normalization o f  relations with the West. “More Acitve 
Attitude Toward the World” (text). Prague Lidove Novini in Czech (19 December 1990). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East 
Europe, 27 December 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-249; p. 21-22).
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Accordingly, national diplomacy attempted to curtail Moscow’s ability to use the 
Warsaw Pact as a means to deny Czechoslovakia full sovereignty and later advocated its 
dissolution altogether. Concurrently, the non-communist government was able to 
negotiate an agreement on a swift troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. The 
withdrawal of more than 73,000 troops was formally agreed upon in February 1991 
during President H avel's visit to Moscow, and formally completed in June 1991.35 Along 
with the withdrawal o f foreign troops the country made swift progress on its return to 
Europe priority as it joined the Council of Europe in February in 1991 and signed a 
European Association Agreement in December. Even more importantly from a security 
perspective, in November 1991 Czechoslovakia and Germany signed border treaties, an 
issue of symbolic significance for Prague.
With the Soviet troops gone, Czechoslovakia found itself in a benign security 
environment. No neighboring country seemed to have territorial demands on 
Czechoslovakia and, in Prague’s view, no attempt by any country to make changes to the 
country's borders was seen as even slightly probable. The disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia into two independent states rendered the security environment of the 
Czech Republic even more benign. This change had several important security 
consequences for the new state. It moved the country's geographical gravity westward: 
the shift created more distance from the already increasing turmoil in the Balkans and the 
unpredictability of the former Soviet states.56 It also greatly decreased the size of
“ Hyde-Price, 232.
36In an interview with Hospodarske Noviny, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec 
argued that, after the split with Slovakia, not only did Czech Republic find itself removed 
from the turbulence of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans and it is now a more 
“clear-cut” Western state. Milos Sklenka, “Two States, Two Diplomatic Policies” (text). 
Prague Hospodarske Noviny in Czech (19 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign
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minorities in the Czech Republic and freed its national politics o f the burden of dealing 
with a relatively more backward Slovakia.37
The relatively favorable geopolitical position of the new state among the countries 
of Eastern Europe conditioned the relative absence in Czech foreign affairs of significant 
security issues. In fact, this early period in the foreign policy of the state set in the 
tendency of benign neglect of security policies by both the public and the political 
leadership.35* Accordingly, the national leadership did not lobby vigorously for 
membership in NATO.39 Only after the Alliance's decision in 1993 to expand did Prague 
openly campaign for inclusion in the first round. NATO membership was seen more as 
part of the overall policy of a return to Europe rather than as a security policy to 
guarantee national sovereignty against any conceivable military challenge. The newly 
independent state quickly identified itself as a Western society which had been denied its 
rightful place am ong democracies and with which it shared basic values and principles. 
Thus joining the institutions of these democracies was defined as part of the process of 
rejoining the West.
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-East Europe. 22 January 1993 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-013; p. 18-20).
37The division also greatly diminished the public’s perception of threats posed by 
minorities (See Table 18).
3XHad and Handl.
39Prime M inster Vaclav Klaus suggested in 1993 a '"French model” for the Czech 
Republic's membership in NATO—after a long and careful process o f integration in the 
Alliance the Republic would gain membership without its national troops being 
subordinated to a united command. Tomas Smrcek, “Vaclav Klaus Will Meet in Paris 
with President M itterrand and W riter Kundera.” (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech (4 
November 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-East Europe , 10 November 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-216: p. 11-12).
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The lack of interest in security and defense issues resulted in a delay in the 
formal, official conceptualization of national security. In early 1993. the Czech 
parliament received and noted principal guidelines for foreign policy, presented by the 
foreign minister. The guidelines, however, did not represent a formal national security 
concept.60 In the part relevant to national security, the guidelines observe that direct 
military threats to the Republic have diminished significantly. Instead the document 
identifies other, non-traditional and less-predictable threats such as the growth of militant 
nationalism, ethnic conflict, refugees, and the possible disruption of supplies of raw 
materials. The guidelines also define integration in NATO, the EU and the WEU as well 
as good relations with neighboring states as the means to guarantee the Republic's 
security, a point over which there was already a wide political consensus. Indeed, in this 
period the Czech Republic was more concerned with the uninterrupted flow of vital raw 
materials including oil and gas rather than with any conceivable military threat as it went 
to great lengths to quickly diversify its sources of deliveries.61
While the government still failed to produce an official security concept, the 
Institute of International Relations (IIR), an advisory board to the Czech Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, produced two documents elaborating the nation's security policies.62
6<>For a discussion see Had and Handl. 132-3.
61 “German Pipeline Halts Dependence on Russia” (text). Prague Radiozumal 
Radio Network (25 March 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 26 March 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-059;
p. 16).
62The two documents entitled Czech National Interests and The Security Policy o f  
the Czech Republic were published in 1993 and 1997. For a discussion o f the two 
documents see Andrew A. Michta, “The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a Free 
Rider?” in Andrew A. Michta, ed., Am erica's New Allies (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1999): 112-48.
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According to these documents the goal of every Czech government is to sustain freedom 
and independence. The way to achieve this goal is through establishing and sustaining a 
democratic political system and a functioning market economy. Domestic policies to 
attain this security goal must be supported by a comprehensive policy of integration o f 
the country into a larger, democratic, market-based European area.63 According to the 
1994 document, if there was any external threat to the Republic, it was, above all, the 
developments in the former Soviet Union/14 Even the raging civil war in the Balkans was 
not seen as presenting similar threats as the political, ethnic, social and economic 
conflicts in the former USSR.
To the extent that there existed any threat from Russia, political leaders agreed 
that the Czech Republic’s integration in Western institutions, and especially in NATO 
would eliminate this danger as a direct and specific threat to the state. For all the comfort 
that distance from the former Soviet Union provided to the Republic, a realist assessment 
of Russia’s geopolitical place in Europe was displayed by Czech political leaders. 
Therefore, Russian membership in NATO was rejected as incompatible with the values 
underpinning the Euro-Atlantic community as well as unrealistic considering Russia’s 
size and pow er/0 The Russian assault in early 1995 in Chechnya only seemed to 
reinforce those attitudes.66
^Institute for International Relations, The Security Policy o f  the Czech Republic 
(Prague: Institute for International Relations, 1997), 47.
6,For a discussion of this threat see a commentary in Mlada Fronta Dries.
“Experts See a Greater Risk in the Former Soviet USSR Than in Bosnia” (text). Prague 
Mlada Fronta D nes in Czech (23 May 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe. 31 May 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
EEU-94-104; p. 17-18).
6:>In an interview with French historian Jacques Rupnik, President Havel argued 
that Russia would be unwilling to become just another member of NATO, and in any
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The documents also specifically identify NATO, the EU, and the WEU as the 
most significant elements of the European security architecture. At the same time, the 
documents caution that small countries such as the Czech Republic need external security 
guarantees together with membership in international security institutions as the best 
means to guarantee national security. It explicitly states that the state should never again 
become a subject of manipulation by big powers or international organizations—an 
implicit reference to the inability of Czechoslovakia to influence the great powers’ 
readiness to sacrifice its sovereignty before the Second W orld War.67
At the same time, however. Czech security experts and most citizens were 
cognizant of the Republic's inability to influence its security environment and came to 
accept the Westss responsibility for maintaining security, order and stability.68 Therefore, 
the Czech political leadership faced a dilemma: the awareness of the limited security 
capacities of the Republic which required integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions 
dominated by great European powers, especially Germany, on the one hand, and fear that
event the Alliance was providing a balance to the overwhelming power of the Russian 
state on the continent. Jacques Rupnik, “We Constitute a Single Whole” (text). Krakow 
Tygodnik Powszechny in Polish (26 June 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 27 July 1994 (PrEx Translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 7.10: FBIS- 
EEU-94-144;p. 7-10).
66Eva Hulkova (text). Prague Radiozunial Radio Network in Czech (10 January 
1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East 
Europe, 11 January 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-007; p. 5); Ivan Holan (text). Prague 
Radiozumal Radio Network in Czech (10 January 1995). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 11 January 1995 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-007; p. 5).
67For a discussion of security concepts and policies of the states in Central Europe 
see Glantz.
68Had and Handl, 138-39.
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those great powers were capable of having a great impact on the security environment. 
Not surprisingly, while the public seemed to see no threat posed by neighboring 
countries. Germany and Russia scored high as perceived security threats by public 
opinion (See Tables 25 and 26). It must be noted that the public fears of potential threats 
from Germany and Russia were partially shared by the Czech leadership with one 
important qualification: the Czech leaders believed the threat from the two countries 
seemed unlikely to materialize. But if they were to endanger Czech sovereignty, the cost 
would be enormous. In other words Germany, and especially Russia presented, an 
unlikely but potentially costly threat. That explains why the Czech leadership very early 
on became an enthusiastic proponent of the United States' continued engagement in the 
continent, a Czech preference that endured throughout the 1990s.69
In the first years after the peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia the Czech 
Republic failed to formalize a security concept. Thus the Ministry of Defense undertook 
the unusual step of preparing the National Military Strategy in 1995 and the National 
Defense Strategy without the framework provided by a security concept.70 The official
69Tomas Smrcek, ' ‘Europe Lacks U.S. Decisiveness” (text). Prague Cesky Denik 
in Czech (9 October 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 19 October 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-200; p. 4); 
“Klaus Calls for U.S. to Stay in Europe” (text). Prague Radiozumal Network in Czech 
(11 May 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-East Europe, 13 May 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-093; p. 13); Eva Hulkova. 
“Conversations at Lany” (excerpt). Prague Radiozumal Radio Network (12 M ay 1996). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East 
Europe, 13 May 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-093; p. 13).
7(>For a discussion o f the Republic’s military doctrine and strategy see Nastoupil.
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Security Strategy was finally approved by the Czech government on 17 February 1999 as 
one of the requirements before joining NATO in March of the same year.71
The Strategy distinguishes between security threat and security risk. It uses 
“security threat” for dangerous phenomena and processes stemming from willful 
conduct” while security risk is defined as “phenomena and processes whose direct and 
indirect negative impact on society, the functions of the state, or citizens is not a 
manifestation of a willful conduct.”72 The vital national interests to be defended include 
“sovereignty, territorial integrity, the principles of democracy and a legal state, and the 
creation o f the fundamental conditions o f the lives o f its citizens.”7’ The Strategy points 
out that the end of the Cold War resulted in a substantial relaxation of general tensions 
and greatly diminished threat of worldwide confrontations. This development, however, 
does not eliminate threats as they are now posed by states, non-governmental groups, and 
organizations that do not respect international law. implicitly referring to actors which do 
not accept the existing status quo in international politics. The Strategy reinforces this 
point by declaring that the threat of use o f nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction had not been totally eliminated.
What distinguishes the Republic's Strategy from similar security concepts is that 
while the security conceptualization of Eastern European states identifies the threats and 
challenges to individual states, the Czech Republic sees the threats and risks to an area, 
the W est, in which the Republic is almost completely integrated. In others words, the
7lGovemment o f the Czech Republic, Security Strategy o f  the Czech Republic. 
(June 2001). Available from http://www.mzv.cz: INTERNET.
72Ibid„ 2.
7’Ibid, 3.
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potential risks and threats challenge the international security of the Euro-Atlantic area 
rather than face individual states. Thus, according to the document, the Republic is bound 
to face these risks and threats as part o f a politically, economically, and militarily 
integrated area rather than on its own.74 Accordingly, the threats and risks that the Czech 
Republic faces are by definition identical to those faced by the Euro-Atlantic community. 
The most serious threats to this area are developments in Southeastern Europe where 
instability and conflict threaten to spill over. Other threats include the complex 
developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia, and 
especially in the Trans-Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa. The Strategy points out, however, that in the medium term there is 
no direct military threat to the Czech Republic.
Among the risks, the Strategy identifies widespread political and economic 
migration, economic inequality among states, economic interdependence, and 
communication opportunities. Once again, the document sees these risks as challenging 
the Euro-Atlantic area rather than specifically the Czech Republic. Accordingly, the 
Czech Republic’s only means to address these risks and threats is in the framework of 
security-providing institutions of this area, including NATO. WEU. and indirectly, the 
EU. Therefore, the Republic's complete integration in these institutions is the most 
important priority of the nation’s foreign policy.
The Strategy also addresses the internal dimension o f security. Significantly, 
while the document identifies some of the possible internal sources o f threats and risks to 
security, it leaves no doubt in the strength o f political and state institutions. Instead, it 
points out that some of the threats and risks may pose a challenge to the proper
74Ibid„ 2.
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functioning of these institutions. In addition, it details that the integration in Euro- 
Atlantic institutions turns the Republic into an open state and society, both an opportunity 
that must be preserved in order to prosper but also a challenge that makes the role of the 
domestic security and law and order institutions more complex.
The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic expired on 21 January 2001, and an 
amended Strategy was approved by the government.75 Although it once again makes a 
distinction between threats and risks, the document, very much along the lines of 
Baldwin's conceptualization, defines security threat as a situation that can inflict damage 
to the Republic. Accordingly, the amended Strategy includes natural disasters as one of 
the possible risks. Reflecting the benign security environment, the document lists only 
security risks, while adding that some of them may develop into threats in the future.76 
Furthermore, it does not identify a specific region presenting either a risk or threat to 
national security. Even a reference to the low probability of nuclear confrontation 
mentioned in the previous version, was this time omitted. Thus, while the Czech Republic 
identified specific security threats in its pre-NATO security strategy, once it became a 
member of the Alliance, its amended strategy specifies only risks, reflecting the official 
perception of enhanced security.
The change in the Czech Republic’s military expenditures reflected the 
transformation of security perceptions. During the Cold W ar Czechoslovakia was in the 
center of war scenarios and witnessed a great concentration o f  both national armed forces 
and Soviet troops. Accordingly, the state devoted great resources, both human and
75Govemment of the Czech Republic, Security Strategy o f  the Czech Republic, as 
amended on 22 January 2001 (January, 2001). Available from http://www.mzv.cz: 
INTERNET.
76Ibid„ 3.
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economic, to national defense (See Table 17). After the Cold W ar, the government 
quickly reduced defense expenditures—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
GDP—and manpower, a move that met no public or even professional soldiers’ resistance. 
Low regard for the armed forces and the need to divert resources to national reform led to 
levels of armed expenditures that were seen as unacceptably low for a future NATO 
member.77 Only after the Alliance’s pressure did the Czech Republic agree to increase its 
military expenditures to at least 2 percent of its GDP.78 In 1993 the armed forces had over 
106,000 troops and after steady annual decline it reached 55,000 troops by 2000.79
The political elite’s neglect o f security and defense issues was reinforced by 
similar perceptions and attitudes held by the public.80 The public does not view political 
and national security risks as matters that can threaten the state in the near future and. in 
any event, doubts the ability o f the national military forces to defend the country 
effectively.81 These attitudes are consistent with long-running pacifist tendencies 
determined by history and politics.82 In the Second World W ar Czechoslovakia’s military
77On NATO’s criticism o f the Czech military’s shortcomings sec Michta. 137.
78Simon, “The New NATO Members."
79Ibid„ 4.
80Stefan Sarvas. “Attitudes of the Czech Public Toward National Security, the 
Military, and NATO Membership," Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies 11. no. 3 
(September 1998): 56-88.
8lIn the 1992-97 period, the majority o f the public believed that in case of a 
military conflict, the Republic was not able to defend itself. A majority also believed that 
it is futile to consider national defense because superpowers will decide the nation’s fate. 
Sarvas, 60; See also Blasek.
82 An international Gallup poll conducted in 1995 found that only 12 percent of 
Czechs expressed any fear that global conflict would occur within the next ten years, the 
lowest percentage of all 50 countries in which the pool was conducted. Blasek, 90.
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was unable to defend the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and in 1968 during 
the Prague Spring—a national movement seeking the reform of the communist regime— 
the military failed to resist Soviet intervention. Recently, the armed forces have been a 
constant target of defense-issues reporting by the Czech media.8’ Not surprisingly, the 
national military does not enjoy high public approval and it has a difficult time attracting 
young men into the professional ranks.84
O f course, historical ambiguity about the ability o f the armed forces to defend the 
nation is only one o f the factors explaining the relative lack of interest in security issues 
among the public. The society was also influenced by the calm security environment the 
Czech Republic found itself in after the Cold War and the split with Slovakia.83 Public 
perceptions of traditional security, perceived as the lack of threat to national sovereignty, 
rapidly assumed that there was no strong enemy that could threaten the country. The only 
exception was Russia, which was perceived by a great majority to constitute a potential 
threat to the stability o f the country. Another great power. Germany, with which the 
Republic had an uneasy relationship regarding the fate of property rights of the Germans 
expelled from Czechoslovakia after the Second World W ar and the German dominance
8 ’Libor Hlavacek. “Some Contemporary Aspect of the Portrayal of the Armed 
Forces o f the Czech Republic and Czech Mass Media,” Journal o f Slavic Military Studies 
12, no. 1 (March 1999): 47-50.
84Jiri Hodny and Stefan Sarvas, “Conscripts and the Military Profession in the 
Czech Republic,” Journal o f  Slavic M ilitary Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1999): 34-46; Jiri 
Hodny, ‘T h e  Prestige o f Professional Czech Soldiers in the Eye of the General Public,” 
Journal o f  Slavic M ilitary Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1998): 97-104.
83 A poll in late 1993 found the 58 percent of the public to be satisfied with the 
Republic’s foreign policy. “People Are Most Satisfied with Foreign Policy” (text).
Prague Mlada Fronta Dues in Czech (16 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 22 December 1993 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-244; p. II),
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of the Czech economy, seemed to divide public opinion (See Table 26).86 Thus the public 
seemed to share with the political leadership the perception that the main external threat 
to national security was the potential great powers’ collusion, particularly between Russia 
and Germany, rather than a danger from a single country.87
It must be noted that the perceived threat from Russia and Germany should not be 
exaggerated. The majority of the public which identified the two countries as threats at 
various times was asked to choose the most likely among several threats. However, when 
asked whether there was any military threat to the Republic 78 percent of the respondents 
in 1996 believed that there was no military threat to the country while a year later as 
many as 83 percent did not see any military threat.88 This public perception o f relatively 
high traditional security is confirmed by the polls which indicated declining perceptions 
of threats coming from the Balkans—a region specifically identified by the Czech security 
experts as a potential source of threats and risks.81’ All in all, the Czech public perceptions
86According to a public poll conducted in 1995. while 5 1 percent o f the public 
trusted Germany, 47 percent did not. An overwhelming majority, 84 percent, did not trust 
Russia. "Half the Population Does Not Trust Germany” (text). Prague M lada Fronta 
Dues in Czech (14 July 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 18 July 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-137; p. 6).
On the public fear over possible Russo-German agreement to reject NATO 
enlargement see Dusan Trestik, “Germany and Russia” (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in 
Czech (21 February 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 1 April 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-063; p. 8-9).
H8“Majority Says Czech Republic Not Threatened—Poll,” Czech News Agency (27 
February, 1997).
g<)
While in 1994 10 percent, and in 1995 as many as 14 percent o f the public 
believed that the Balkans represented a sources of threat to national security, in 1998 only 
4 percent believed so. “Czechs See Russia as Biggest Threat to Country’s Security-Poll,” 
Czech News Agency (20 March, 1998).
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of threats to national security gradually abated and by the time Czech Republic was 
invited to join NATO, the public ceased to see any likely external threat to country.
After Czechoslovakia's split in 1993, the Czech public also ceased to see ethnic 
minorities as a threat to national security (See Table 18). Therefore, security perceptions 
underwent transformation as the public began to rank traditional security well below 
other forms of security.<M) The society came to see internal sources of threats and 
challenges as the top set o f factors affecting security, and social and individual threats as 
priority concerns in the security field.
As in most other East European countries, a majority o f the Czech public 
considers social and economic risks and threats as priority security concerns. This 
tendency was reinforced by the economic crisis after 1996. which caused the depreciation 
of the national currency, the failure of several banks and an increase in unemployment.
In the early transition period the Czech Republic was seen as the model of post­
communist transition as the Republic successfully implemented political and economic 
reforms without the political turmoil and social tensions faced by the other East European 
countries, either successful or not. The Klaus government was able to establish a market 
economy and get rid of inefficient industries while keeping unemployment, inflation, and 
social dislocations under control (See Tables 19 and 20). Therefore, although the 
generalization about domestic insecurities having greater impact on citizens' security 
perceptions than that o f any other external threats and risks remained true, gradually by
yoA public poll in 1995 fund that the public ranked military security to be seventh 
among security priorities, well behind good family relations—ranked first—urban security, 
social security, income security, ecological security and security o f democratic rights.
Blasek. 91.
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1994 the public’s sense of internal insecurity diminished greatly.'M In other words, 
internal insecurities initially rem ained greater because external threats and risks were 
perceived to be low. The economic crisis of 1996-97, although tarnishing the Republic’s 
image of success, did not alter these attitudes. The crisis did not disturb the sound 
foundations of Czech transition and did not change public trust in and approval of the 
political system and its institutions.
Social indicators suggest that, indeed, the Czech population, in contrast to most 
other post-communist societies, experienced a relatively smooth transition. The life 
expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates, both good indicators o f  the quality of life 
and the health care system, by the end of the 1990s had better indicators than at the 
transition's beginning (See Tables 24 and 22). The Czech HDI too. although in decline in 
the early 1990s, rebounded and the country improved its rank among all states. Even the 
1996 economic crisis failed to cause the social tensions and dislocations common in 
similar developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, economic hardship 
was not associated with labor protests.
Lithuania's Security
Unlike the most other Eastern European states, Lithuania initially faced a severe 
challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity; the very existence of the newly 
independent state was contested by the Soviet Union and later Russia. To ensure its 
survival Lithuania adopted policies which simultaneously sought three objectives—
9lMagda Boguszakova and Ivan Gabal, ‘T he Czech Republic," in Richard Smoke, 
ed.. Public Opinion and Expert Assessm ent in Europe's New Democracies (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996): 64-71.
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gaining international recognition of its independence, concluding an agreement with the 
Soviet Union on its sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic.
On May 12, 1990, a month after the parliament voted to restore Lithuania's 
independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established the Baltic States Council, which 
was designed, among other objectives, to help all three republics reach these goals. In 
fact, the geopolitical interests o f the three republics have coincided since they decided to 
seek independence. Very early in this period, Lithuania emerged as the most ardent 
proponent of an uncompromising approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. The 
government in Vilnius, headed by the staunchly anti-communist Sajudis and its leader 
Vytautas Landsbergis, saw the presence of Soviet troops as the greatest threat to the 
survival of the state. The pressure Moscow exerted on Lithuania to rescind the 
declaration of independence, including the imposition of crippling economic sanctions 
and the use of Soviet troops in January 1991, convinced all Lithuanian political parties 
that the Soviet Union posed the greatest challenge to national survival. Not surprisingly, 
the Lithuanian political elite reached a consensus on the need to eliminate Soviet 
presence in the Republic as a precondition for national independence. Sajudis and the 
LDLP. the two dominant parties, however, differed on the speed of reaching an 
agreement and the approach to negotiating with Moscow. W hile Saujdis demanded an 
uncompromising stand even at the risk of provoking a conflict, the former communists 
insisted on a step-by-step approach. At this early phase of consolidating Lithuania's 
independence, however, it was Sajudis which dominated national politics.
The unsuccessful coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 further motivated 
Vilnius to seek the immediate withdrawal o f Russian troops. At the Baltic States Council 
in October 1991 in Vilnius, Landsbergis insisted that the withdrawal was not a question
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of negotiations and that all Russian military forces should leave by the end o f the year. 
Although Estonia and Latvia considered the deadline unrealistic, a document was adopted 
making the withdrawal o f troops the major foreign policy goal of the Baltic states.92 At 
the time, there was over 34,000 strong Russian military presence in Lithuania at over 180 
bases. Although the Sejma passed a law prohibiting the introduction of any new troops, 
the newly independent state had no means to enforce the law and Russia maintained its 
presence. Furthermore, in the ensuing institutional collapse and chaos following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Vilnius found it problematic to find the appropriate 
authority in Moscow to negotiate.
Lithuania’s hopes o f a withdrawal agreement with Russia increased in January 
1992 when the Russian Supreme Soviet finally ratified the treaty signed in July 1991, 
formally recognizing Lithuania’s independence. On the day of the ratification.
Landsbergis was able to convince Yeltsin to withdraw Russian troops. However, little 
progress was made in subsequent negotiations. By then it became clear to Vilnius that 
Moscow did not speak with a single voice, as Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a 
difficult time keeping his promises and exerting authority over security and military 
matters. In fact, some officials in Moscow suggested that the continued presence of 
Russian military forces in the Baltic states was a stabilizing security factor in this part of 
Europe.9'
)2Saulius Gimius, “Progress in Withdrawal of Troops from Lithuania?” RFE/RL 
Research Report 1, no. 34 (28 August, 1992): 29-33.
,JFedor Shelov-Kovedaev, Russian first deputy foreign minister, told reporters 
that Russian bases in the Baltics as “an integral part of the world security system.” “News 
Update,” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 35 (4 September, 1992): 42.
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Moscow’s refusal to consider an immediate troop withdrawal was caused by 
growing pressure in Russia for a revision of Yeltsin’s relatively pro-Western policies. 
There were calls for Moscow to take a tougher line toward the so-called “near abroad,’’ 
the area of the former Soviet Union.94 One of the reasons for the worsening o f relations 
between the Baltic republics and Russia was that the Russian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
failed to exert its authority over the process o f foreign policy decision making and instead 
left the military leadership to handle the “near abroad.” Consequently, the military 
establishment began to negotiate with the government o f Lithuania w ithout any political 
oversight.93
As part of the policy of getting tough with the form er Soviet republics, Moscow 
began to champion the rights o f ethnic Russians left outside Russia after the 
disintegration of the USSR. The “ Karaganov Doctrine,” named for Sergei Karaganov. an 
early adviser to Yeltsin, justified Russian intervention in the domestic affairs of the 
countries in the “near aborad,” if the human rights and the rights of ethnic Russian were 
violated.’6 Even as the Russian approach to the “near abroad” hardened, Vilnius and 
Moscow continued to negotiate the withdrawal of military forces. In Septem ber 1992 in 
the Kremlin, Lithuanian Defense Minster Audrius Butkevicius and his Russian 
counterpart Pavel Grachev agreed on a schedule that provided for the withdrawal of 
troops from Lithuania to be completed by August 1993.07 Even as the troops were being
94John Lough, “The Place of the “Near Abroad” in Russian Foreign Policy,” 
RFE/RL Research Report 2 no. 11(12 March, 1993): 21-29.
95Ibid„ 24.
96Clemens, 182-84.
97“Russian W ithdrawal Schedule from Lithuania Agreed," RFE/RL Research 
Report I, no. 37 (18 September, 1992): 66.
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withdrawn, Russia continued to insist that the rights o f ethnic Russians were being 
violated and threatened to  halt the pullout.'w In October 1992 the Russian president issued 
an order suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states: however, the 
pullout continued unabated.
Despite Russia’s intransigence Lithuania reached an agreement on troop 
withdrawal by skillfully negotiating with Moscow and rallying support at home and 
abroad. Recognizing the limits of its power, Lithuania relied on cooperation and 
coordination of policies with Estonia and Latvia and sought the assistance of international 
organizations and individual states. Internally, the government quickly granted automatic 
citizenship to all ethnic Russians, thus denying Moscow one of the most successful cards 
it used against the other two Baltic states. In an effort to discredit a Russian claim that 
Lithuanians did not want the Russian troops to leave the country, the government held a 
referendum on the question in June 1992; over 90 percent voted for the unconditional 
withdrawal and compensation for the years of Soviet occupation.40
Lithuania's success of solving the problem of Soviet military presence on its soil 
owed not only to the relentless efforts to reach an agreement but also to geopolitics and 
Russia’s weakness. Even the Russian military establishment, despite its refusal to accept 
psychologically or legally Lithuania's independence, had to accept temporary retreat as 
the price for the future restoration of Russia’s military might. In addition, Lithuania did 
not have military installations of any strategic value and Moscow found it easier to part
98“Lithuania Criticizes Russian Stance on Pullout,” RFE/RL Research Report I, 
no. 48 (4 December, 1992): 58.
"Norgaard, Johannsen, et al., 187.
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with its position there. Very importantly, Russia needed uninterrupted access to its 
enclave of Kaliningrad, a transit right that required Vilnius’ cooperation.100
Vilnius also successfully used the assistance of various states and international 
institutions in its pursuit of Russia’s military pullout. Along with the coordination of 
policies among the members of the Baltic States Council, Lithuania benefited from 
involvement by the CSCE, the European Community, and especially the U.S. Even after 
the withdrawal of the last Russian soldier from Lithuania in 1993 was completed, Vilnius 
continued to side with Estonia and Latvia in their attempts in 1994 to achieve the same. 
This stand stemmed not only from the commitment Vilnius undertook in the BSC but 
also from the belief that the security o f the country would be enhanced if Moscow pulled 
out from all Baltic states.
Lithuania’s ability to establish working relations with Moscow was also greatly 
enhanced by the change in power in Vilnius in 1992. While Sajudis and its leader 
Landsbergis applied an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow, 
Brazuskas and the former communists were willing to accommodate Russia's concerns 
and establish a better relationship with the Kremlin.101 The new approach was not an 
indication of an ideological affinity with Moscow, but rather based on the recognition 
that Lithuania was still very dependent on Russia’s goodwill for economic development
l(K,Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Soviet Legacy and Baltic Security: The Case of 
Kaliningrad,” in Olaf F. Knudsen, ed., Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region 
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999): 29-54.
l0lEven after the Sajudis’ overwhelming loss at the 1992 elections. Landsbergis 
continued to insist that Russia exhibited “pro-empire” tendencies in its dealings with 
Lithuania even as Russian troops were pulling out, and called for a no-compromise policy 
toward Moscow. “Landsbergis on Russian Attitude Toward Vilnius” (text). Moscow 
Baltfax in English (18 January 1993). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 22 January 
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-013; p. 100).
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and even security. Brazuskas insisted that Lithuania was still unprepared to achieve 
integration in the West and saw the process o f seeking membership in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions as a long and difficult one. In the meanwhile, Lithuania had no choice but to 
establish good relations with Moscow.102 In this early phase of independence, the ruling 
former communists did not see integration in NATO and the EC as a politically realistic 
means to guarantee national security.IOj Instead, the ruling elite considered the 
accumulation of national power and good relations with neighbors as the way to enhance 
national security. Meanwhile, the opposition leader Landsbergis continued to insist that 
Russia posed a great danger to Lithuania.104 Accordingly, while the Labor Democrats 
preferred to strike a balance between the country's eastern and western orientation.
Sajudis insisted on quick integration in NATO and the EC.
l02During the presidential campaign in 1993, Brazauskas stated that he would seek 
good relations with Russia and the East. “Brazuskas Outlines Foreign Policy Plans"
(text). Moscow Baltfcix in English (10 February 1993). FBIS Daily Report-Central 
Eurasia , 11 February 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-027; 63-64). Once elected as 
president. Brazauskas continued to support the maintenance o f good relations with the 
former Soviet republics, especially Moscow, and suggested that a stable relationship with 
Russia would alleviate Lithuania's economic problems in the transition and speed up the 
Russian troops' pullout from the Republic. “Supports East-West Balance of Interests" 
(text). Moscow Baltfax in English (21 March 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 24 March 1993 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-SOV-93-055: p. 87).
llbJustas Paleckis, presidential aid for foreign policy, insisted that “Lithuania has 
no good relations with the East, and is not interesting to the W est." He insisted that the 
best way of guaranteeing national security is the unity of all national democratic forces 
and the stability of the country. “Presidential Aid Discusses Foreign Policy” (text). 
Moscow Baltfax in English (12 May 1993). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 13 May 
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-091; p. 72).
l04“Landsbergis Warns of Growing Russian Threat” (text). Moscow Baltfax in 
English (11 March 1993). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 12 March 1993 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-047: p. 74).
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Although Vilnius em braced cooperation with Estonia and Latvia in its quest for 
membership in international institutions, differences among the Baltic states began to 
strain their commitment to cooperation.103 The constitutional crisis in Russia involving 
President Yeltsin and the Parliament, the ascent of nationalist forces in the 1993 Russian 
parliamentary elections, the establishment of a more assertive foreign policy toward the 
“near abroad,” and the continued conflict in Chechnya forced the political leadership in 
Vilnius to seek speedy integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions without necessarily 
coordinating policies with its Baltic neighbors. Lithuania decided that domestic stability, 
neutrality in foreign affairs and good relations with neighbors would not suffice to 
guarantee national security. l06Yet, according to the ruling Labor Democrats, the process 
of integration should not come at the cost of antagonizing the bilateral relationship with 
Russia. Indeed, despite what was perceived to be worrisome domestic developments and 
attitudes in Russia, Vilnius was willing to downplay their potentially negative impact or 
recognize some of them as legitim ate.107 In fact, the ruling elite perceived bilateral
"bLithuanian ambassador to the EC, NATO and the Group of 24 argued that 
Lithuania could have joined European organizations very quickly if the country were 
acting alone instead o f waiting the Estonia and Latvia to sort out their relationship with 
their Russian minorities. "Inflexible” Baltic Laws Hinder European Membership” (text). 
Moscow Baltfax in English (12 November 1992). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 13 
November 1992 (PrEx^7.10: FBIS-SOV-92-220: p. 88).
l00National Defense M inster Audrius Butkevicius warned that there were forces in 
Russia that seek to either restore the Soviet Union or to split Russia. Both of these forces 
were represented danger to security in the region. Lithuania needed to address this danger 
through integration in Western security institutions. Valdas Sutkus, “Audrius 
Butkevicius: “I Am Against the Concept of Neutrality” (text). Vilnius Lietuvos Aidas in 
Lithuanian (27 March 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia , 14 April 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-070; p. 87- 
88 ).
l07President Brazauskas attributed some of the belligerent rhetoric toward the 
“near abroad” as electoral cam paigning and defended Russia’s willingness to send troops 
in parts the former Soviet Union as based on legitimate security concerns to maintain
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relations to be good and attributed any problems to be part of the normal process of 
establishing a relationship between two newly independent states.108
While during the rule of the Labor Democrats Lithuania seemed to have reached a 
working relationship with Russia and to have attained the most basic conditions for 
national sovereignty including international recognition, basic treaties with Moscow, and 
the pullout of foreign troops, there remained questions about the significance of threats to 
national security. An analysis of Russia’s security and military policies indicates that, in 
fact, Lithuania’s independence and security were more threatened than the perceptions, 
especially those exhibited by the Labor Democrats, would have suggested.
In the chaos and uncertainty following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
external environment seemed threatening to Russian foreign policy makers. Initially, 
however, Moscow failed to elaborate on a clear concept for the country’s relations with 
the diverse states emerging on its borders. In the ensuing vacuum of foreign policy 
visions and properly distributed areas of authority the Defense Ministry assumed some of 
the responsibilities for dealing with the former Soviet republics, while the Foreign 
Ministry focused on relations with the rest of the world. Very early on the defense 
establishment not only negotiated the status of former Soviet troops on the territories of 
the newly independent countries but also became involved in the many local conflicts.
The Ministry went as far as to include in its military doctrine the responsibility to defend
peace and stability on its borders. “Brazauskas on Nordic, Russian Relations. NATO” 
(text). Vilnius Vilnius Radio Network in Lithuanian (3 December 1993). Translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-Central Eurasia , 6 
December 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-232; p. 86-87).
l08Rytas Staselis. ‘The President Is Calm” (text). Vilnius Respublika in 
Lithuanian (22 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 4 January 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94- 
002; p. 56-58).
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the rights and interests of ethnic Russians on the territory of the former U SSR.109 Soon, 
however, the intensity o f security threats forced the Russian political leadership to begin 
the elaboration of a cohesive foreign and security policy.
The continuing conflicts in the states along the Russian border, especially to the 
South, forced Moscow to think of its strategic interests in terms of sphere o f influence.110 
Russia saw the emergence of a security vacuum, which could potentially invite outside 
powers willing to fill it. Instead Moscow established the concept of “'near abroad” and 
claimed to be responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the whole post-Soviet 
space.111 And while Russia came to accept the independence of the former Soviet states, 
it perceived itself to have a legitimate right to be engaged in the region as it was seen as 
home to millions o f ethnic Russians as well as a potential source of threats to Russia.
After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, which led to the rise o f the nationalist 
right, some in Moscow did not rule out the use of force to achieve these foreign policy 
priorities.112
10*)Lough, 22; See also Jeff Checkel. “Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the 
Future.” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 41 (16 October, 1992); 15-29.
ll0For an excellent study of Russia’s post-communist security thinking sec 
Alexander A. Sergounin, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing 
Paradigms, occasional paper (Copenhagen. Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute, 2001). Available from Columbia International Affairs Online.
11'in early 1993 Yeltsin suggested that Russia be granted the United Nations 
mandate to secure peace and stability in the former Soviet Union. “Landsbergis Criticizes 
Yeltsin Peacekeeping Statement” (text). Moscow Baltfax in English (3 March 1993). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-Central 
Eurasia, 5 March 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-042; p. 71-72).
ll2The policy came to be known as the Kozyrev Doctrine, proclaimed by the then 
Russian Foreign Minster Sergey Kozyrev. Sergounin, 15-19.
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Russia paid increased attention to the “near abroad" after Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev was replaced in 1996 by Evgeniy Primakov. Moscow began to think of its place 
in the world and its foreign policy in increasingly power relations terms. In its part 
concerning the Baltic states, including Lithuania, the new Russian security 
conceptualization envisioned the region as adhering to strict neutrality. Accordingly, 
Moscow strongly objected to NATO expansion to include any o f the Baltic states." ’
Responding to the Baltic states’ quest to join the EU and NATO, Russia tried to 
stall the process by threatening not to sign or ratify any agreement delimiting their 
borders, a crucial requirement by both Euro-Atlantic institutions in order to gain 
membership.114 Very significantly, Russian officials at the highest level questioned the 
current borders and suggested that they should be revised."3
In order to deny the Baltic states the choice o f membership in NATO, Russia 
suggested that their insecurities could be addressed by bilateral security arrangements 
with Moscow. In 1997 Moscow proposed to the Baltic and Nordic states a security 
agreement offering individual states the option to conclude either a bilateral security 
guarantee or a security agreement involving Russia, the U.S., or NATO itself."6 Of 
course, no state accepted the offer, rejecting the idea of separating Northern Europe from
1 "ibid., 24-6.
" 4In 1997 the Russian Duma urged President Yeltsin not to hurry with signing the 
Russian-Lithuanian Treaty on the state border citing that the treaty would deprive Russia 
of legal rights to Klaipeda territory, and would deny Moscow from affecting Lithuania's 
policy of seeking NATO membership. See Paul Goble, “Putting Pressure on Baltics," 
RFE/RL Research Note (14 February, 1997). Available from http://www.rferl.ora: 
INTERNET.
" 3On the Russian approach to NATO enlargement see Blank.
"°Olav F. Knudsen, “Nordic Perspectives on Baltic Security: A View Through 
Diagnostic Statements,” International Politics 36, no. 1 (March 1999): 89-112.
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the rest of Europe as a region with separate security guarantees.117 In fact, any 
suggestions that the security of the Baltic states could be somehow considered separately 
from the process of unconditional membership in NATO, caused fears in Lithuania.118 
The subsequent Baltic Chapter concluded in 1998 between the Baltic states and the 
United States, although not providing firm security guarantees, further committed 
Washington to the security of the three states. Yet Russia persisted in its attempt to force 
the Baltic states to conclude regional security arrangements long after the three states 
firmly rejected any bilateral agreements and declared that NATO membership had no 
alternative.11<>
II7In October 1997 President Yeltsin formally proposed to his Lithuanian 
counterpart, Algirdas Brazauskas, that Russia was ready to guarantee unilaterally the 
security of the three Baltic states. The presidents o f the three Baltic states rejected the 
Russian offer of security guarantees in their summit meeting held in Lithuania a month 
later. See RFE/RL Newsline (27 November, 1997).
I i X‘ Responding to a report in the Washington Times that the United States was 
prepared to hand over the Baltic states into the Russian sphere of influence, Lithuanian 
officials quickly requested official information from the U.S. State Department and later 
assured the public that Washington had not changed its policy of support for Lithuania's 
membership in NATO. “Foreign M inister Rules Out New East-West Partition” (text). 
Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian (12 September 1994). Translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 13 
September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177; p. 74). See also “U.S. Response to 
Formal Inquiry Noted” (text). Tallinn BNS in English (12 September 1994). FBIS Daily 
Report-Central Eurasia, 13 September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177; p. 74).
n<)Sergey Shakhray, security expert in the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy 
Council, argued that Moscow could prevent the Baltic states' accession to NATO only by 
offering them common security guarantees with the Alliance. “Russian Expert Says 
Russia and NATO Should Together Ensure Baltic Security" (text). Tallinn BNS in 
English (22 December 2000). FBIS D aily Report-Central Eurasia, 22 December 2000 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-2000-1222). Available from W orld News Connection; 
INTERNET.
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Lithuania approved its first national security concept on 19 December 1996, and 
the document was amended in 1998 and 2000.120 It must be noted that the differences 
between the amended versions o f the Law are relatively minor and follow the themes and 
approaches set by the original concept. The approach to conceptualizing national security 
in all versions is very comprehensive and lengthy as it includes not only general 
provisions but also identifies the institutions responsible for ensuring security, discusses 
the development of the security system, and includes the legal regulations and the long­
term program for strengthening national security.
The security concept does not identify specific threats but defines the nature of 
probable threats. Like the Czech security concept it includes risks and threats but, unlike 
it, does not formally define the differences between them, although it appears that the 
distinction is the degree of threat. It divides the risks and threats into external risks and 
dangers, and internal risks. Notably the internal challenges include risks but not dangers, 
implying a relative confidence that the stability o f society and state institutions make 
internal sources of dangers less probable. Among the external threats the Law identifies is 
one of the most significant: the geopolitical environment, including the militarization of 
the region and the instability o f democratizing states. The concept focuses only on 
regional political, military, economic, and criminal factors that could threaten national 
security.1"1
The Law does not identify any specific threat, including any state or 
contemporary development. However, the concept is explicit in its requirement that
l2,,Lithuania Parliament, Law on the Basics o f  National Security, No. VII1-49. 
Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.
I2llbid„ 8.
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Lithuania's national security be developed as part of the trans-Atlantic defense system, 
specifically discussing NATO, the EU, and the WEU. The national security is to be 
guaranteed by the state not only through the strength o f national defense forces but also 
through the country’s future participation in these institutions. In addition, citizens are 
expected to play an important role in national security by preparing for total civil 
resistance, developing civic associations, and fostering the resolve to defend Lithuania's 
freedom.1"
Lithuania's security concept attempts to strike a balance between traditional 
security conceptualization, including defense and alliance participation, and a focus on 
soft-security issues including confidence-building measures, strengthening of domestic 
institutions and people-to-people contacts with other societies. Yet, the priorities in the 
Law imply that hard-core security factors, especially in the regional environment, are the 
preconditions for national security. Although no country or region is specifically 
identified as posing a threat or risk, references to probable adverse developments that 
may cause acute dangers to the already achieved national sovereignty and internal 
institutional stability implying that Vilnius sees Russia and Belarus as the only potential 
security threats.
Although Russia was seen as the most significant threat to national security. 
Lithuanian leadership was well aware that good relations with the giant to the East was a 
precondition for successful integration in the West. Even after 1997, when Russia seemed 
to have finally established the fundamentals of its foreign policy toward the former 
Soviet republics including Lithuania, Vilnius did not significantly alter its approach to
‘"Ibid., 3.
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dealing with Moscow.12'’ While rejecting Russia’s attempts to divert Lithuania's course 
toward the integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Vilnius went out of its way to 
cultivate a working relationship with Moscow and address its security fears and concerns. 
Even when the growing integration of Russia and Belarus was seen as creating a new 
danger to national security as it was about to bring once again Russia to Lithuania's 
border,124 Vilnius continued to assure Russia of the benign nature of its quest to join 
NATO.
Russia, however, remained unconvinced and continued to aggressively reject 
Lithuania's quest for NATO membership.123 That caused Lithuania to speed up its efforts 
to join NATO by lobbying for its inclusion in the 2002 round of expansion, enlisting the
l2’Lithuanian Defense Minister Geslovas Stankevicius assured visiting NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana that despite continuing Russian objections Lithuania 
would not change its position on the Alliance's expansion. “Lithuania: Minister Rejects 
Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion” (text). Moscow Interfax (15 June 1998). FBIS 
Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 16 June 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-167). Available 
from W orld News Connection: INTERNET.
l24“Lithuanian Speaker Concerned by Russia-Belarus Integration" (text). Vilnius 
Interfax in English (28 December 1998). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 28 
December 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-362). Available from World News 
Connection: INTERNET.
l23Russia’s First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Michailov insisted that 
Kaliningrad should be used as a “deterrent and nothing more than that, to NATO 
expansion.” “Russia: Russia Looks to Kaliningrad as Deterrent to NATO Expansion” 
(text). Moscow Interfax in English (2 December 1998). FBIS Daily Report-Central 
Eurasia, 2 December 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-336). Available from World News 
Connection: INTERNET; See also “Baltics to Remain in Zone of Russia’s Vital 
Interests” (text). Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (24 Seprtem ber 1999). FBIS Daily 
Report-Central Eurasia, 24 September 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SO V-1999-0927). 
Available from World News Connection: INTERNET.
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support of individual states, even at the expense o f coordinating policies with its Baltic 
neighbors.126
Despite the prevailing perception of external threats. Lithuanian military 
expenditures did not seem to reflect a nation obsessed with the traditional defense o f 
national territory and independence. Although Lithuania had to build military forces from 
scratch, and in that respect was in a disadvantaged position compared to Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic, efforts to establish the basic structure of a national military were initially 
modest at best. In the first years of independence, the military budget did not reach 1 
percent of the GDP (See Table 17). O nly after NATO made it clear that one of the 
preconditions for membership is the ability of the candidate countries to contribute 
military power to the Alliance did Lithuania undertake a concerted effort to increase its 
defense budget. Even then, the military establishment found it difficult to receive 
sufficient resources to meet the basic requirements for building national defense.127 In 
fact, Lithuania's military budget remained one of the lowest in Eastern Europe.
Lithuania’s public perceptions of security followed a tendency similar to those in 
the rest in Eastern Europe. The public seemed to be more concerned with internal sources
l_6Vilnius, while still committed to cooperation and coordination o f Baltic 
policies of joining NATO, insisted that countries should gain membership based on the 
countries progress of meeting the membership criteria. "Lithuania Not Strict About
Baltics’ Joint NATO Entry” (text). Prague CTK in English (21 September 1999). FBIS 
Daily Report-East Europe, 21 September 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-1999-0921). 
Available from World News Connection; INTERNET; Lithuania's activism alarmed its 
neighbors Estonia and Latvia, which suspected that Vilnius was abandoning joint efforts 
for membership. “Lithuania Surprised by Latvian Criticism of Security” (text). Tallinn 
BNS in English (7 February 2000). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 7 February 2000 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-2000-0207). Available from World News Connection: 
INTERNET.
,27Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis warned that the failure o f the Parliament 
to allocate sufficient resources for national defense would endanger Lithuania’s chances 
of joining the Alliances. Huang, “So Far So Smooth.”
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of threats and risks and more attention, at least in the second half o f the 1990s, was paid 
to personal and societal security rather than to traditional military security. Indeed, the 
public's understanding of security seemed to have departed from the traditional power 
relationship image and instead was increasingly linked with the concepts of freedom and 
liberties, free market economy, social security, and the maintenance o f civil society.128 
Remarkably, already in the mid-1990s the majority of the public perceived the size of the 
national military force as adequate or too large, while only 21 percent supported an 
increase in the military.,2,> Accordingly, 45 percent of the public pointed to internal 
dangers as probable threats to national security. This is not to say that the public was 
oblivious to dangers posed by Russia. Instead the majority saw Russia emerging as the 
most likely threat in the case of Lithuania's failure to accomplish political and economic 
reforms and the W est’s failure to open up to the Baltic states' membership in Euro- 
Atlantic institutions. Indeed, while the great majority of the public in the mid-1990s 
believed that Russia represented a threat to Lithuania's stability, by the end of the decade, 
the number of people believing so decreased (See Table 25).
Economic and social developments reinforced public perceptions of the 
significance of internal threats and risks to national security. Lithuania experienced one 
of the most dramatic, in terms of economic and social dislocations and suffering, 
transition processes in Eastern Europe. In the early years following independence 
declining economic growth, high unemployment and hyper-inflation caused social pain 
and a rapidly declining standard of living (See Tables 19 and 20). Lithuania experienced
l28Rolandas Kacinskas, “The Lithuanian Public’s View on National Security in a 
Changing Environment,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review no. 2 (1998): 77-86.
I2l,lbid„ 84.
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one of the steepest declines in HDl, a development also reflected by declining life 
expectancy and increasing infant mortality rates. However, the political stability and the 
advance of economic and social reforms in the second half of the 1990s reversed this 
trend and Lithuania quickly began to improve personal and social conditions. In addition, 
the public perceptions o f threats posed by minorities significantly declined, a remarkable 
turnabout considering the long history of nationalist and international confrontation.
Conclusion
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania experienced varying degrees of 
security through the first decade of post-communist transition. All three states perceived 
security to be the presence of conditions under which the state’s sovereignty, 
independence, and integration in the Western core was guaranteed. Domestically, 
security was perceived as the enhancement and preservation of the democratic nature of 
the society, and the increase in economic and social prosperity. In other words, security 
was seen as the low probability of damage to those values.
Of the three countries, the Czech Republic clearly enjoyed the highest level of 
security (See Appendix III). After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the split of 
Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic found itself in a benign security environment, 
surrounded by states which were either part o f the W estern core, which Prague aspired to 
join, or were in the process of joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In addition, no 
neighboring state had any territorial claims on the Republic and all of them had an 
interest in seeing the state completing political, economic and social reforms and joining 
the Western core.
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Czech leadership saw the level of security the Republic had as relatively high.
The country’s sovereignty and independence was seen as unchallenged by any significant 
player or political development. In Czech security thinking, the potential threats and risks 
to security were directed at the Western core which the state strived to join, rather than 
specifically at the Republic. The threats more specific to the Czech Republic were 
associated with developments that challenged the country's quest to join the Euro- 
Atlantic institutions. Even those threats, however, were not perceived to be intense and 
were categorized by experts as risks rather than traditional hard-core threats.
Significantly, the economic and political instability in Russia in the mid-1990's although 
perceived by Prague as a short-term risk, ultimately enhanced the Czech Republic’s 
security in the long term as the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the national leadership 
accelerated their efforts to integrate the state in the Western core.
The Czech public seemed to share official perceptions o f security. The benign 
nature of the security environment and the success o f post-communist reforms created a 
sense of security in the population not typical for East European societies. The public saw 
neither a neighboring state nor a development that could possibly emerge as a significant 
threat to national security. Of course, this conclusion requires a qualification as both 
Russia and Germany were seen as posing threats. This perception, however, was 
consistent with the official image of threats to peace and stability o f the continent posed 
by general confrontation among great powers rather than a threat specific to the Republic. 
In addition, in the case of Germany, the risk was associated more with the powerful 
neighbor’s economic presence in the country rather than with any clear attempt to 
dominate politically.
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Conversely, Lithuania faced a fundamentally different security environment. In 
the first years o f newly acquired independence the very survival and sovereignty o f the 
state was questioned by the Soviet Union and later Russia. Therefore, Lithuania was the 
only state in this study to face a challenge to the fundamental value o f national survival.
In the course of post-communist transition, however, the security threat subsided as 
Lithuania concluded treaties with Russia recognizing its independence and secured the 
relatively speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. In addition, the country 
gained international recognition and participation in major international organizations, 
which validated its sovereignty. Although the country secured its sovereignty, the 
security environment remained dangerous as the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
created a new set of neighbors with which Lithuania had yet to establish relations and 
sort out long suppressed grievances and issues. The continuing instability in the former 
Soviet area, however, spurred Vilnius’ efforts to reach an understanding with its 
neighbors and create an area with them wherein military conflict seemed unlikely. 
Lithuania also established a working relationship with Moscow and reached an 
agreement on basic issues including demarcation o f borders, access rights to Kaliningrad, 
the status of ethnic Russians, and economic and social cooperation. Russia's rejection of 
Lithuania’s policy o f joining NATO, on the other hand, instead of increasing the potential 
for conflict between the two countries, forced Vilnius to maintain good relations with 
Moscow. In fact, in Lithuanian security thinking, the success of the country's quest to 
join the Western core depended, among other factors, on maintaining a problem-free 
relationship with Russia, an official attitude which dominated governments’ policy 
toward the eastern neighbor after Sajudis' loss of power in 1992.
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Lithuania’s public seemed to have a less intense sense of external security 
compared to either objective o r official evaluation of the security environment. 
Lithuanians quickly shifted their focus from external to internal threats and risks to 
security. Indicative of this attitudinal change is that while Lithuania was still a Soviet 
republic the population overwhelmingly voted for Sajudis, which called for immediate 
independence and an uncompromising approach to dealing with the greatest threat to this 
goal, the Soviet Union. After independence was achieved, however, the population voted 
for the former communists who emphasized the collapse of the national econom y and the 
accompanying social despondency. In addition, the labor democrats insisted on a more 
moderate approach to dealing with Russia. Indeed, the consequent improvement in 
economic and social conditions contributed to the further relaxations of perceptions of 
external and internal threats, as both the ethnic minorities and Russia were seen by only a 
small share o f the population as threats to national security.
Among the three states, Bulgaria scored worst on the dependent variable security. 
Although at no point through the post-communist transition did Bulgaria confront a 
challenge to its sovereignty and independence, the country faced a dangerous security 
environment. The disintegration o f Yugoslavia, civil wars, and the appearance o f new 
neighbors presented the country with an uncertain and turbulent environment in which 
non-traditional security threats stemming from ethnic conflict, organized crime, and 
economic and social deprivation challenged Bulgaria's national security. One o f the 
declared national values-joining the Western core—was threatened as continuing warfare 
and unstable neighbors threatened to isolate the country and prevent it from establishing a 
stable interaction with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In fact, on occasion, including 
during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, Bulgaria found itself physically cut off from Western
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markets. Thus, although the country did not experience the type of challenge Lithuania 
faced to its sovereignty and independence in the first years o f post-communist transition, 
it confronted a similarly intense danger to its national security stemming from the 
regional environment.
The nature of the security perceptions of Bulgaria’s political leadership reflected 
for the most part the intensity o f objectively existing security threats. Well into 1996. the 
political leadership felt extremely uncomfortable with the end o f firm external security 
commitments and tended to exaggerate the intensity of traditional security threats such as 
the ones posed by a state to another state. Accordingly, Sofia searched for an immediate 
remedy to its security conditions and fell back on traditional means, including the 
maintenance o f  strong military power and falling back on tested security arrangements. 
After 1996, however. Bulgaria began to recognize the non-traditional nature of security 
threats and therefore embarked on a new approach to addressing challenges. Security 
threats and risks, however, remained intensive.
The public in Bulgaria, like in the rest in Eastern Europe, shifted its focus from 
external to internal threats and risks to security, and from state security to social and 
individual security. The slow pace of political, economic, and social reforms created 
social and economic deprivation that sustained the sense of insecurity. Indeed, although 
the number o f people who saw ethnic minorities and neighboring states as threats 
decreased, the sense of insecurity remained high. It must be noted, however, that the 
public, like the leadership, began to see integration in the W estern core as the means to 
address the dangers fading national security.
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Appendix III
Figure 6 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of degree o f national security on a ordinal scale from 
most secure to least secure. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed security variable. 
The three counines arc ranked by summing the three variables by assigning values of 3 to the highest ranking on each 
variable. 2 to the next and I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the same ranking, the states receive 
the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000
Security is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country, which has the highest degree 
o f objective security, the highest o f  security as perceived by national political elite, and the highest degree of security 
as perceived by the population. The value of one is assigned to the country which scores lowest on each of the same 
variables.
Figure 6 .
Variable Security
(1 > (2 ) (3) Total Average
Bulgaria 1 1 1 3 1 00
Czech R. 3 3 3 9 3 00
Lithuania 1 2 2 5 1.67
Note: Column headings are xs follows: ( I ) Objective security: (2) Official perception of security: (3 1 Public perception 
o f security.
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Tabic 17.
Military Budgets as Percentage of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Bulgaria 4.5 3.5 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.5
C/.ech R 2.6 2.3 16 1.9 1.9 2.1
Lithuania 0.7 0.5 0 5 0.5 0.8 1.3
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SII’RI Yearbook 2000: Armaments. Disarmament and  
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000). 280.
Table 18.
Perceived Threat from Ethnic Minorities in the Country
(percentage of public)
1992 1995 1996 2000
Bulgaria 46 37 43
Czech R. 44 15
Lithuania 29 23
Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Haerpfcr. Wallace and Rose. 15: Rose. New llaltic Barometer II. 34: Rose. .Veir Baltic Barometer IV. 36: 
Vitosha Research.
Table 19
Unemployment
(percentage)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria 1.7 11.1 15.3 16 4 12.8 1 I I 12.5 13.7 12.2 16 0 17.9
Czech R. 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2 9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9 4 8.8
Lithuania 0.3 1.3 4.4 3.8 6.1 7.1 5.9 5.4 8.4 12.6
Source: "Statistics: Annual." Business Central Europe (Julv-August. 2001) Available from http://www.bccmac.com: 
INTERNET
Table 20.
Inflation 
(percentage)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria 23.8 338 91 72.8 96 62.1 123 1.082 22.3 0.3 9.9
Czech R. 9 7 56 11 20.8 10 9 1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9
Lithuania 8.4 225 1.161 188 45 35.7 13.1 8.4 2.4 2.5
Source: Ibid.
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Table 21.
Infant Mortal itv Rates
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Bulgaria 14.4 14.4 16.9 15.9 15.5 16.3 15.6 14.8 17.5 14.4
Czech R. 10.0 10.8 10.4 9.9 8.5 7.9 7.4 6 0 5 9 5.2
Lithuania 10.7 10.2 14.3 16.5 16.0 14.1 12.5 10.1 10 3 9.2
Source: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Demographic Yearbook. IW 6 
(United Nations Publications: New York. 1998). 432-33: United Nations. Department o f Economic and Social Affairs. 
IW S  Demographic Yearbook (New York: United Nations Publications. 1998). 363-4.
Table 22.
Life Expectancy at Birth
1980-1985 1990-1995 1995-2000
Bulgaria Male: 68.5 
Female: 74.3
Male: 67.8 
Female: 74.9
Male: 67.6 
Female: 74.7
Czech R. Male: 67.2 
Female: 74.3
Male: 68.8 
Female: 75.2
Male: 70.3 
Female: 77.4
Lithuania Male: 66.1 
Female: 75.5
Male: 64.9 
Female: 76.0
Male: 64.3 
Female: 75.6
Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistic Division. United Nations. Statistical Yearbook (New 
York: United Nations Publications. 2000). 87-88.
Table 23.
Human Development Index
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 I99S 1999
Bulgaria 0.854
(40)
0.796
(65)
0.773
(62)
0.780
(69)
0.789
(67)
0.758
(63)
0.758
(63)
0.772
(60)
0.772
(57)
Czech R. 0.892
(26)
0.872
(38)
0.872
(37)
0.882
(39)
0.884
(39)
0.833
(36)
0.833
(36)
0.843
(34)
0.844
(33)
Lithuania 0 881 
(29)
0.762
(71)
0.719
(81)
0.762
(76)
0.750
(79)
0.761
(62)
0.761
(61)
0.789
(52)
0.S03
(47)
Note: Figures in parenlhescs are country's rank among members of the United Nations.
Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report (New York Oxford University Press. 
1992-20011
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Tabic 24.
Death Rate Caused by Homicide. Injury. Purposely Indicted by O ther Person and Other Violence 
(number of deaths per 100.000)________________________________________________
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bulgaria 3.6 4.0 5.2 6.7 6 3 7.7
C/.ech R. 6.0 6.9
Lithuania 11.2 12.7 13.0 15.3 17 19.5 18.2
Source: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 1996. 
765-854.
Table 25
Perceived Russian Threat to Security
(percentage of public)
1992 1995 1996 2000
Bulgaria 6 5
C/.ech R. 39 55
Lithuania 68 50
Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: llaerpfer. Wallace and Rose. 6: Rose. New Baltic Barometer If. 34: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 36. 
Table 26
Perceived German Threat to Security 
(percentage o f public)_____________
1992 1996 2000
Bulgaria 3 3
Czech R. 38 44
Lithuania 5
Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Hacrpfer. Wallace and Rose. 9: Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 32: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 36.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
Chapter VII summarizes the main findings of the dissertation. It joins two major 
debates—the sources o f security in Eastern Europe and the security o f small states.
The Three Case Studies
Bulgaria, like the other East European states, recognized early on the changing 
nature of threats and security. However, the political elite failed for most o f the 1990s to 
reach a consensus on the specific threats and policies to guarantee the nation's security. 
While there was no disagreement on what values to protect—including sovereignty, 
independence, and democratic practices, among others—the elite disagreed on the policies 
to lower the probability of damage to these values. In fact, Bulgaria is a good example o f 
the limited ability of the neorealist approaches to predict the country's behavior in its 
search for security as consecutive governing elites formulated different foreign policies in 
response to similar factors in a relatively stable international system. In other words, the 
country's foreign and security policies changed not in response to any significant changes 
in the international environment but rather in response to changes in internal politics.
The early period o f post-communist transition witnessed the power domination o f 
the former communist party and the inability of political elites to agree on the basic rules 
and principles of the political system. The lack of an encompassing political consensus 
and the dominance of old political elites forced Bulgaria to postpone a complete break 
from old security and foreign policy patterns. The country continued to perceive
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historical foes including Greece, Yugoslavia, and especially Turkey as the most likely 
and immediate threats to national security. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the 
end of firm external security commitments to Bulgaria's security faced the country with a 
dilemma: the post-communist transition required that the state increase its distance from 
Russia and improve relations with the West including Turkey and Greece, while the 
imperative of national security, according to the former communists, required that 
Bulgaria maintain good relations with Moscow and rely on the former ally for security.
During this period even the opposition, while seeking to bring Bulgaria closer to 
the West, did not object to the efforts of the ruling elite to seek a Russian security 
commitment to national security. The ruling elite was preoccupied with regional threats 
and danger and not surprisingly did not see any of the great European powers, including 
Russia, as a threat to the country. These perceptions were shared by the public as history 
conditioned the population to see neighbors as threats, while the great powers—however 
meddlesome in the international politics of the Balkans—had never directly occupied the 
country for long. Indeed, while in most other East European countries it was Germany or 
Russia, or both, which were seen as the past and potential imperial power, in Bulgaria it 
was Turkey that was seen as the past imperial ruler and a possible future danger. 
Accordingly, official Bulgarian security thinking continued to focus on a hard-core 
security threat—including to sovereignty and territorial integrity-em anating from 
traditional sources and at the same time relying on the traditional means to address these 
threats including maintaining, although in a less formalized form, tested alliances. 
Similarly, along with seeking a traditional external means to enhance security, the old 
elite resorted to traditional internal policies to guarantee security by maintaining a large 
military, sustaining the ability of the Bulgarian economy to increase the national military
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power, and policies designed to increase the ability of the government to mobilize the 
population to resist external threats.
Several developments, however, convinced the Bulgarian opposition to commit 
itself to firm, pro-NATO policies. The decision of the Alliance to maintain only the 
robust security institutions in Europe and continuing instability in the East, including 
Russia's inability to build democracy and implement reforms as well as M oscow’s return 
to more traditional realpolitik. exposed Bulgaria’s perilous security position in staying 
away from the process wherein post-communist states were already seeking a complete 
integration in the West, even at the expense of a complete break with the East. 
Concurrently, the UDF recognized that the already declared policy of integration in the 
European Community, a goal shared by all national political actors, was inconsistent with 
neutrality and staying out o f NATO. Furthermore, the opposition decided that the 
country's limited political, economic, and social capacities would inhibit any attempts to 
reform unless Bulgaria sought complete integration in all Euro-Atlantic institutions 
including NATO. In other words Bulgaria could achieve its main objectives including 
security, democracy, and free market only though full integration in the West.
Thus by the mid 1990s the dominant political players held different views on the 
country's security and the policies to ensure it. The Socialists continued to conceptualize 
Bulgaria's security conservatively, focusing on policies aimed at the internal mobilization 
of resources as a means to increase national power and relying on old alliance patterns to 
ensure external guarantees to security. The reliance on Russia forced Bulgaria’s Socialists 
to make sure that their policies of integration in the West were aimed at membership in 
the European Union but not in NATO. The ruling elite insisted that a membership in the 
Alliance would be considered only after its transformation into a European-wide security
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organization in which Russia was a member. This policy was not lost on the West and 
soon Bulgaria’s lack of reform and stability and its ambiguous integration strategy 
relegated the country to international isolation.1 At the end neither Bulgaria’s objective 
security nor the perception of security increased as the ruling elite and the public 
continued to see various intense threats to security, both internal and external. The 
country found itself dangerously exposed as the failure to achieve a substantial level 
integration in W estern institutions, similar to the one achieved by most other post­
communist countries in Eastern Europe, exacerbated the sense of isolation while 
revealing the inability of the country to achieve internal political and economic stability 
without those same institutions.
The failure o f the Socialists’ rule and the ascent to power of the UDF in 1997 
marked a watershed in Bulgaria’s security policies. The former opposition implemented 
very different foreign and security policies. W hile still considering the region as the main 
source of external dangers to national security, the new government embarked on a 
process of unambiguous integration in Western institutions including NATO as the 
means to achieve security. Neighboring states ceased to be seen as potential threats to 
national security in the traditional sense and instead the new elite defined various 
developments in the region as the sources of danger. Furthermore, the government began 
the implementation o f thorough economic and political reforms both as a policy to meet 
the requirements for membership in the Western institutions and as a means of building a 
stable political system and a market economy. In other words, the reforms were seen as 
both achieving integration in the West and consolidating domestic institutions. This 
policy adequately addressed the requirements o f the security conceptualization defined by
'Gareth Jones, “Close Russia Ties Push Bulgaria to Back of NATO Queue,” 
Reuters (10 April, 1996)
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the post-1997 rulers—international integration and domestic institutional consolidation 
were defined as the strategies to achieve security.
During the rule o f the UDF the Socialists still remained skeptical o f the 
government’s security policy and opposed, until at least early 2000, integration in NATO. 
This time, however, the Socialists’ opposition did not translate into an ambiguous 
national security policy as the BSP was relatively inconsequential as an opposition party 
and the other significant political parties supported the country’s integration in the 
Alliance. Therefore, Bulgaria was able to maintain the appearance of a security policy 
based on national consensus. In addition, the public became more committed to the 
process o f integration in NATO.
The policy of integration and reform paid off when new challenges to the 
country’s security emerged in the late 1990s. The Kosovo crisis, seen as a significant 
source o f threat to the state, prompted the Alliance to provide security guarantees, 
although short of formal commitments. The crisis also prompted the EU to invite 
Bulgaria to begin membership negotiations despite the country's obvious shortcomings, 
and further committed the Union to its stability. Bulgaria received further financial 
assistance, and visa restrictions on its citizens were eliminated. The Kosovo crisis and its 
aftermath marked the end of the country’s isolation and made its security and stability a 
matter of greater NATO and EU interest. Thus in the course of the UDF’s rule the 
external security of the country was enhanced. Internally, however, the weaknesses of the 
economy and the instability and ineffectiveness of domestic institutions—all factors with 
deep and long systemic shortcomings—remained significant sources of societal and 
individual threats to security.
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From a security point of view, the Czech Republic is the country with perhaps the 
best geopolitical position among the states in Eastern Europe. The only clear danger to its 
sovereignty, the presence of Soviet troops, was addressed quickly and without political 
struggle in the first year of transition. Surrounded by states seeking to completely 
integrate the region in the West, the Republic boasted the most stable political system and 
the most advanced economy, making it the best-suited candidate for membership in 
Western institutions.
The Czech reformers were able to steer the Republic into a quick transition to 
post-communist politics without having to contend with old elites. The new elites were 
able to reach a consensus on the nature and direction o f all major reforms, including on 
foreign and security policies. The basic rules of the political game and the structure of the 
political system were swiftly established and did not at any point become a matter of 
political contention. The basic policies o f democratization and marketization were widely 
accepted by political parties and the public. Similarly, the early governm ent's security 
and foreign policies were even less contentious as the benign security environment and 
the lack of public interest made the formulation of policies non-political and pragmatic.
In the early phase of the transition the governing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus defined 
integration in the West as the main the foreign policy priority. Accordingly, the Republic 
sought quick membership in EU, although it was less than insistent on NATO 
membership until the Alliance declared its policy of enlargement. The opposition parties 
found this objective and the policies to achieve it uncontroversial, and for most of the 
1990s foreign policy was not a political issue in domestic politics.
The political elites also achieved a wide-ranging consensus on the structure of the 
political system and the nature of the political, economic, and social reforms. Having met
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no opposition from the old communist elite, the reforms were able to build a political 
regime that satisfied the interests and preferences o f the significant political actors. The 
government of Vaclav Klaus was not only able to implement the reforms but also to meet 
the economic and social expectations o f the public. Although the public understanding of 
security was increasingly associated with internal threats and risks and focused on 
economic and social factors, the government, at least until 1996. was able to address 
these concerns. Even the economic crisis after 1996 did not challenge the process of 
institutional consolidation and integration in the West. Although the economy stagnated 
the population did not experience the economic and social pain inflicted by similar 
developments in the rest o f Eastern Europe. Thus neither the public nor any significant 
political force challenged the stability o f the political regime and the country's foreign 
policy. The electorate simply booted Vaclav K laus’ government and elected the Social 
Democrats to power. By relying on Klaus’ party to rule, the minority government o f 
Milos Zeman in effect continued its predecessor’s policies although at a different pace. 
The slow-down of reforms did not threaten the Republic’s integration in the West.
The success of reforms and the stability o f  the Czech Republic made it a front- 
runner for membership in both the EU and NATO. Not surprisingly, the Republic was 
invited to begin negotiations to join the Union and became along with Poland and 
Hungary the first East European state to join NATO. The gradual integration in the West 
eased perception of risks and threats on official and public levels. Experts ceased to see 
any of the neighboring states as presenting any threat to national security. Most o f the 
potential risks and threats were seen emanating from the former Soviet Union and the 
Balkans. Not surprisingly, instabilities in these regions only increased the determination 
o f the political elite to seek quick integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Gradually,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
287
however, there emerged a recognition that the regions o f instability were relatively 
distant and did not present direct threats to the national security. Instead, as the Czech 
Republic was becoming further integrated in the West, any potential threats emerging 
from the regions of instability were seen as affecting the Euro-Atlantic area rather than 
individual states. In other words, experts saw the Republic as joining an area in which 
security is indivisible.
The public, too, gradually relaxed its perceptions of external threats. Although 
Russia continued to be seen as the greatest probable threat to national security, when 
asked whether there were any military threats to national security the overwhelming 
majority of the public by late 1990s believed that there were none. Even the Balkans, a 
region which experts tended to identify as a potential source o f threats and risks, 
gradually ceased to be seen by the public as a security danger, regardless of the 
continuing violence in the area. While external security issues did not attract public 
attention the population was much more concerned with the domestic dimension of 
security. Yet even societal and individual security concerns were tempered by the 
political and economic stability of the Czech transition. The extension of political and 
civil liberties and freedoms accompanied by the continued growth of living standards 
guaranteed that the majority of the public would gain a sense of security quite unique 
among the societies in Eastern Europe.
O f the three countries in this study, Lithuania experienced the most intense threat 
to its national security in the early phase of post-communist transition. Unlike in 
Bulgaria, however, the political elite reached a consensus on how to address the threat to 
national sovereignty even before the Republic formally seceded from the Soviet Union.
In fact the intensity o f external threats played a positive role in the early years of
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Lithuania’s independence as it forced all significant political players to work together and 
craft basic rules o f the political game so they were accepted by all. The two main political 
parties saw the stability of domestic institutions as a guarantee against the Soviet 
encroachment.
Sajudis and the former communists reached an agreement on the basic political 
institutional structure and the means to sustain national independence, including the 
withdrawal o f Soviet and later Russian troops. Even as the political elite reached a basic 
consensus on the most important issues in the post-communist transition, there emerged 
some disagreement that clearly marked the future divisions among political parties. While 
Sajudis insisted on an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow, a clear 
break with the East and quick integration in the West, the former communists argued a 
more conciliatory approach towards Moscow and balanced relations with both the East 
and the West. Ironically it was the former communists who reached an agreement with 
Moscow and the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania and also restored 
economic stability after the chaotic and economically disastrous rule of Sajudis.
The Labor Democrats' rule brought about not only some economic and political 
stability but also enhanced national security by achieving the withdrawal of Russian 
troops and setting the course for integration in the West, including the EU and NATO. 
Lithuania became an associated member of the EU and a PfP partner. The country also 
denied Russia the ability to interfere in its domestic affairs by granting all ethnic Russians 
on its territory automatic citizenship and ensuring their political participation. Lithuania 
also felt safe enough to develop a normal relationship with M oscow both as an attempt to 
cultivate acceptance of Lithuania's independence Russia and as a response to the EU and 
NATO's requirements to maintain good relations with its neighbors. In fact, Lithuania's
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policies of integration in the W est by requirement included the cultivation of 
relationships with neighbors, which in the past presented-and some still do~security 
threats and risks. Thus the very process of seeking membership in the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions enhanced Lithuania’s security as the country had to sort out historically 
burdened relations and apply confidence-building policies. For example, Poland quickly 
turned from an old foe suspected of seeking to incorporate parts o f Lithuania’s territory 
into a partner and ally in the process of joining NATO and the EU.2
Lithuania’s relatively tenuous security position and limited power forced the 
country to seek a cooperative approach to enhancing its security. Given the internal 
consensus on security and foreign policy, the country was able to sustain a cohesive 
strategy of seeking the formalized assistance of various states and organizations in order 
to increase not only its internal power but also its ability to utilize the power of various 
international institutions. The early political cooperation and coordination among the 
three Baltic states was institutionalized and, although differences in geopolitics and 
reform progress soon strained commitment to cooperation, enabled Lithuania to utilize 
capacities provided by international institutions to support this process in the Baltic 
region.
The Baltic states were able to attract the political and economic commitments of 
Western states and institutions. Even in the security realm, the three states were able to 
commit the U.S. to increase its interest in the maintenance of peace and stability o f the 
region by signing the Baltic Chapter. Although short of a formal security commitment, 
the Chapter represented an elevated degree o f Baltic integration in the Western arena.
2Parts o f present-day Lithuania used to be part of Poland in the interwar period. 
After the Second World W ar the Soviet Union acquired Polish territory as part o f the 
post-war settlement.
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While maintaining its cooperation with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania also pursued 
bilateral policies to increase its power and to achieve speedy integration in the West by 
seeking close relations with states with interests in the region including Poland and 
Denmark.
After the initial steep decline in economic activity, Lithuania was able to 
implement market reforms and achieve a stable and rapid economic growth. The creation 
of a currency board severely limited the ability of governments to apply economic 
policies that would potentially lead once again to inflation and unrestrained public 
spending. In fact, the currency board regime and the application of the EU requirements 
for membership inhibited any political tendency to select policies that would have 
destabilized the Lithuanian economy. The economic stability and growth soon helped 
reverse the trend of falling living standards, and the basic indicators of life quality began 
to improve.
The intense threat to Lithuania’s security in the early transition years also 
dampened public dissatisfaction inflicted by the break with the Soviet Union. Once there 
emerged a public belief in the country’s basic parameters of independence and 
sovereignty, the population became willing to accept a more moderate and gradual 
approach to strengthening the country’s power and security. The public increasingly 
became more confident in Lithuania’s ability to withstand external threats and instead 
focused on the domestic sources o f threats and risks to security. Security came to be 
associated with personal and societal security. The heightened sense o f insecurity 
prompted by the initial pain of reforms did not, however, translate into political 
instability as the institutional design proved efficient; the voters or the parliament were 
able to follow constitutionally prescribed paths for political changes and avoiding any
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challenges to the established institutional order. In other words, economic and social 
disenchantment did not translate into political instability as political and state institutions 
proved capable of channeling political participation and mobilization.
The Study o f  Security o f  the Small States in Eastern Europe
The changing structure o f the international security system  after the end o f the 
Cold W ar has significantly increased the opportunity of small Eastern European states to 
operate autonomously in pursuit of their preferences. Although great powers still define 
the nature of the international system, post-communist states are able to select from 
among diverse policies. Serious dangers are created, however, where these small states 
face severe military and economic threats emanating from regional rivalries, hostile 
ethnic groups, or declining economic development. The transition countries of Eastern 
Europe face even more complex challenges as along with providing for their national 
security after the disintegration of long-lasting security arrangements they embarked on a 
difficult process of fundamental political, economic, and social reforms.
Most of the literature on East European security is based on the traditional 
neorealist paradigm. Accordingly, the international security o f  the area is seen in the 
context of the security vacuum left by the end o f the Cold W ar, and the national security 
of individual states as the search of new alliance arrangements to guarantee the national 
sovereignty and independence. More specifically, NATO is seen as the means to address 
the problem of the existing security vacuum and provide a security framework capable of 
facing any outside threat and rendering conflicts among mem ber states highly unlikely.
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Realists differ among themselves as to how much explanatory power is to be 
attributed to the international system .3 For neorealists, the system is a material structure, 
which functions as a significant independent variable influencing the states that are part 
o f this system. However, according to traditional realists, including Wolfers, Morgenthau 
and Kissinger, what is also very significant is the nature of the state; there is a difference 
between imperialist, revolutionary and revisionist states which seek to alter the nature of 
the international system on the one hand, and status-quo states, which seek to preserve 
the international system and their places in it on the other. Another group, the so-called 
modified structural realists, while accepting the insights of neorealism, attempts to 
incorporate international institutions and domestic factors as explanatory factors of state 
behavior.4
A modified realist approach, concentrating on the behavior of individual states 
and incorporating internal and external variables into the analysis, can provide insights on 
the international behavior of small states of Eastern Europe.3 Deborah Larson suggests 
that the dominant elite of a weak state seeking external allies may not necessarily act out
’Fora short discussion see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International 
Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Global ism, and Beyond (Boston; Allyn and Bacon. 
1999). 82-84.
4For a review of the modified structural realism see Randall L. Schweller and 
David Priess, “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutional Debate,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 41, supplement 1 (May 1997): 1-32.
3Within the realist body o f literature, the emerging trend is known as neoclassical
realism. For a discussion of neoclassical realism see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism 
and Theories o f Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144-72. For 
good examples o f neoclassical realism see Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: 
Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); W illiam C. W ohlforth, The Elusive 
Balance: Power and Perception during the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins o f  America’s World 
Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
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of concern for the territorial integrity of the state, but rather seek its own political 
survival.6 Alignment with an external hegemon may help a weak regime by eliminating 
external threats and providing political and economic assistance, thus enhancing the 
dominant elite’s domestic legitimacy. Analyzing the international behavior of Third 
World countries, Steven David argues that the elites of weak regimes are willing to 
accommodate secondary external threats and concentrate on battling primary domestic 
threats.7 In other words, elites seek external resources to deal with internal threats.8 O f 
course, one may correctly argue that the experience o f Third World countries in creating 
alliances provides no valuable insights into the foreign policy formation of East European 
states, especially the ones in which there are relatively stable and legitimate political and 
state institutions and a high consensus on the domestic and foreign policy objectives 
among the elites. However, this approach reveals that the formation o f alliances is not a 
simple function of the presence o f external threats, but is also linked to the domestic 
objectives of national elites. It is also linked to the political, social, and economic 
constraints on the elites' ability to mobilize internal resources needed to ensure the 
territorial integrity of the state and their own political survival. In an attempt to illuminate
6Deborah Welsh Larson. "Bandwagon Image in American Foreign Policy: Myth 
or Reality,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds.. Dominoes and Bandwagons:
Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991).
7Steven R. David. "Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43. no. 2 
(January 1991): 233-56: See also Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and 
Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1991).
8In a study o f Egypt's foreign policy, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy reach 
similar conclusions by pointing out that domestic threats to the ruling elite shaped its 
decision to ensure its survival by concluding external alliances. Mark Bamett and Jack 
Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73." 
International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369-95.
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domestic factors in the states' international behavior, Randall Schweller goes even further 
by insisting that the most important determinant o f alignment is the compatibilities of 
political goals, rather than the distributions of power or threats.'*
Some authors go even further and call for a synthesis combining elements of 
realism and pluralism. Robert Keohane and John Ruggie, among others, propose that 
analysis must begin with the realist focus on power and the state which provide the 
context to understand the actions and behavior of actors and political structures.10
The scarce literature on security in Eastern Europe, applying mostly realist 
approaches, fails to incorporate insights provided by the modified approaches to the study 
o f state behavior. Thus the traditional approaches provide limited understanding o f  East 
European security as it still conceptualizes security in the traditional terms as freedom 
from threats to the sovereignty and independence of the states. The post-communist states 
and societies, however, defined security in more complex, inclusive terms. In addition, 
policies designed to attain what the states consider to be national security were based not 
simply on the possibilities and limitations posed by the international environment but also 
by domestic processes. In other words, it is domestic actors involved in domestic 
processes who make the assessment o f the international context and the choices necessary
yRandall L. Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back in,” InternationaI Security 19, no. 1 (January 1994), 105; See also Randal L. 
Scheweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and H itler's Strategy o f World Conquest 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
l0John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: 
Toward Neorealist Synthesis.” World Politics 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-85; Robert 
O. Keohane, “T heory  of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Ada W. 
Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State o f  the Discipline (Washington, DC: American 
Political Science Association, 1983); See also Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984).
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for national security. Therefore, the traditional approach to the study of East European 
security does not systematically account for the differences in paths taken by the post­
communist states in search of security. The actual paths were determined by what 
individual ruling elites and societies understood to be national security, what they saw as 
threats to this value, and the process of formulating o f the proper policy responses. Thus 
although the three states analyzed in this dissertation operated in the same international 
environment and, from a realist perspective, had similar positions in the international 
system, domestic politics determined variations in preferences and choices and 
consequently variations in outcomes.
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